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<title>FTC Spyware Workshop: 1st Impressions in Security</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/r10018653</link>
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<pubDate>Sun, 29 Nov 2009 13:17:48 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: FTC Spyware Workshop: 1st Impressions</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,10387374</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/1016651"><b>urankjj</b></A> : spyware on my pc is certanly the begining of the end of my on-line purchasing, you can `count^ on it.]]></description>
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<pubDate>Mon, 31 May 2004 19:30:41 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: FTC Spyware Workshop: 1st Impressions</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,10350451</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/378696"><b>eburger68</b></A> : Hi All:<br><br>At the end of my review of Panel 4 of the FTC's Spyware Workshop, I looked forward to the release of the official transcript of the workshop's sessions and noted that:<br><br> <BLOCKQUOTE><SMALL>said by Eric L. Howes:</SMALL><HR>I am already anticipating that the transcript will underscore the wiliness of human memory, and I will be happy to make corrections and emendations to these posted remarks where my own memory of the workshop has proved to be less than completely reliable.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE><br><br>Having now looked over the entire transcript, I see that I was not wrong in thinking that I would have some corrections to make. Thus, I want to call attention to claims I made about the workshop, its participants, and what was said that were either wrong or not entirely correct. I'll also offer a run-down of the claims that I made that were correct and provide pointers to the appropriate pages from the transcipt where you can find the discussions I was referring to.<br><br>Note: the official transcript of the Spyware Workshop can be downloaded from the FTC's site here:<br><br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/spyware/transcript.pdf" >www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/spywar&middot;&middot;&middot;ript.pdf</A><br><br>The transcript is 298 pages long and lacks bookmarks or hyperlinks. For a more navigable, easy-to-use version of the transcript with bookmarks, use this version:<br><br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/transcript-idx.pdf" >www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/trans&middot;&middot;&middot;-idx.pdf</A><br><br>**What I Got Wrong...**<br><br>First, the errors that I made. <br><br>In my review of Panel 1, I complained about the performance of Ari Schwartz of the Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT). I wrote:<br><br> <BLOCKQUOTE><SMALL>said by Eric L. Howes:</SMALL><HR>Indeed, that pretty much sums up this panel: instead of working to protect consumers, this panel was more interested in protecting themselves. And to its great shame and discredit, the Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT) did almost nothing to challenge that agenda (more on the CDT in a bit). <HR></BLOCKQUOTE><br><br>Having reviewed the transcript of Panel 1, I now must admit that my characterization of the CDT's performance was not entirely fair. Late in the discussion of Panel 1, Ari Schwartz noted that the spyware vs. adware distinction urged by all the other panelists had problems (pp. 38-39):<br><br> <BLOCKQUOTE><SMALL>said by Ari Schwartz:</SMALL><HR>MR. SCHWARTZ: I do think that there's a reason that Adware has gotten a bad name. And a lot of it has to do with the fact that some companies have basically decided that they will do anything they possibly can to get their software onto the user's computer, and that they don't really -- and we found that a lot of those are Adware companies. (...)<br><br>And so therefore, when Marty says, you know, there's no overlap between Adware and Spyware, I don't think that that's true. There is certainly companies that are engaging in bad practices. It's not Adware itself that makes it a bad practice, but we have seen -- Adware companies seem to push the lines by using these affiliate kind of programs in order to make it happen. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE><br><br>Still later, after listening to Avi Naider's response to a question about PC Pitstop's findings that over 80 percent of users were not aware of the software on their systems, Mr. Schwartz summarized the problems with software bundling and concluded (pp. 55-56):<br><br> <BLOCKQUOTE><SMALL>said by Ari Schwartz:</SMALL><HR>MR. SCHWARTZ: We haven't done our own research on this yet, but, I mean, anything in the 80 percent sounds very high. If it's really that high, there is a major problem.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE><br><br>Now, I wish that Mr. Schwartz had taken a stronger, more unambiguous stance on the question of adware vs. spyware and simply rejected the definitional distinction outright, as several participants on other panels did (see Bryson Gordon's rejection of this distinction on p. 85; see also the discussion on pp. 97-102 of the connection between adware/spyware and traditional malware, Austin Hill's discussion of consumer confusion with adware on p. 106, Ray Everett-Church's questioning of the privacy claims of adware on pp. 120-121, and Steve Urquhart's characterization of adware "victims" on p. 270). And I still have strong reservations about the CDT's work with the Consumer Software Working Group, the CDT's advocacy of P3P-like self-regulatory measures, and its enthusiasm for "industry self-regulation" more generally. But the CDT did not completely cave in the industry representatives on Panel 1, who were all too eager to exempt their software from the discussion of spyware, and I am happy to note that here.<br><br>In my review of Panel 4 I decried one of the statements made by a panelist about the "flexibility" of "best practices" and "industry self-regulation":<br><br> <BLOCKQUOTE><SMALL>said by Eric L. Howes:</SMALL><HR>Indeed, one of the industry reps on the panel remarked that "best practices" would necessarily have to be pluralistic and flexible -- that there could be no single set of "best practices" because we couldn't impose inflexible solutions on corporations. That kind of talk should leave no doubt in anyone's mind that "best practices" are simply not intended to set high standards for corporate behavior, but rather to allow corporations to make them into whatever happens to be convenient.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE><br><br>To my embarrassment, no such comment exists in the transcript of Panel 4, though Panel 4 does include a discussion about preventing any single company from monopolizing the establishment of "best practices" and using them for competitive advantage (see pp. 192-194). Rather, the comment I was thinking of comes from Daniel Weitzner on Panel 5 (pp. 235-236):<br><br> <BLOCKQUOTE><SMALL>said by Daniel Weitzner:</SMALL><HR>MR. WEITZNER: I'm going to just make one suggestion. I think that best practices are great if they describe a set of practices among which application writers and users can choose.<br><br>I think that it would be unfortunate even if a diverse group, an open group, got together and said here are the things we'll allow; here are the things we won't allow. And I don't think you're suggesting that, Jeffrey, but just to be clear. Best practices doesn't mean a single list of the good things and the bad things.<br><br>Best practices I think means doing the sort of thing that the now much-mentioned CDT report -- it should have been on Amazon. It would have done really well today -- would identify a set of problematic behaviors and could identify a set of other behaviors and then let people make choices.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> <br><br>I made a similar error in my review of Panel 5, where I discussed a portable ActiveX-based security scanner that I thought had been announced by David Moll of Webroot:<br><br> <BLOCKQUOTE><SMALL>said by Eric L. Howes:</SMALL><HR>Moll went on to describe a portable security scanner that Webroot has developed. It's an ActiveX control that users can download and run while on potentially insecure machines (a PC in an Internet cafe, for example). This portable security application scans the entire box for malicious code (keyloggers, system monitors, trojans, etc). Moll billed it as a way for users ensure that boxes they don't control are secure.<br><HR></BLOCKQUOTE><br><br>In fact, that portable security scanner is being developed by X-Block, not Webroot, and was described by Wayne Porter of SpywareGuide.com -- see pp. 216-217 for Porter's discussion of the X-Block portable security scanner.<br><br>Finally, in my review of Panel 6 I incorrectly attributed a claim about there being no need for new legislation to cover spyware to Elizabeth Prostic, formerly of the Dept. of Commerce:<br><br> <BLOCKQUOTE><SMALL>said by Eric L. Howes:</SMALL><HR>Unfortunately, three members of Panel 6 rejected calls for new legislation to address these inadequate installation practices, insisting that current law is adequate to the task of addressing spyware problems. Mark Eckenwiler of the Department of Justice, Mary Engle of the Federal Trade Commission, and Elizabeth Prostic of the Department of Commerce all disputed the need for new legislation and claimed that U.S. regulatory agencies have sufficient authority and leeway under current law to go after spyware vendors. Each was asked the same question: "Do you think new laws are needed to address the spyware problem?" Each looked straight at the audience and said clearly and firmly, "No."<HR></BLOCKQUOTE><br><br>In fact, only Mr. Eckenwiler of the DOJ and Ms. Engle of the FTC were asked that question, and both gave the answer I described (see p. 261 for Mr. Eckenwiler's answer and pp. 262-263 for Ms. Engle's answer). Ms. Prostic was likely not asked the question because, as was noted at the start of the discussion on Panel 6 (see p. 255), Ms. Prostic had left the Dept. of Commerce 4 days earlier for a private law practice.<br><br>Finally, when discussing the problem of enforcing existing laws with advertising software vendors who use EULAs, I wrote:<br><br> <BLOCKQUOTE><SMALL>said by Eric L. Howes:</SMALL><HR>The key question is whether the FTC, under current laws against "unfair" and "deceptive" trade practices, will be able to reign in the advertising software industry, which by and large does present users with EULAs. Even a month now after the Spyware Workshop we have heard nothing whatsoever from the FTC to indicate: a) whether it thinks it can pursue enforcement action under current law against companies that use EULAs and other inadequate forms of notice and disclosure; or b) under what criteria and in what situations it thinks it could go after such companies. Although current law does allow the FTC to go after companies for "unfair" and "deceptive" trade practices, the presence of a EULA such as that used by WhenU, Gator, and C2 Media during installation enormously complicates the picture, casting doubt on the ability of the FTC to address the widespread problems with advertising software.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE><br><br>While it is true, strictly speaking, that the FTC has not offered specific comments on the application of existing law to these "difficult" cases in which inadequate notice and disclosure is provided, Mary Engle of the FTC did address the issue (pp. 291-292):<br><br> <BLOCKQUOTE><SMALL>said by Mary Engle:</SMALL><HR>MS. ENGLE: And can I just follow up on that from -- from our perspective. The FTC law is pretty clear that, if you're going to give notice to consumers of something, it has to be clear and conspicuous, and we have actually issued a long -- you know, several years ago now, guidance to the online community called "Dot Com Disclosure," that gives you a pretty good understanding of how to make disclosures clear and conspicuous to consumers, and that includes things like, if they've got to click on a button to find out the information, that the button has to be clearly labeled, and also, labeled with the import, so that they know why they should be clicking, not -- not just click here for more info, or something like that. So, from our perspective, just because some term is buried in a four-page ULA doesn't mean that consumers have necessarily given their consent to it. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> <br><br>The "Dot Com Disclosures" document that she refers to can be found here:<br><br>Dot Com Disclosures: Information About Online Advertising<br>HTML: &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/buspubs/dotcom/" >www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/buspubs/dotcom/</A> <br>PDF: &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/buspubs/dotcom/index.pdf" >www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/bus&middot;&middot;&middot;ndex.pdf</A><br><br>That document was the product of another workshop that the FTC conducted back in 2000:<br><br>Rules and Guides: Electronic Media Issues<br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/rulemaking/elecmedia/index.htm" >www.ftc.gov/bcp/rulemaking/elecm&middot;&middot;&middot;ndex.htm</A><br><br>Just before Engle's remarks, however, Mark Eckenwiler of the DOJ seemed a bit more skeptical of using existing law with these kinds of cases (pp. 290-291):<br><br> <BLOCKQUOTE><SMALL>said by Mark Eckenwiler:</SMALL><HR>MR. ECKENWILER: I think the point is well taken that, if we were to try to charge somebody with, you know, a Computer Fraud and Abuse Act violation for putting up -- you know, one of these "Do you want to accept this" screens that's, you know, 25 pages long in six-point type, in a very narrow column, totally unreadable, it's not the most attractive circumstance for us to bring a criminal prosecution, remembering that we actually have a Constitutional burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that, as I said before, this was under 1030, without or in excess of authorization.<br><br>I think the first line of defense in such a case is going to be that the defendant was, in fact, acting within the scope of authorization, and that becomes a kind of ugly jury question. If we're going to pick and choose cases to prosecute, I think we are more likely to take cases like the Jon case, or this newly- indicted case, the Ropp case, where there just -- there's no argument that that was -- there was never any constructive notice. Never even any attempt at notice. This was, you know, purely a -- a clandestine installation. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> <br><br>Those interested in notice and disclosure issues should see the following documents on the FTC's web site:<br><br>FTC Policy Statement Regarding Advertising Substantiation <br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/guides/ad3subst.htm" >www.ftc.gov/bcp/guides/ad3subst.htm</A><br><br>FTC Policy Statement On Deception <br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-decept.htm" >www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-decept.htm</A><br><br>FTC Policy Statement On Unfairness <br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-unfair.htm" >www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-unfair.htm</A><br><br>So far as I can tell, that is the extent of the outright errors that I made in my review of the six panels at the FTC's Spyware Workshop.<br><br>**What I Got Right...**<br><br>Throughout my reviews of those six panels I described or summarized a number of comments made by panelists. In the space that remains, I want to provide pointers to the comments I was referring to in the transcript of the workshop.<br><br>In my original post about the workshop, I noted:<br><br> <BLOCKQUOTE><SMALL>said by Eric L. Howes:</SMALL><HR>Panel 1 (definitions of spyware/adware) was as bad as I expected it to be. Dominated by industry representatives or those friendly to the industry, the panel came to a consensus very early (and even noted that they were all essentially in agreement). <HR></BLOCKQUOTE><br><br>Indeed, Avi Naider of WhenU noted early in the discussion (p. 21):<br><br> <BLOCKQUOTE><SMALL>said by Avi Naider:</SMALL><HR>MR. NAIDER: And speaking for WhenU, I can say that we're quite pleased that there's unanimity on this on the panel in the sense that we're also a member of this working group. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> <br><br>Still later in the original post, I described Mr. Naider's claim that the number of uninstallations of WhenU's software indicated that users were being given adequate notice and choice:<br><br> <BLOCKQUOTE><SMALL>said by Eric L. Howes:</SMALL><HR>Avi Naider from WhenU pursued exactly this line, claiming that most WhenU users were quite aware of the installed software on their computers. In a somewhat bizarre move, Naider attempted to back this claim up by pointing out that of roughly 100 million WhenU installations, 80 million had been uninstalled. He claimed that the fact that users had uninstalled WhenU demonstrated that they were aware of the installations. There are all kinds of problems with this argument, which I won't bother to cover here.<br><br>Suffice it to say it was at that moment that Rob Cheng and Dave Methvin of PC Pitstop (the outfit sued by Gator/Claria last fall, by the way) began distributing their new survey of WhenU users that tells quite another story: over 80% of WhenU users are NOT even aware that the software is installed on their computers.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE><br><br>Here is Mr. Naider's reasoning (pp. 53-54):<br><br> <BLOCKQUOTE><SMALL>said by Avi Naider:</SMALL><HR>MR. NAIDER: I'm not sure that the PC Pitstop refers to WhenU specifically. I haven't seen that information. But just answering the question in general, there are certainly software applications out there that are not installed with user consent. We would agree to it. Very specifically, it's all in how you do it. (...)<br><br>And what I can say very specifically is in the case of WhenU, we've done over 100 million unique installations of our software. Eighty million consumers have removed it.<br><br>Now, what does that tell you? What it tells you is that we still have to make sure that the software that we bundle with is better and better value for consumers, because not all consumers want to see advertising supported by software if they don't value the software highly enough.<br><br>But what it tells you is that 80 million people can remove it. Clearly, 80 million people means that you have a mass market audience that makes a choice and makes a decision, and consents both upon the installation and consents on an ongoing basis to the software. And by that definition, if you adhere to standards, it's a very consent-driven type of model.  <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> <br><br>Still further, I called attention to Chris Jay Hoofnagle's discussion of Ben Edelman's finding that WhenU may have violated its privacy policy:<br><br> <BLOCKQUOTE><SMALL>said by Eric L. Howes:</SMALL><HR>The low point for WhenU must have come during Panel 3, when Chris Jay Hoofnagle from the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC.org) pointed out that Ben Edelman's research, which reported the results of some extremely clever and tenacious packet sniffing, raised the prospect that WhenU was violating its own privacy policy by collecting and transmitting certain personally sensitive data. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE><br><br>You can find Mr. Hoofnagle's discussion of Ben Edelman's research on pp. 151-152.<br><br>Also in my original post, I noted that one of my questions was put to Panel 4:<br><br> <BLOCKQUOTE><SMALL>said by Eric L. Howes:</SMALL><HR>Audience members (including this author) were allowed to put questions to the panelists, but we had to do so via question cards submitted to an FTC employee for vetting. Of the five questions I submitted over the course of the day, one was accepted and read to one of the panels. (I asked how panelists could place such faith in consumer education when 10 plus years of education on viruses and antivirus software has been a demonstrable failure. None of the panelists addressed the question square-on.) Some of the other anti-spyware folks got some of their own questions accepted as well, though the answers they received were often less than responsive. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE><br><br>You can find Panel 4's response to that question on pp. 194-198.<br><br>Panel 1<br><br>While reviewing Panel 1's sorry performance, I denounced the agendas being pursued by several of the panelists:<br><br> <BLOCKQUOTE><SMALL>said by Eric L. Howes:</SMALL><HR>A few of the panelists were quite open about what they were attempting to do, stating flatly that "adware is simply different than spyware, and people have got to understand that" -- as if they alone could establish the difference through some sort of declarative fiat without the input or suggestions of others. This was but one of several moments during the day when the arrogant, obstructionist, anti-consumer agendas of those represented on various panels were nakedly on display and visible to all who cared to look. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE><br><br>To understand what I was reacting to, see the comment from Marty Lafferty on pp. 33-34:<br><br> <BLOCKQUOTE><SMALL>said by Marty Lafferty:</SMALL><HR>MR. LAFFERTY: And I'll just add that there is no overlap between Adware and Spyware. They're mutually exclusive. Adware is presumptively legitimate. It's a terrific business model for providing valuable software to consumers at no cost in exchange for accepting some advertising. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> <br><br>Other panelists made similar claims. I called attention to Avi Naider's similar comments:<br><br> <BLOCKQUOTE><SMALL>said by Eric L. Howes:</SMALL><HR>One of those commercial interests was WhenU.com, represented by its chief executive Avi Naider, who insisted at one point that the word spyware "was never meant to include software-based advertising...It's pro-consumer; it's pro-competition; it's pro-competitive. (It's) one of the most promising technologies that exists on the Internet today." <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> <br><br>Mr. Naider's full comments appear on pp. 32-33:<br><br> <BLOCKQUOTE><SMALL>said by Avi Naider:</SMALL><HR>MR. NAIDER: Spyware was never meant to include software-based advertising, which is what legitimate Adware is. And very specifically, it's software on a consumer's computer that has been installed at the consent of the computer -- of the consumer, makes it very clear to the consumer what it's doing, can be removed easily by the consumer, and effectively gives the consumer potentially relevant valuable information. Specifically, as the consumer traverses the web, software-based advertising can deliver things like retail coupons. (...)<br><br>So in theory, the concept of Adware or software-based advertising is extremely pro-consumer. It's pro-competition. It's pro-competitive. And if done with proper notification, consent, and the consumer's ultimate control over the computer, which is the key point -- and I think Ari said it before -- the consumer has to understand that they have this type of software, has to have the ability to remove the software, has to be made clear when the software is generating coupons and ads. In that case, you have a very legitimate, a very promising technology that actually promises to reduce prices for consumers and to make the Internet a more competitive place. (...)<br><br>But it's very important to understand that legitimate software-based advertising, not only is it very clearly not within the definition of Spyware, but it's actually one of the most promising technologies that exists on the Internet today. And if allowed to evolve, it will make the Internet a very, very exciting place over the next decade. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE><br><br>Later in my review of Panel 1, I described how several of the panelists claimed that there would be collateral damage from the Utah anti-spyware bill because of the overbroadness of its definition of spyware. For that discussion, see pp. 23-27 of the transcript.<br><br>One of the other common objections to anti-spyware legislation is the requirement for an uninstallation method. I noted:<br><br> <BLOCKQUOTE><SMALL>said by Eric L. Howes:</SMALL><HR>The Utah bill's requirement of an uninstallation method provoked still more comments from one of the panelists, who warned users to "be careful what you ask for." <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> <br><br>The comment I described angered many people, including Mike Healan of SpywareInfo, who wrote that he "wanted to rise up out of my chair at that rubbish" ( &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.spywareinfo.com/newsletter/archives/0404/24.php" >www.spywareinfo.com/newsletter/a&middot;&middot;&middot;4/24.php</A> ). Here is Mark Bohannon's actual comment (pp. 58-59):<br><br> <BLOCKQUOTE><SMALL>said by Mark Bohannon:</SMALL><HR>MR. BOHANNON: Ironically, if you give across-the-board ability to uninstall, we have got to have a very strong caveat emptor. Because many things are put in place to insure the continued functionality of software, and that the ability of a consumer -- and because I believe this issue is about more than consumers, but also about business users uninstalling. Just be careful what you're asking for here, because you could, in fact, lead to greater frustration, less security, less ability to manage your personally-identifiable information if it is, in fact, a categorical right to uninstall. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> <br><br>Panel 2<br><br>Moving on to Panel 2, readers will be interested in taking a look at both the comments from some of these panelists as well as their presentations, which are available in PDF format.<br><br>* Maureen Cushman, Dell: Comments, pp. 69-72.<br><br>* Bryson Gordon, McAfee: Comments, pp. 72-76; Presentation ( &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/spyware/gordon.pdf" >www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/spyware/gordon.pdf</A> ).<br><br>* Austin Hill, Zero Knowledge: Comments, pp. 96-97.<br><br>In my review of Panel 2 I also called attention to several other comments from panelists:<br><br>* Roger Thompson on the number of new additions to Pest Patrol's database: see p. 76<br><br>* Roger Thompson on impact of spyware boot times: see p. 78.<br><br>* John Gilroy on consumer difficulties with spyware: see pp. 78-80. <br><br>And, as I also noted, Commission Swindle's videotaped remarks were shown to us just before the start of Panel 2 -- see pp. 62-67 of the transcript and &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/spyware/remarks_swindle.pdf" >www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/spywar&middot;&middot;&middot;ndle.pdf</A> for a separate copy.<br><br>Panel 3<br><br>As I remarked in my review of Panel 3, the discussion on this panel was at times a bit dry and abstract. Nonetheless, there were a few noteworthy moments.<br><br>Chris Jay Hoofnagle's contributions were esp. useful, as I noted:<br><br> <BLOCKQUOTE><SMALL>said by Eric L. Howes:</SMALL><HR>Chris Jay Hoofnagle of the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC.org) did manage to bring the discussion around to several useful points, though. First, Hoofnagle was the only panelist at the entire workshop to point the finger at Microsoft for providing the technological means for advertising software vendors to confuse and bamboozle users, install software without their full knowledge and understanding or meaningful consent, and hijack their browsers and PCs. Hoofnagle rightly noted that Microsoft's overly powerful ActiveX technology -- with its integration of mobile code straight into the operating system as well as the confusing manner in which ActiveX controls are installed through Internet Explorer -- opens too many doors for advertising software vendors to walk through and puts users on the defensive.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> <br><br>Mr. Hoofnagle's actual comments on Microsoft (p. 130):<br><br> <BLOCKQUOTE><SMALL>said by Chris Jay Hoofnagle:</SMALL><HR>MR. HOOFNAGLE: One, I think it's hard to look at this issue without looking at Microsoft. I think it's probably too easy to write to the critical areas of the registry that allow programs to start at boot. Similarly, it's too easy and there is not enough user understanding of the start up folders, which trigger software that you might not want to run. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE><br><br>I also appreciated Hoofnagle's comments on Fair Information Practices:<br><br> <BLOCKQUOTE><SMALL>said by Eric L. Howes:</SMALL><HR>Second, though, Hoofnagle usefully pointed out that Panel 3's discussion of privacy principles -- or, more formally, Fair Information Practices -- tended to reduce those principles to but two of four (notice and choice), when in fact internet users ought to be extended protection through a full range of Fair Information Practices.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> <br><br>In Mr. Hoofnagle's own words (p. 132):<br><br> <BLOCKQUOTE><SMALL>said by Chris Jay Hoofnagle:</SMALL><HR>MR. HOOFNAGLE:The Federal Trade Commission defines substantive privacy rights as notice, choice, access, security and accountability.<br><br>I think it's very important that we not allow privacy to be watered down to this idea of notice and choice in this debate or in others. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> <br><br>I also contrasted Hoofnagle's constructive comments with those of others:<br><br> <BLOCKQUOTE><SMALL>said by Eric L. Howes:</SMALL><HR>Hoofnagle's comments were a refreshing change from those of several of the other panelists, who enthused over the privacy initiatives of industry front groups like the Network Advertising Initiative (NAI), as if these organizations could be trusted or expected to do anything substantive to protect users' privacy in the face of voracious industry demands for access to users' desktops -- the next frontier or market in online advertising -- and all manner of data about users and their online behavior. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> <br><br>Ronald Plesser provided one of the better examples of this when he at once dismissed the issue of notice as not that big of a deal and recommended the Direct Marketing Association's (DMA) work on standards for notice (p. 138):<br><br> <BLOCKQUOTE><SMALL>said by Ronald Plesser:</SMALL><HR>MR. PLESSER: I don't know that I -- I think a notice is a notice. Some are better than others. I think we have seen -- I don't know that I've seen any in the privacy area, in spyware. I've seen some where the computer will serve you ads that they think will be of interest to you. I think those are usually pretty straightforward. When those ads come in, those alternative ads come in, they have little logos on them, or some of them do, that say this is being served to you by XYZ network, and it's different from where you originally went.<br><br>I don't think it's all that difficult, but I think there can be notices that can be workable. Again, I think the DMA is working on this stuff. I think it's important. I think one of the principles that we are working on with the DMA is to make sure these notices are obviously out there before the stuff comes onto the system, that the notice is given prior to installation. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE><br><br>"Notice is notice" fairly sums up the industry's attitude toward the problem of inadequate notice and disclosure during the installation of advertising software.<br><br>Panel 4<br><br>As readers of my comments will have noticed, Panel 4 was chock full of interesting moments.<br><br>First, there were two sets of comments by industry representatives on the impact of spyware on businesses:<br><br>* Brian Arbogast, MSN: Comments, pp. 161-163<br><br>* Andrew McLaughlin, Google: Comments, pp. 163-167; Presentation ( &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/spyware/mclaughlin.pdf" >www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/spywar&middot;&middot;&middot;hlin.pdf</A> )<br><br>Second, however, the majority of the discussion of Panel 4 focused on "industry self-regulation" and "best practices." Esp. bad were Commissioner Thompson's comments on the industry generally. I wrote:<br><br> <BLOCKQUOTE><SMALL>said by Eric L. Howes:</SMALL><HR>In one of the more nauseating moments of the afternoon, FTC Commissioner Mozelle Thompson quipped that the FTC was happy to hear the views of the large companies represented on the panel because they were truly the "elected" representatives of consumers. The corporate reps smiled at this bit of bureaucratic groveling before business interests, as Thompson was in fact chirpily parroting one of Corporate America's most cherished and noxious propaganda lines -- namely that the market is equivalent to democracy, and that the public, democratic institutions in which citizens actually participate (or are supposed to participate) are comparatively illegitimate. On this view, America is a democracy of consumers -- one dollar, one vote -- rather than a democracy of citizens. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE><br><br>Thompson's comments appear in his closing remarks on the panel (p. 198-199):<br><br> <BLOCKQUOTE><SMALL>said by Mozelle Thompson:</SMALL><HR>COMMISSIONER THOMPSON: At the same time, you have many of those same pressures, because even though you're not elected, they elect you every day when they decide whether to buy or not to buy or to participate or not to participate. And that's where we have the same challenge. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> <br><br>I also called attention to one of the panelists remarks about "consumer education":<br><br> <BLOCKQUOTE><SMALL>said by Eric L. Howes:</SMALL><HR>In other words, "consumer education" in this scheme of things isn't really education as we normally understand it; rather, it's public relations and propaganda -- manipulating consumers into the "correct" ways of thinking about the software. And this was made perfectly clear by the several industry representatives on Panels 1 and 4, who insisted over and over that we get it into our heads that their software is "adware" not "spyware." Indeed, one of the representatives on Panel 4 (though just who I am at a loss to recall) let the cat out of the bag when he or she helpfully explained that "we need to educate consumers so that they understand what this software really is." A more naked, forthright statement of just what the industry has in mind for consumers would be hard to come by.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE><br><br>In fact, two panelists made comments along that line:<br><br>1. Chris Kelly (p. 183):<br><br> <BLOCKQUOTE><SMALL>said by Chris Kelly:</SMALL><HR>MR. KELLY: So I think that that can go hand-in-hand with a consumer education campaign oriented towards explaining to people the difference between client software and spyware. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> <br><br>2. Jules Polonetsky (p. 184):<br><br> <BLOCKQUOTE><SMALL>said by Jules Polonetsky:</SMALL><HR>MR. POLONETSKY: I'd comment on a couple of different levels, one on the comparison to some of the other self-regulatory processes. I think one of the reasons why on the network advertising initiative side of the world things end up working is you could really could sit most of the relevant players who were doing this on any scale around the table.<br><br>They all were public or soon-to-be public companies that were, you know, part of the civil debate part of the world, and you could say to them, look, you all need to do an awful lot more to explain your business practices, because people have concerns about them. So step up, do more, work harder, bother your customers, make them do more. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> <br><br>Panel 5<br><br>The highlight of Panel 5 was the presentation by Microsoft on ActiveX controls and the upcoming changes in SP2 for Windows XP:<br><br>* Jeffrey Friedberg, Microsoft: Comments, pp. 201-213; Presentation ( &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/spyware/friedberg.pdf" >www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/spywar&middot;&middot;&middot;berg.pdf</A> ).<br><br>By far the most entertaining panelist of the day, though, was Steven Bellovin, who quipped at one point, "It seems to be my role here to be disagree with people" (p. 250). One of his more notable disagreements with another panelist concerned the portable security scanner application announced by Wayne Porter of SpywareGuide (but which I mistakenly attributed to David Moll and Webroot). As I reported:<br><br> <BLOCKQUOTE><SMALL>said by Eric L. Howes:</SMALL><HR>The irony of this "security application" was not lost on Steven Bellovin, Fellow with AT&T Labs-Research, also on the panel. Noting that mobile code is one of the biggest security problems in Windows, he quipped that Webroot's portable security scanner was one of the "scariest things" he had yet heard about at the workshop.<br><br>And Bellovin was right, of course, because what Moll had unwittingly pointed out is that ActiveX controls can be used to import and run completely foreign code of unknown provenance at the user's discretion on boxes that the user ostensibly shouldn't control.<br><HR></BLOCKQUOTE><br><br>Mr. Bellovin's actual comments (p. 250):<br><br> <BLOCKQUOTE><SMALL>said by Steven Bellovin:</SMALL><HR>MR. BELLOVIN: I think there are a number of mistakes we can point to, but to me the biggest mistake the industry made was deploying mobile code without adequate safeguards.<br><br>The scariest thing that I heard today was it's possible to write an ActiveX control to scan a machine for spyware. You have a control that's that powerful that can roll with those permissions, my God, what else could it have done? <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> <br><br>As I noted, Daniel Weitzner had useful comments on P3P-like solutions to spyware:<br><br> <BLOCKQUOTE><SMALL>said by Eric L. Howes:</SMALL><HR>To his credit, Daniel Weitzner of the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), one of the prime forces behind the P3P specification, expressed his skepticism of such an adaptation of P3P, though he said he wouldn't completely dismiss the idea. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> <br><br>Mr. Weitzner's actual comments (pp. 231-232):<br><br> <BLOCKQUOTE><SMALL>said by Daniel Weitzner:</SMALL><HR>MR. WEITZNER: I have to say, I'm slightly on the fence here about how much a labeling approach can really accomplish when it comes to spyware. And I think it can probably help some, but the history of trying to label things on the web I think is really instructive here. I think if you look at both privacy on the one hand and things like pornography and spam on the other hand, you see the sort of limits and benefits of labeling. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> <br><br>See pp. 228-235 for the complete discussion of P3P-like anti-spyware solutions, problems w/ labeling schemes, and the similarity of problems with spyware and spam.<br><br>Panel 6<br><br>Though Panel 6 was a long time in coming (or so it seemed at the time), it too had its noteworthy moments.<br><br>In my review of Panel 6 I called attention to the remarks of Jennifer Baird of Rep. Mary Bono's office:<br><br> <BLOCKQUOTE><SMALL>said by Eric L. Howes:</SMALL><HR>Although at times appearing a bit uncomfortable with speaking to such a large audience, Ms. Baird nonetheless made her boss's position quite clear: that new legislation is needed to protect consumers against the invasive, destructive software currently being distributed by the advertising software industry. While she acknowledged the potential benefit of "industry self-regulation," consumer education, and enforcement of existing laws against the more unscrupulous spyware distributors, Ms. Baird firmly and unambiguously insisted that those actions were simply not adequate to the job. Moreover, she rejected calls from the industry and others to study the issue more and allow the industry itself to address the problem. "That's just not how things work in Congress," she said, and went on to describe Rep. Bono's work on her own anti-spyware bill... <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> <br><br>Ms. Baird's actual comments (pp. 266-267):<br><br> <BLOCKQUOTE><SMALL>said by Jennifer Baird:</SMALL><HR>MS. BAIRD: Another thing has been -- another thing that we heard from industry has been, you know, self-regulation is the answer, but we can't really come up with best practices yet.<br><br>So, in other words, what we're hearing is, this is a problem, it needs to be solved, but we don't know how, so just hold on.<br><br>And that's not how it works in Congress, and, you know, as a member of Congress, my boss has the responsibility to do all she can to protect her constituents from downloading onto their computer that they use for personal, you know, banking and for credit - - you know, buying things through their credit card and so on and so on. She has the responsibility to make sure that they have confidence when they're using their computer, and that that information won't be shared.<br><br>And another thing that, of course, has been said is, legislation is just the wrong answer. This can only be done through self-regulation.<br><br>I would say that we can't sit around and just think about it and talk about it for days and nights in a year, we do have to act. But that being said, I do think that industry self-regulation is a very important aspect of this, and my boss understands that legislation by itself will not stop the problem, but it is a step in the right direction. It is a step in the right direction that people know what they're downloading onto their computer before they download it. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> <br><br>I also applauded the remarks of State Rep. Steve Urquhart of Utah:<br><br> <BLOCKQUOTE><SMALL>said by Eric L. Howes:</SMALL><HR>Thus, it was helpful and encouraging to listen to the remarks of Utah State Rep. Stephen Urquhart, the principle force behind the Utah bill. Urquhart was quite impressive throughout his comments. Demonstrating a firm grasp of the issues, Urquhart rejected the flim-flam objections and diversions from the industry, quickly batting them down. Describing his own experience drafting the Utah bill, Urquhart remarked that he and his colleagues in the Utah House received no useful input from the industry, which simply wanted to kill the bill, as should be apparent from the several industry comments publicly available (see the NetCoalition above, for example).<HR></BLOCKQUOTE><br><br>Here are two choice quotes from Mr. Urquhart:<br><br>1. p. 274:<br><br> <BLOCKQUOTE><SMALL>said by Steve Urquhart:</SMALL><HR>MR. URQUHART: I mean, constituents, they demand results. They're sick of this stuff. And so I've heard a lot of handwringing here today, and I think it is great that we do need best practices, we need education, we need technology, but we also need regulation.<br><br>I mean, how do you stop bad guys? You have a neighborhood watch? You have education to pick up your newspapers. Don't leave them sitting around. You have technology, you have alarms and bars, but at the end of the day, you've got to have laws and a cop on the beat. And so we've put a cop on the beat. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> <br><br>2. pp. 287-88<br><br> <BLOCKQUOTE><SMALL>said by Steve Urquhart:</SMALL><HR>MR. URQUHART: Yeah, let me point out that, in Utah, like in most states, we don't write our laws into - - in stone. We don't chisel them in stone, we write them on paper, and so, we have made it plenty clear to industry, and to all parties, that we wanted their input.<br><br>And about the only input we got during the sessions was, don't do it. Let -- for Heaven's sake, let the feds deal with this, and, you know, that -- that's not acceptable to my consumers. And so, this was brought forward by an industry member, saying put in an operating system, and currently, in the law, they could argue that this is a vital component of the operating system, then it would be exempted out. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> <br><br>For more of Mr. Urquhart's comments, see pp. 269-275 and pp. 287-290.<br><br>**Errors in the Transcript**<br><br>Yes, the transcript itself does contain a few errors that readers should be aware of, though most of them are minor.<br><br>p. 78: here Roger Thompson of Pest Patrol is misidentified as "Commissioner Thompson." (Commissioner Thompson did actually offer remarks just after Panel 3 and went on to host Panel 4. The Thompson on Panel 2, though, was Roger Thompson.)<br><br>p. 218: "sharistic" should be "heuristic"<br><br>p. 223-224: the transcript misattributes David Moll's comments to Daniel Weitzner. That this is so should be clear from context, because the remarks cover the partnership between the maker of Spy Sweeper and Earthlink (misspelled "Earthlinks" in the transcript).<br><br>p. 226: "wy" should be "way"<br><br>pp. 257-258: these two pages contain a series of interconnected errors of attribution. The transcript attributes question on p. 257 ("Could you just sketch out for us,...") to Mary Engle by tacking on the question to the end of Engle's response to a previous question, and the answer ("Well, to bring a case,...") to Beth Delaney, who was actually the host asking the questions. The next question on p. 258 ("Mark, we'd like to hear about...") then bleeds into the end of the response and is correctly attributed to Beth Delaney, however, the preceding response is Engle's. In other words, 257-258 should have question by Delaney, response by Engle, question by Delaney. Instead what we get is question by Engle (at the end of her response to a previous question), a response by Delaney, and then a question by Delaney.<br><br>There are undoubtedly other minor errors, but those are the ones I spotted.<br><br>**Concluding Remarks**<br><br>In going through the transcript for the FTC's Spyware Workshop I happened across a number of interesting comments that deserve attention, and I'll be posting a list of them in the next few days. You can think of that list as my own selection of key highlights from the workshop for those who don't have the time or inclination to plow through all 298 pages of the transcript.<br><br>Also, the FTC has finished posting comments from the public about "spyware," and the comment period is now closed (the last day to submit was May 21). Here's a short breakdown of the comments posted in the past few weeks (#212-359):<br><br># 212-349: these are mainly short comments from consumers, many of them angry and frustrated at spyware and, occasionally, the FTC itself<br><br># 350-359: the last ten submissions include a number of comments worth noting.<br><br>(Note: see &raquo;<A HREF="/forum/remark,9864340~mode=flat">A Guide to Spyware Comments Filed w/ the FTC</A> for pointers to earlier comments posted to the FTC's site.)<br><br># 350 Recording Industry Association of America (04/23/04) <br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/040423peertopeer.pdf" >www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/&middot;&middot;&middot;peer.pdf</A><br><br>The RIAA weighs in with a hefty document linking spyware to P2P file sharing software.<br><br># 351 Lavasoft (05/17/04) <br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/040517lavasoft.pdf" >www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/&middot;&middot;&middot;soft.pdf</A><br><br>Lavasoft, makers of Ad-ware, provides straightforward answers to the main questions on the FTC's agenda.<br><br># 352 Association of Shareware Professionals, Inc.-2 (05/20/04) <br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/040520assocofsharewareproff-2.pdf" >www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/&middot;&middot;&middot;ff-2.pdf</A><br><br>In its second submission this industry organization dismisses the purported difference between adware and spyware.<br><br># 356 The National Network to End Domestic Violence (05/21/04) <br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/040521natlnetwrktoenddomesticviol.pdf" >www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/&middot;&middot;&middot;viol.pdf</A><br><br>Providing an object lesson on the problems with the term "spyware," which leads people to confuse advertising software with system monitoring programs, this non-profit organization advises the FTC on why keyloggers are a threat to battered women.<br><br># 357 Webroot Software, Inc. (05/21/04) <br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/040521webrootsoftware.pdf" >www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/&middot;&middot;&middot;ware.pdf</A><br><br>Like Lavasoft, Webroot addresses all the main questions on the FTC's announced agenda.<br><br># 358 WhenU.com (05/21/04) <br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/040521whenu-comrepycomments.pdf" >www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/&middot;&middot;&middot;ents.pdf</A><br><br>A "must read": WhenU finally replies to Ben Edelman's finding that WhenU's SaveNow software transmits URLs in violation of its privacy policy (see &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.benedelman.org/spyware/ftc-031904.pdf" >www.benedelman.org/spyware/ftc-031904.pdf</A> ) and PC Pitstop's survey of WhenU users, which revealed that over 80 percent of WhenU "users" were unaware of the software installed on their systems (see &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/040413pcpitstop.pdf" >www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/&middot;&middot;&middot;stop.pdf</A> ). <br><br>Edelman has already posted a response to WhenU's reply on his web site: <br><br>WhenU Violates Own Privacy Policy<br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://www.benedelman.org/spyware/whenu-privacy/#response" >www.benedelman.org/spyware/whenu&middot;&middot;&middot;response</A><br><br>PC Pitstop will undoubtedly be posting a response of its own. <br><br>Having looked over WhenU's reply, I must say that WhenU's attorney isn't the sharpest knife in the drawer. Her argument against Edelman's findings is completely inadequate, as she seeks to downplay the plain language of the EULA itself, which WhenU was forced to revise in the past few days. Moreover, her reply to PC Pitstop's survey effectively supplies the reasoning necessary to underscore the ultimate point of PC Pitstop's survey. In other places, she contradicts herself, misstates or misdescribes PC Pitstop's survey, and simply ignores evidence when it isn't convenient. All in all a sorry performance.<br><br># 359 Howes-2 (05/21/04) <br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/040521howes-2.pdf" >www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/&middot;&middot;&middot;es-2.pdf</A><br><br>My response to C2 Media's reply to its critics -- see # 181 Lucas-2 (04/14/04) ( &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/040414lucas2.pdf" >www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/&middot;&middot;&middot;cas2.pdf</A> ) -- is the very last posted comment for the workshop. I should have an HTML version of this up on my FTC Spyware Workshop page in the next few days:<br><br>The FTC's Spyware Workshop<br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/ftc-spyware.htm" >www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/ftc-spyware.htm</A><br><br>Best regards,<br><br>Eric L. Howes]]></description>
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<title>Re: FTC Spyware Workshop: 1st Impressions</title>
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<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/795407"><b>SnowyOne</b></A> : Mahalo for the wealth of information in this most recent update. It's great to see that actions relating to "Unfair & Deceptive" trade practices are coming into play regarding crapware.<br>I believe it's only a matter of time before some State Attorney General ups the stakes & prosecutes with the power & flexibility of the RICO Act.<br><SMALL>--<br>Dave said "By the way, 4294967295 is just another way to write -1".</SMALL>]]></description>
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<pubDate>Fri, 21 May 2004 00:11:50 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: FTC Spyware Workshop: 1st Impressions</title>
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<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/378696"><b>eburger68</b></A> : Hi All:<br><br>Over four weeks after the FTC's Spyware Workshop on April 19, I will finally review the last of the six panels at the workshop. This review will go beyond discussing the particular comments and points made by the panelists, however, and will discuss the issues surrounding governmental action generally and anti-spyware legislation specifically.<br><br>It seems appropriate, then, to note that at the time of this writing legislative pressure is mounting on the spyware industry. Not only has the Utah bill passed, but the first enforcement action under its provisions has been taken by Overstock.com, whose web site was targeted by contextual advertising:<br><br>Utah sees first spyware case<br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/05/19/overstock_utah_spyware/" >www.theregister.co.uk/2004/05/19&middot;&middot;&middot;spyware/</A><br><br>The text of the Utah anti-spyware bill can be found here:<br><br>Utah Spyware Control Act<br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://www.le.state.ut.us/~2004/bills/hbillenr/hb0323.htm" >www.le.state.ut.us/~2004/bills/h&middot;&middot;&middot;0323.htm</A><br><br>Additionally, the California anti-spyware bill moved a step closer to enactment when the California State Senate sent the bill to the Assembly on May 18:<br><br>Consumers would have to be told before installation<br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://msnbc.msn.com/id/5014546/" >msnbc.msn.com/id/5014546/</A><br><br>The text of the California anti-spyware bill can be found here:<br><br>California SB 1436: CONSUMER PROTECTION AGAINST COMPUTER SPYWARE ACT<br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/bill/sen/sb_1401-1450/sb_1436_bill_20040511_amended_sen.html" >www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/bill/sen/&middot;&middot;&middot;sen.html</A><br><br>As a recent Washington Post article noted, vigorous state action only increases the pressure on lawmakers in Washington D.C. to pass a federal anti-spyware bill:<br><br>States Speed up Spyware Race<br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A24746-2004May13.html" >www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ar&middot;&middot;&middot;y13.html</A><br><br>But state legislators aren't the only ones driving the fight against spyware. Several other actions have been taken by private parties, putting still more pressure on the spyware industry. L.L. Bean recently sued several companies for using contextual pop-up advertising, such as that delivered by Claria's Gator and WhenU's SaveNow software, to target its web site:<br><br>L.L. Bean sues pop-up advertisers<br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://www.cnn.com/2004/TECH/internet/05/18/llbeanpop.ups.ap/index.html" >www.cnn.com/2004/TECH/internet/0&middot;&middot;&middot;dex.html</A><br><br>What sets the L.L. Bean law suit apart from some of the other well-known law suits over contextual advertising (such as that by Hertz and others against Claria) is that the aggrieved party is going after the companies who took out the advertising (Nordstrom's and others), not the company who delivered it (Claria). L.L. Bean isn't the first company to do so, but it is a large, prominent company and its actions should get the attention of the advertising industry.<br><br>And still further, Google has stepped forward to insist on better behavior from advertising software vendors. Last week Google booted WhenU from its search listings for engaging in banned behavior ("cloaking") to improve its rankings:<br><br>Search engines delete adware company<br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://news.com.com/2100-1024_3-5212479.html" >news.com.com/2100-1024_3-5212479.html</A><br><br>This "cloaking" behavior was uncovered by Ben Edelman of Harvard University, who has testified in several anti-spyware law suits and who was at the FTC's Spyware Workshop:<br><br>WhenU Spams Google, Breaks Google "No Cloaking" Rules<br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://www.benedelman.org/spyware/whenu-spam/" >www.benedelman.org/spyware/whenu-spam/</A><br><br>Shortly after exposing WhenU's "cloaking" tactics on Google, Edelman also brought to light a significant number of copyright violations on WhenU's sites, which improperly reproduce news articles from a variety of news agencies and web sites:<br><br>WhenU Copies 26+ Articles from 20+ News Sites<br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://www.benedelman.org/spyware/whenu-copy/" >www.benedelman.org/spyware/whenu-copy/</A><br><br>And, finally, the FTC has indicated that it is interested in pursuing enforcement action under existing federal law against companies that engage in "unfair" and "deceptive" behavior. The Center for Democracy and Technology has already filed one complaint against MailWiper, the company behind the notorious "anti-spyware" product SpyWiper, which used heavy-handed scare tactics and browser hijacking on its web sites to stampede clueless users into accepting "drive-by-downloads" of its software (see &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.cdt.org/privacy/20040210cdt.pdf" >www.cdt.org/privacy/20040210cdt.pdf</A> ). No official action from the FTC has yet been taken in response to the CDT's complaint, though.<br><br>Needless to say, spyware is now a national issue, and it will be difficult for the spyware or advertising software industry to avoid reform and action of some kind. Just what those reforms ultimately will be, though, is an open question, and it is not at all certain that the reforms enacted will be useful ones that significantly change the unscrupulous practices of the spyware industry and provide consumers with strong protection against its invasive software.<br><br>The FTC's Spyware Workshop of April 19 is best understood as one attempt to get ahead of the legislative reform game and shape its movement and direction by giving the advertising software industry and its allies a prominent platform on which to showcase its own preferred non-solution -- "industry self-regulation." The final panel at the workshop, though, did offer panelists the chance to discuss potential governmental actions, including legislation.<br><br>Panel Six: Government Responses to Spyware - Law Enforcement, Consumer<br>Education, and Coordinating with Industry<br><br>Panelists:<br><br>P - Jennifer Baird, Legislative Counsel, Office of Rep. Mary Bono<br>U - Mark Eckenwiler, Deputy Chief, Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section, Department of Justice<br>U - Mary Engle, Associate Director, Division of Advertising Practices, Federal Trade Commission<br>U - Elizabeth Prostic, Chief Privacy Officer, U.S. Department of Commerce<br>P - Matthew Sarrel, Technical Director, PC Magazine<br>P - Stephen Urquhart, State Representative, Utah House of Representatives<br><br>Key:<br><br>X - industry/corporate friendly<br>U - unknown/undetermined<br>P - privacy friendly <br><br>Note: be sure to take a look at the photos of Panel 5 as well as the other panels at Bill Pytlovany's blog page and Declan McCullagh's site:<br><br>Declan McCullagh - FTC Spyware Workshop Photos<br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://www.mccullagh.org/theme/ftc-spyware-workshop-apr04.html" >www.mccullagh.org/theme/ftc-spyw&middot;&middot;&middot;r04.html</A><br><br>Bill Pytlovany's Blog from the Workshop<br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://www.mysteryware.com/blog.html" >www.mysteryware.com/blog.html</A><br><br>A Divided Panel<br><br>The panelists on this last panel of the workshop generally fell into two camps: those in favor of new legislation to address the threat of spyware, and those opposed. All the panelists agreed on the need to enforce current laws against "unfair" and "deceptive" practices in order to reign in the more objectionable practices of some advertising software vendors, however, they disagreed as to whether current laws were adequate to the job of making a significant difference in the fight against spyware.<br><br>A Strong Call for Legislation<br><br>Two of the panelists made clear, unambiguous calls for strong, new legislation to address the spyware issue: Jennifer Baird, Legislative Counsel in the office of Rep. Mary Bono (the principal sponsor of one of the major anti-spyware bills currently before Congress), and Steve Urquhart, State Representative from the Utah House of Representatives (the major force behind the anti-spyware bill that was recently passed in Utah).<br><br>Although at times appearing a bit uncomfortable with speaking to such a large audience, Ms. Baird nonetheless made her boss's position quite clear: that new legislation is needed to protect consumers against the invasive, destructive software currently being distributed by the advertising software industry. While she acknowledged the potential benefit of "industry self-regulation," consumer education, and enforcement of existing laws against the more unscrupulous spyware distributors, Ms. Baird firmly and unambiguously insisted that those actions were simply not adequate to the job. Moreover, she rejected calls from the industry and others to study the issue more and allow the industry itself to address the problem. "That's just not how things work in Congress," she said, and went on to describe Rep. Bono's work on her own anti-spyware bill, the text of which can be found here:<br><br>HR 2929: Safeguard Against Privacy Invasions Act (S.P.I. Act)<br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:h.r.02929" >thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z&middot;&middot;&middot;.r.02929</A><br><br>Rep. Bono's S.P.I. Act is but one of three different bills in Congress right now. The others are:<br><br>H.R. 4255 (Rep. Jay Inslee): Computer Software Privacy and Control Act<br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_cong_bills&docid=f:h4255ih.txt" >frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin&middot;&middot;&middot;55ih.txt</A><br><br>S. 2145 (Sen. Conrad Burns): SPY BLOCK Act<br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c108:s.2145" >thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c108:s.2145</A><br><br>The Bono bill and the SPY BLOCK bill have both received a fair amount of press coverage, esp. after the House subcommittee hearings a few weeks ago, where several committee members angrily responded to the FTC's insistence that no new legislation was needed:<br><br>&raquo;<A HREF="/forum/remark,10106664~mode=flat">FTC Goes to Bat for Spyware Industry</A><br><br>The Inslee bill has received much less attention, though, as it was the last to be introduced (April 30). While all three bills have problems of one sort or another, my initial review of the Inslee bill suggests that it may actually be the most promising (more on which later).<br><br>The industry, of course, has stubbornly rejected all calls for legislation, including the first anti-spyware bill of its kind to pass anywhere -- the Utah bill:<br><br>NetCoalition Letter Against Utah Anti-Spyware Bill<br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://www.netcoalition.com/index.asp?Type=B_BASIC&SEC={A5677952-F73C-42F3-9A2B-0426A898DF83}" >www.netcoalition.com/index.asp?T&middot;&middot;&middot;898DF83}</A><br><br>And see also the Business Software Alliance's statement to a Senate subcommittee back in March:<br><br>Testimony of Robert Holleyman, Business Software Alliance (BSA)<br>On E-SPYING: BAN BEHAVIOR NOT TECHNOLOGY<br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/040323bsaspywaretestimony.pdf" >www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/&middot;&middot;&middot;mony.pdf</A><br><br>Thus, it was helpful and encouraging to listen to the remarks of Utah State Rep. Stephen Urquhart, the principle force behind the Utah bill. Urquhart was quite impressive throughout his comments. Demonstrating a firm grasp of the issues, Urquhart rejected the flim-flam objections and diversions from the industry, quickly batting them down. Describing his own experience drafting the Utah bill, Urquhart remarked that he and his colleagues in the Utah House received no useful input from the industry, which simply wanted to kill the bill, as should be apparent from the several industry comments publicly available (see the NetCoalition above, for example).<br><br>Notice & Disclosure During Software Installation<br><br>Although the majority of his comments concerned the Utah bill, Urquhart did address the question of installation practices -- a critical topic for those struggling to find solutions to the problem of spyware. At the start of his remarks Urquhart went through a short PowerPoint presentation, using screenshots to highlight the inadequate forms of notice and disclosure provided by firms such as WhenU, who shoehorn the long, dense blocks legalese from their EULAs into tiny, confusing scroll boxes in order to pressure users to click through and consent to the installation of software they do not fully understand (see my "Anatomy of a Drive-by-Download" for an extended consideration of this problem: &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/dbd-anatomy.htm" >www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/dbd-anatomy.htm</A> ). <br><br>Given these kinds of installation practices -- which are primarily designed to cover the legal backsides of spyware vendors without actually impacting their installation rates -- no one should be surprised that most "users" of Gator and WhenU are completely unaware of the software on their systems, because the EULAs provided by those companies simply do not serve as adequate forms of notice and disclosure. (See PC Pitstop's surveys of Gator and WhenU users for the numbers: &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/040413pcpitstop.pdf" >www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/&middot;&middot;&middot;stop.pdf</A> and &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/040315pcpitstop.pdf" >www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/&middot;&middot;&middot;stop.pdf</A> ).<br><br>Urquhart contrasted these shady installation practices with those used by Google for its popular Google Toolbar ( &raquo;<A HREF="http://toolbar.google.com/" >toolbar.google.com/</A> ). As Urquhart pointed out, the difference between Google's installation and the installations of so many advertising sotfware vendors is that Google does not regard the mere presentation of information about software behavior as adequate notice and disclosure. To craft adequate forms of notice and disclosure that actually ensure that users understand the software to be installed on their computers, the installation practices themselves much change. Put another way: we've got to stop regarding the notice/disclosure problem as merely one of the amount and kinds of information provided to users. In addition to the quality of the information provided, we've also got to consider the manner in which that information is presented, and that means taking a hard look at installation practices. <br><br>Google has done just that with its Google Toolbar, taking several steps to ensure that users are presented helpful, usable information in an easy-to-read format that simply cannot be missed. Google's installation practices ensure that the notice and disclosure afforded users is not simply full and forthright, but "clear" and "conspicuous."<br><br>Interestingly, Google announced yesterday a set of "software principles" that it thinks the industry ought to adopt to guide the provision of notice and disclosure during software installations:<br><br>Google defines good manners for adware<br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://news.com.com/2100-1029_3-5215941.html" >news.com.com/2100-1029_3-5215941.html</A><br><br>Feedback requested: A proposal to help fight deceptive Internet software<br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://www.google.com/corporate/software_principles.html" >www.google.com/corporate/softwar&middot;&middot;&middot;les.html</A><br><br>Unfortunately, the majority of those "software principles" address only the amount and type of information provided, not the actual practices through which that information is delivered. While Google's document does insist on "clear" and "conspicuous" notice, it largely neglects to lay out just what that would mean. Indeed, I strongly suspect that companies like Gator and WhenU would claim that they already abide by these principles and point to their EULAs, which are presented to users during the installation of Gator, SaveNow, and their other software applications. In my own analysis of the automated, online installation of C2 Media's Lop.com software (see &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/dbd-anatomy.htm" >www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/dbd-anatomy.htm</A> ), it was clear that C2 Media's collection of EULAs and privacy policies had in fact covered all of the major functionality and behavior of the software installed, just as Google's "software principles" insist. The problem was that the notice and disclosure of such functionality took the form of a 9400 word EULA that most users could make no sense of and that the EULA was presented in a completely confusing, even misleading, context. <br><br>While insisting on "clear" and "conspicuous" notice and disclosure, Google's "software principles" document does not outright reject such installation practices and does almost nothing to spell out what it would consider an adequate alternative. Until such proposals start addressing installation practices beyond the amount and kind of information provided, companies such as WhenU and Claria will continue to be able to insist that they do provide users with adequate notice and disclosure, despite the fact most users don't even know the software is installed on their systems. <br><br>And we should be clear that these companies have every reason to resist providing notice and disclosure that would actually allow users to understand the software to be installed on their systems. It is simply not believable that most users would knowingly consent to the installation of software that clearly and conspicuously disclosed the fact that users would be subjected to:<br><br>* frequent, annoying, disruptive pop-up advertising on their desktop<br>* re-configured browser home page and search settings<br>* monitoring and reporting of their online behavior<br>* obnoxious new toolbars and other widgets on their browsers and desktops<br>* significant decreases in browsing speed and system responsiveness<br>* scads of new icons and links, many of them pornographic, on their browsers and desktops<br>* outrageous phone bills from premium rate porn dialers<br><br>Were advertising software vendors to disclose such functionality and behavior in a truly clear and conspicuous manner, they would be out of business in no time because most folks simply don't want that kind of software. One of the surest indications of this came from WhenU's own Avi Naider on Panel 1, who noted that of 100 million WhenU installation, 80 million had been uninstalled by consumers. In other words, after putting up with WhenU's obnoxious desktop advertising for some amount of time, 80 percent of users finally managed to remove it. And I strongly suspect that over well over 90 percent of the remaining 20 million installations will be uninstalled once those unwitting victims figure out how to give Mr. Naider's software the boot.<br><br>Unfortunately, current law -- at least as it has been explained to me -- allows companies like Gator, WhenU, and C2 Media to persist in the fiction that they provide users with adequate notice and disclosure without actually doing so or cutting into their installation rates. Until we have laws on the books that make it clear that merely sticking a 9400 word EULA in front of confused users does not constitute adequate notice and disclosure, the spyware problem will continue, just as Google itself noted when it remarked, "We do not see this trend reversing itself. In fact, it is getting worse."<br><br>Enforcing Existing Laws<br><br>Unfortunately, three members of Panel 6 rejected calls for new legislation to address these inadequate installation practices, insisting that current law is adequate to the task of addressing spyware problems.  Mark Eckenwiler of the Department of Justice, Mary Engle of the Federal Trade Commission, and Elizabeth Prostic of the Department of Commerce all disputed the need for new legislation and claimed that U.S. regulatory agencies have sufficient authority and leeway under current law to go after spyware vendors for "unfair" and "deceptive" trade practices. Each was asked the same question: "Do you think new laws are needed to address the spyware problem?" Each looked straight at the audience and said clearly and firmly, "No."<br><br>While it was interesting to hear their discussion of current laws and the enforcement actions that might be possible under those laws, none of these government officials squarely addressed the real problems with the installation practices used by most advertising software vendors. Instead they talked about marginal or tangential cases, including keyloggers and dangerous porn dialers. <br><br>Although the examples offered clearly fit the description of "unfair" and "deceptive" trade practices  -- or even, in some cases, outright fraudulent, criminal behavior -- these examples were of software and installation practices far different the typical offerings of the advertising software industry. Moreover, as dangerous and destructive as keyloggers and other such system monitoring software applications are, they are a diversion from the central issue in the "spyware" debate: unwanted advertising software, which is installed by companies not nefarious individuals and which is protected behind EULAs and other confusing installation practices. As I noted in my discussion of Panel 2 ( &raquo;<A HREF="/forum/remark,10018653~mode=flat~start=20#10060847">FTC Spyware Workshop: 1st Impressions</A> ), McAfee's numbers clearly demonstrated that it is advertising software (adware) that is fueling consumer problems with unwanted software, not keyloggers. Thus my frustration with the term "spyware," which continually distracts public officials and the media from the central issues at hand and which leads to "spyware" discussions that meander into handwringing over keyloggers, identity theft, and other outright criminal actions by individuals. Such discussions simply fail to address the largest problems with advertising software and the installation practices used to foist such software on unwitting victims.<br><br>The key question is whether the FTC, under current laws against "unfair" and "deceptive" trade practices, will be able to reign in the advertising software industry, which by and large does present users with EULAs. Even a month now after the Spyware Workshop we have heard nothing whatsoever from the FTC to indicate: a) whether it thinks it can pursue enforcement action under current law against companies that use EULAs and other inadequate forms of notice and disclosure; or b) under what criteria and in what situations it thinks it could go after such companies. Although current law does allow the FTC to go after companies for "unfair" and "deceptive" trade practices, the presence of a EULA such as that used by WhenU, Gator, and C2 Media during installation enormously complicates the picture, casting doubt on the ability of the FTC to address the widespread problems with advertising software. <br><br>Moreover, while I think it is certainly possible to go after spyware distributors who either fail to use a EULA or who do not disclose certain key software functionality in a EULA, those companies are marginal at best. With the shining exception of CoolWebSearch -- which is in a category all its own ( &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.spywareinfo.com/~merijn/cwschronicles.html" >www.spywareinfo.com/~merijn/cwsc&middot;&middot;&middot;les.html</A> ) -- most of the worst actors spring up out of nowhere, wreak havoc on users' computers for a month or so, and then disappear -- probably because their destructive practices angered enough people that they were effectively run out of town. (Howard Beales of the FTC noted himself in recent testimony before a House subcommittee that the worst actors are often fly-by-night con artists who "ride off into the cyber-hills" -- see &raquo;<A HREF="http://cbs.marketwatch.com/news/story.asp?guid=%7BCCCD507B-F3D4-4A9A-A5ED-C76547E69783%7D&siteid=google&dist=google" >cbs.marketwatch.com/news/story.a&middot;&middot;&middot;t=google</A> .) The larger, more established advertising software vendors endure, however, racking up tens or even hundreds of millions of installations and attracting mainstream advertisers and venture capitalists ( &raquo;<A HREF="/forum/remark,9898401~mode=flat">What's the *motivation* for hijack-ware?</A> ). Until we address the unscrupulous practices of the largest players in the advertising software industry, we will be simply nibbling around the edges of the problem.<br><br>The Complexity of Crafting Effective Legislation<br><br>Whatever the limits of enforcing current laws against "unfair" and "deceptive" trade practices, the FTC should be encouraged to do so where possible. (See the CDT's "Consumer Software Working Group" document for examples of "unfair" and "deceptive" software practices that might be actionable under current law: &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.cdt.org/privacy/spyware/20040419cswg.pdf" >www.cdt.org/privacy/spyware/20040419cswg.pdf</A> ) <br><br>If we are serious about addressing the problems with spyware, however, then we will need new legislation to tackle the "tough cases" -- the cases in which advertising software vendors do provide some form of notice/disclosure but in a way that is inadequate and that doesn't truly allow most internet users to make sense of the software they encounter on web sites. But crafting legislation to address the problems with spyware can be tricky business, and casual observers of the debate over spyware frequently underestimate the difficulties involved. <br><br>All too often I see online comments from people who are justifiably outraged by spyware and who say something to effect that, "It's my computer! If software is installed without my permission, then it should be illegal! How tough is that!" <br><br>The answer is: "Actually, it's a bit tougher than you think, and righteous indignation doesn't even begin to tell us how to make spyware illegal." Put quite simply, the question becomes: "How are we to determine what software was installed without your permission, esp. given that most advertising software presents users with a EULA of some sort?"<br><br>Even beyond the question of determining what constitutes adequate notice and disclosure, there are other difficulties that involve targeting unwanted software or software behavior in a way that doesn't unwittingly affect legitimate software that users do want. Still further, we must  be careful to construct solutions that don't so severely burden legitimate software vendors that their software becomes unbearably complex and difficult for users to install and use. <br><br>In the space that remains, I want to summarize some of the key issues in crafting effective anti-spyware legislation so that those following the debates in Washington over the several anti-spyware bills currently before Congress can make sense of what is going on.<br><br>Two General Approaches<br><br>There are two broad approaches to crafting anti-spyware legislation, each with its own advantages and disadvantages:<br><br>1. The "Go-for-the-Jugular" Approach: this approach cuts to the root of the problem and bans certain key spyware practices outright -- e.g., drive-by-downloads, software bundling, and contextual advertising. The advantage of this approach is that it is unambiguous and allows no wiggle room whatsoever for advertising software vendors. The most objectionable and confusing software practices are simply banned outright. Not only does this approach put a stop to the installation practices so often used to bamboozle users into consenting to the installation of otherwise unwanted software, but it outlaws one of the key revenue sources for this industry, effectively cutting off its financial blood flow.<br><br>As attractive as this aggressive approach is, it has several significant problems. First and foremost, it risks making the online installation of legitimate software much tougher, because automated installations (drive-by-downloads) are banned. This could prove to be a significant problem for web sites that depend on special software to provide key functionality or content, and webmasters want to make the experience of using their sites as trouble-free and transparent as possible for users. <br><br>Second, though it is difficult if not next to impossible to craft language that bans software bundling (e.g., bundling third-party advertising software with popular, "free" applications such as KaZaA) without severely burdening legitimate software makers, whose software packages are inescapably modular and whose installations often include a wide variety of software modules from several different sources, including third parties. A ban on software bundling could make the distribution of completely legitimate software incredibly difficult and burdensome.<br><br>Finally, though, it can be anticipated that many legislators will simply be reluctant to ban outright whole classes of software practices, which comes uncomfortably close to outlawing whole classes of technology. While there is certainly a good case to be made that software practices that are ripe for abuse and prone to causing substantial harm to normal internet users ought to be banned -- whatever the ill effects of the ban on innocent software vendors and users -- most legislators will probably prefer another more flexible approach.<br><br>2. The Notice/Disclosure/Choice Approach: this approach seeks to improve notice, choice, and disclosure so that users have a better chance of understanding the software that is installed on their systems. The idea behind this approach is that by requiring better notice, choice, and disclosure from software vendors, we can reduce the likelihood that users are surprised by unwanted software which is installed without their full knowledge, consent, and understanding. All of the legislation currently before Congress takes this approach to solving the spyware problem, though in slightly different ways.<br><br>The advantage to the notice/disclosure/choice approach is that it is more flexible because it allows all manner of software to be distributed and installed, provided users are given adequate notice of key functionality and the ability to control the installation. The disadvantage to this approach is that if the requirements for improved notice, disclosure, and choice are not crafted properly, we could wind up with a situation that resembles what we have now -- an online environment in which unscrupulous advertising software vendors use forms of notice, disclosure, and choice that don't truly allow internet users to understand the software to be installed on their systems. The advertising software vendors would effectively be able to continue pushing their software on confused users, only now with the defense that they meet strict federal requirements.<br><br>As the notice/disclosure/choice approach is the preferred approach used in the bills currently before Congress, I will next lay out some of the key issues and conundrums for attempts to improve notice, disclosure, and choice for users.<br><br>Three Classes of Software <br><br>Improving notice, disclosure, and choice largely means that we need to reform the installation processes used by software vendors. When we consider problems with installation processes, there are currently three classes of programs:<br><br>1. Stealth installers -- programs that exploit security holes and use other rogue, deceptive installation methods to completely bypass all forms of warning, notice, and disclosure or trick users into installations. Still other programs fail to disclose key functionality in EULAs or provide no EULAs whatsoever.  The FTC and others (e.g., the CDT -- see &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.cdt.org/privacy/spyware/20040419cswg.pdf" >www.cdt.org/privacy/spyware/20040419cswg.pdf</A> ) suggest that most of these "devious" are probably illegal already. These are likely to be the kinds of programs that the FTC finds it easiest to target for enforcement because the nature of their "unfair" and "deceptive" practices is much clearer than others.<br><br>2. Obfuscated installers -- programs that do use do present a EULA and/or privacy policy of some sort, but which do so in confusing circumstances, which present agreements that few users can make any sense of, and which exploit users' impatience and/or confusion to pressure them into installation.  These EULAs and installation practices are, for the most part, currently considered legally adequate means of notice and disclosure, however, experience and evidence suggest that they are not adequate means for providing users with meaningful notice and disclosure.<br><br>3. Clear and conspicuous installers -- installers (like that for Google's Toolbar) which not only disclose key terms and practices, but which also employ carefully constructed installation processes to force users to notice this information. This kind of "clear" and "conspicuous" notice protects users by ensuring that software cannot be installed without their full knowledge, consent, and understanding.<br><br>Currently Class 2 is the one giving users the biggest problem because it allows unscrupulous software vendors to exploit users' ignorance and confusion while remaining on the right side of the law. They give just enough notice to stay on the right side of the law, but not enough notice that they damage their installation rates.<br><br>Current law makes EULAs a minimally sufficient contract for notice and consent, however, this form of notice and consent is clearly insufficient for most consumers. Junkware vendors cling to this minimal standard because it gives them wide leeway to push installations on hapless users -- through contexts and environments that consumers find confusing --  and secure the widest possible distribution of their software, which is critical to their business models. They then insist that their satisfaction of this minimal legal standard ought to mean that consumers have no legitimate complaint and that nothing ought to be done. <br><br>But this is a specious argument. Once cannot argue that the law ought not to change by insisting that one is already following the current law itself. We insist that this minimal legal standard no longer serves its intended purpose, and the complaints of consumers -- not to mention the damage inflicted on individuals, businesses, and organizations -- ought to tell us as much. We insist on a change in the law to reform the installation practices used by software vendors so that they actually provide adequate notice and secure meaningful consent. When installation practices no longer provide for meaningful knowledge and consent from users, the laws governing notice, choice, and consent need to be strengthened to reflect that reality of the environment in which they are used.<br><br>The Difficulties w/ Improving Notice, Disclosure, & Choice<br><br>As we have seen, any legislative approach to the spyware problem must address the difficult cases -- the software that uses a EULA of some sort to satisfy a minimal legal standard for notice, choice, and disclosure but which doesn't actually provide users the information they need in a usable fashion to allow them to make an informed choice about the software they encounter on the Net. Even when we define the problem in these narrow terms, we are still left a number of issues, some more serious and problematic than others.<br><br>1. Spyware vs. Adware<br><br>The first issue arises from a distinction that the advertising software industry makes between "adware" and "spyware." On this definitional distinction, "spyware" is said to be unwanted software that installs without providing users notice and disclosure and which gathers and transmits personally identifiable information (PII) without users' knowledge and consent. By contrast, it is argued, "adware" is an innocuous form of advertising software that does provide notice and disclosure of key functionality and which usually doesn't gather and transmit PII -- if it does, full notice and disclosure is provided. <br><br>The problem with this adware vs. spyware distinction is that it seeks to use the inadequate forms of notice and disclosure currently employed by advertising software vendors as an excuse to exempt a whole group of software from critical scrutiny. Put another way, the adware vs. spyware distinction essentially declares closed the entire question of whether installation practices currently used by advertising software vendors actually provide meaningful notice and disclosure, when the question ought to remain open to investigation and action. Thus the industry seeks to short-circuit efforts to improve notice and disclosure by insisting that current forms of notice and disclosure used by advertising software vendors are adequate, when we have good evidence to believe they are not. <br><br>The industry's adware vs. spyware distinction doesn't help us address consumer complaints with abusive installation practices -- it is merely a dodge. The self-serving distinction between adware vs. spyware urged by advertising software vendors simply needs to abandoned by those serious about reforming installation practices and providing consumers protection against unwanted software.<br><br>2. Technology vs. Behavior<br><br>A second issue raised by advertising software vendors and the computer software industry more generally is the insistence that we avoid banning or mandating particular technologies and instead focus on reforming behaviors. The distinction between technology and behavior is usually coupled with the observation that it is difficult to define a particular class software known as "spyware."<br><br>This distinction between technology and behavior does have something to recommend it. Not only is it completely uncontroversial among most folks that we would not want to ban whole classes of technology, but an unduly narrow focus on particular technologies could actually undermine reform efforts by making notice/disclosure/choice requirements too specific. <br><br>For example, a bill that required software vendors to supply an uninstallation entry in the Add/Remove Programs Control Panel applet would neglect to cover other operating systems without that particular applet, making it impossible for some software vendors to satisfy the requirement. Moreover, if the Add/Remove Programs applet were to disappear or change in future versions of Windows, the law would essentially mandate the impossible. By turns, a ban on using certain defined JavaScript commands to hijack web pages would fail to cover other forms of browser hijacking, including those not yet invented.<br><br>As useful as such observations about particular technologies are, the more general technology vs. behavior distinction is not as clear-cut as its proponents would have us believe. Is homepage hijacking, for example, a technology or a behavior? Is the use of contextual pop-up advertising a technology or a behavior? Is the addition of porn-related toolbars to users' browsers a technology or a behavior? <br><br>I would argue that each of these examples represents behavior in the sense that they are business practices embodied in code. It is not the particular combinations of code that we seek target; it's the larger behavior that such code embodies. I strongly suspect, however, that those who urge a focus on "behavior" over "technology" would prefer a much narrower definition of "behavior" so as to hamstring legislatures and governmental agencies and prevent them from taking action against the more obnoxious business practices of the advertising software vendors.<br><br>Moreover, an exclusive focus on "behavior" risks becoming overly broad in its focus (as opposed to the overly narrow focus on "technology"). For example, a simple ban on the practice or behavior of transmitting personally indentifiable information (PII) could ensnare completely legitimate types of software, as Declan McCullagh recently pointed out ( &raquo;<A HREF="http://news.com.com/2010-1014_3-5209091.html" >news.com.com/2010-1014_3-5209091.html</A> ):<br><br> <BLOCKQUOTE><SMALL>said by Declan McCullagh:</SMALL><HR>A bill sponsored by Rep. Mary Bono, R-Calif., to ban spyware, goes much further. Bono defines spyware as "any software" that "transmits" personal information -- a category that would include any e-mail client (because it transmits a "From: address") and many Unix utilities. FTC officials recently criticized it as a bad idea.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE><br><br>Where a technology-specific focus risks becoming too narrow, a behavior-specific focus risks becoming too broad.<br><br>Ironically, the proponents of the technology vs. behavior distinction can't seem to keep the distinction straight themselves, as the quote from McCullagh just above demonstrates. In his article, McCullagh actually uses the above example to illustrate risk of focusing on technology, when the problem illustrated by the example is actually that of focusing on behavior. Moreover, those who advocate going after behavior over technology are prone to making ridiculous claims and comparisons to ward off governmental intrusion. McCullagh quotes Will Rodger of the industry trade association the Computer and Communications Industry Association (CCIA) on the problems of addressing problems with technology through law:<br><br> <BLOCKQUOTE><SMALL>said by Will Rodger:</SMALL><HR>Sometimes, it feels good to pass these laws, but they're not going to have an effect on the problem...We often see bills come through with the greatest of intentions. But as they say elsewhere, you can't suspend the laws of physics.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE><br><br>But that is a specious comparison. Software technology, as McCullagh just got through explaining to us, is a human creation that is "infinitely malleable and resists being pigeonholed by lawyers." It is not immutable, fixed, and given like the laws of physics, and thus the problems that arise when we use an overly broad focus on behavior that risk ensnaring all kinds of technologies we didn't intend to cover by targeting behavior.<br><br>The proponents of the technology vs. behavior distinction use similarly muddled logic when they talk about the difficulty of defining a class of software technologies known as "spyware." On the one hand, as we saw on Panel 1 ( &raquo;<A HREF="/forum/remark,10018653~mode=flat~start=20#10038251">FTC Spyware Workshop: 1st Impressions</A> ) industry representatives and allies often complain that current legislation is counterproductive because it focuses too narrowly on technology, and that a narrow focus on technology makes it impossible to define a class of software known as "spyware." Much better, they tell us, to focus on "behavior." On the other hand, they are all too happy to define "spyware" in contradistinction to "adware," leading us to believe that perhaps the problem of defining "spyware" isn't quite as difficult as they would have us believe. Indeed, if one is going to urge a focus on behavior over technology, it is difficult to understand why one would then insist on a distinction between adware vs. spyware, which only puts the focus back on technology. The industry's position on these several issues and terms is completely self-contradictory, self-serving, and confused.<br><br>Still worse, some opponents of anti-spyware legislation even attempt to play both cards at once, as we saw in the remarks of Howard Beales of the FTC before a House subcommittee recently ( &raquo;<A HREF="http://cbs.marketwatch.com/news/story.asp?guid=%7BCCCD507B-F3D4-4A9A-A5ED-C76547E69783%7D&siteid=google&dist=google" >cbs.marketwatch.com/news/story.a&middot;&middot;&middot;t=google</A> ):<br><br> <BLOCKQUOTE><SMALL>said by Michael Cowden, CBS Marketwatch:</SMALL><HR>Beales also argued that the Bono bill didn't provide a workable definition of "spyware." "We need to determine if there is a definable class of software that can truly be called 'spyware,' " he said.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE><br><br>In other words, "spyware" is probably just too tough to define, but Bono bill needs to define it anyway. And what happened to the insistence that we focus on behavior instead of technology, we might well wonder? If the Bono bill were to clearly and satisfactorily define a class of software as "spyware," its opponents would likely complain that it focused too narrowly on technology.<br><br>Some proponents of the technology vs. behavior distinction might object that by "behavior" they mean practices that are not technologically specific, and that we ought to craft laws that outlaw fraudulent practices in general and allow the FTC to prosecute companies on a case-by-case basis. Allowing the FTC to prosecute cases under general fraud provisions of the law has the advantage of great flexibility in that it allows the FTC to make fine judgment calls about ever changing installation practices. But such an approach has several downsides, not the least of which is that it could lend itself to arbitrariness, leaving software companies to wonder just what constituted an acceptable set of installation practices. Still worse, though, such an approach is not likely to be useful in addressing the tough cases that we discussed above -- the cases in which companies do supply a EULA of some soft and thus have a presumptive claim to have given users notice and choice.<br><br>While it will be more productive to focus on objectionable practices as opposed to specific technologies, the language defining those practices must be carefully crafted so as not to be overly broad.<br><br>3. Information vs. Practices<br><br>As we have already discussed, it is simply not enough to focus on the amount and types of information provided to users during the installation of software. We must also pay close attention to the particular installation practices through which that information is delivered. If we focus only on defining the amount and type of information provided, many advertising software vendors will simply be able to continue their usual installation practices, most of which simply fail to actually provide clear, conspicuous notice.<br><br>4. Objectionable Practices<br><br>Contrary to the claims from the industry, most anti-spyware legislation does focus on a core set of problematic behaviors, not particular technologies. It is important that anti-spyware legislation address the full range of objectionable practices and behaviors used by spyware vendors. <br><br>a) PII vs. PSI<br><br>All the bills target software that gathers and transmits personally identifiable information (PII) -- information that uniquely points to individuals (name, SSN#, address, et al). But anti-spyware legislation should also target software that gathers what we can call personally sensitive information (PSI) -- information about users' behavior on the Net, for example. The gathering and transmission of both PSI and PII represents an intrusion into users' privacy unless such monitoring is clearly and knowingly consented to in advance by users.<br><br>The harms inflicted by spyware goes beyond "spying," however, and we need legislation that targets more than just the collection and transmission of PII (or PSI).<br><br>b) Desktop Advertising<br><br>One of the biggest complaints of spyware victims is intrusive, disruptive advertising on their desktops, usually in the form of pop-up advertising. Some of this advertising is contextual -- that is, determined by the web sites users happen to visit and which are monitored by advertising software such as Gator or SaveNow. Other advertising is not contextual. Whatever the case, advertising that is delivered by client software on users' systems (not by web pages or online services) should be targeted by anti-spyware legislation.<br><br>c) System Additions & Modifications<br><br>Another big complaint from users involves unwanted additions to their systems -- such as searchbars, toolbars, and animated characters -- and unwanted modifications to key user settings -- such as the default browser home page or search engines. All of these additions and modifications are designed to drive users to use certain online sites and services, and such commercial practices should be targeted by anti-spyware legislation. In targeting such commercial practices, however, anti-spyware legislation needs to be carefully crafted so that it doesn't target all manner of systems changes, which would needlessly ensnare almost every kind of software currently built.<br><br>d) Uninstallation Methods<br><br>The final serious complaint from spyware victims is that advertising software or spyware often does not provide a reliable uninstallation method. Either the uninstallation method is hidden, or it doesn't work properly. In some cases there is no way to uninstall the software whatsoever. Still worse, some spyware resists being uninstalled, employing tactics to thwart user attempts to remove the software. Anti-spyware legislation should insist on the provision of a conspicuous, reliable uninstallation method.<br><br>Some have objected to this proposed requirement, invoking hypothetical horror stories in which software vendors are required to provide uninstallers for software components vital to the basic operation of the system, thus allowing users to unwittingly sabotage their own systems. Still others have wondered about the effect of such a requirement on parental control software, which prevents children from removing the software themselves. <br><br>None of these objections can ultimately stand at the end of day as legitimate reasons to avoid requiring uninstallation methods for spyware or advertising software. Not only can we craft the language appropriately -- for example, to require that an uninstallation method be provided to the authorized administrator of the computer -- but we can carve out exceptions for certain classes of operating system software modules. Still better, we can limit the uninstallation requirement to software that uses any of the three previously noted practices (collection/transmission of PII/PSI; desktop advertising; system additions/modifications), thus exempting system-critical software entirely.<br><br>5. The Standard Legislative Formula<br><br>When we turn to the specific bills in Congress (the Bono bill, the SPY BLOCK bill, and the Inslee bill), we find that they all tend operate with the following formula:<br><br>Step 1: Define a covered class of software which employs certain objectionable practices (collection/transmission of PII/PSI; desktop advertising; system additions/modifications).<br><br>Step 2: Require certain notice/choice practices for this covered class of software. <br><br>Put negatively, the bills ban software which meets the definition of the covered class of software but which does not meet the practices requirements.<br><br>Step 3: Provide for enforcement.<br><br>The problem with this formula is that it is too rigid in linking Step 1 with Step 2. The key is in linking the covered class (Step 1) with the required behavior (Step 2) in a more flexible fashion. Put another way, when we enshrine certain behaviors in law -- whether those be the behaviors of the covered class of software or the required installation practices for notice/choice/disclosure -- we risk imposing an overly rigid framework on software vendors. We want a framework that that clearly targets certain objectionable practices and requires robust notice/disclosure/choice, but we don't want that framework to be too rigid and inflexible in the face of evolving technology. <br><br>As long as anti-spyware bills rely exclusively on an approach that fixes behaviors and practices in law, it will risk targeting legitimate, innocuous software and burdening software vendors and users with unfeasible requirements. Still worse, such legislation could also risk circumvention by unscrupulous spyware distributors who carefully craft their software to side-step the defined, covered class of software or who tailor their installation practices to fulfill the installation practice requirements without providing users with adequate notice, choice, and disclosure.<br><br>6. A Better Legislative Formula<br><br>Interestingly, the Bono bill ( &raquo;<A HREF="http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:h.r.02929:" >thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z&middot;&middot;&middot;r.02929:</A> ) does provide a hint at what might be a better formula for anti-spyware legislation. This alternative approach can be called the "FTC Guidelines" formula. <br><br>Sec. 2.(b) of the Bono bill requires the FTC to draft guidelines for notice/choice/consent, however, this section doesn't provide advice or guidance on how the FTC would expand upon the specific standards provided in the bill itself for notice/choice/disclosure practices beyond the very specific requirements of Sec. 2. In other words, its mandate for the FTC is too vague. Sec. 2.(a) suggests a more general requirement for "clear and conspicuous request for such consent or through an affirmative request for such transmission," however, the FTC needs to be given clearer guidelines for establishing required information and practices that meet this standard:<br><br>1) The bill should specify that these guidelines for "clear and conspicuous" notice/choice/disclosure be drafted, published, reviewed, and enforced by the FTC through a deliberate, formal, public process. The bill needs to direct that the FTC shall hold a comment and input period on the specific guidelines, publish a set of specific guidelines (which can be more technologically specific because they can be periodically revised), review those guidelines every 6 months or a year, and revise those guidelines as needed. The bill could even mandate empirical research, study, and testing.<br><br>2) "Clear and conspicuous" should be fleshed out a wee bit more to indicate what that means in cyberspace. Moreover, the FTC should be given a list of principles/priorities/parameters for determining/drafting that list of guidelines. For example, these principles/priorities/parameters might specify that the guidelines: a) must give priority to ensuring that consumers receive adequate notice and choice; b) must impose requirements that are technologically feasible; c) must not mandate the use of proprietary technologies/closed standards; et al.<br><br>3) The bill should specify that revisions to the guidelines be driven by: a) changes in technology; b) indication that notice and choice are not being adequately created by present guidelines; c) indication that the guidelines are putting an undue burden on businesses without getting any clear benefits to consumers, et al.<br><br>In other words, the Bono bill's required set of FTC guidelines for notice/choice/disclosure is potentially productive, however:<br><br>1) it needs to be fleshed out into a more deliberate public process;<br><br>2) it needs to be grounded in and driven by particular parameters, priorities, and principles;<br><br>3) it needs to provide for a review, study, and revision process;<br><br>4) it needs to be drafted in such a way to hold the FTC's feet to the fire and prevent the usual suspects from crooking the whole process.<br><br>Under this alternative approach, the formula for anti-spyware legislation would become:<br><br>Step 1: Specify a covered class of software behaviors, but not frame this covered class as "spyware" (collection/transmission of PII, collection of non-PII, advertising, system additions/modifications).<br><br>Step 2: Direct the FTC to establish a set of guidelines for behavior/practices, which would cover notice/choice/disclosure. The key would be to specify: 1) a general set of principles/parameters/goals to frame/constrain/drive the drafting of these guidelines; 2) a revision and review process that would inject some flexibility into the guidelines.<br><br>Note that this Step 2 differs from the standard Step 2 (above) in that instead of enshrining a set of required practices in law, it allows the FTC to set guidelines for those practices within a certain set of parameters. Put another way, it says: "FTC, you shall have leeway to establish guidelines for required notice/choice practices, but those guidelines must do the following..."<br><br>Step 3: Provide for enforcement.<br><br>The difference in this arrangement is that Step 2 is not only more flexible, but allows us to avoid the evils of a) too much narrow technological specificity in the law itself; b) collateral damage from an overly broad focus on behaviors that unwittingly wipes out legitimate software.<br><br>If this "FTC Guidelines" formula could be made to work, it would allow us to negotiate the Scylla and Charybdis of not regulating particular technologies without being so overly broad in regulating behavior that we unwittingly regulate/ban "legitimate technologies." In fact, we COULD get a bit more particular in regulating technologies, as long as those technologies weren't cast in the stone of law but were rather embedded in revisable FTC guidelines that were guided by broader principles/parameters that were themselves set in the law.<br><br>Concluding Remarks on Panel 6<br><br>As I noted at the outset of this long discussion of Panel 6, there are many encouraging signs in the fight against spyware. Things are happening both inside and outside of government, and events are moving so swiftly that the FTC's preferred approach ("industry self-regulation," consumer education, enforcement of existing laws) may well be swept aside in the coming months. As encouraging as such a prospect might be, we must not lose sight of the difficulty of crafting effective anti-spyware legislation.<br><br>In saying that I am mindful that some may regard this admonition with suspicion. That suspicion is not unwarranted, because the industry itself has attempted to throw roadblocks in front of the legislative process by coming up with endless excuses to oppose anti-spyware legislation. I think it is important to recognize that many of their objections and warnings do have some merit, and we ignore the difficulties they point to at our peril. <br><br>Unlike industry obstructionists, however, I think we can work through these difficulties and craft a good bill that provides consumers strong protections against spyware without unduly burdening software vendors or end users. In other words, instead of looking for excuses to reject legislation outright -- which is what the industry is doing -- I think we need to look at the bills currently in Congress, recognize flaws and problems where they do exist, and work to improve the language of the bills to correct those flaws and problems.<br><br>Although I have reviewed all three bills before Congress and have specific comments on them, I will save those comments for another day.<br><br>Best,<br><br>Eric L. Howes ]]></description>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,10295460</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 20 May 2004 23:05:58 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: FTC Spyware Workshop: 1st Impressions</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,10192053</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/378696"><b>eburger68</b></A> : Hi All:<br><br>Before I review the discussion on Panel 5 of the FTC's Spyware Workshop, I want to return briefly to a point that I made in my review of Panel 4 ( &raquo;<A HREF="/forum/remark,10018653~mode=flat~start=40#10123932">FTC Spyware Workshop: 1st Impressions</A> ), where I remarked that large online corporations like AOL and Microsoft could not be completely trusted to protect the interests of consumers because of their own continuing interest in putting advertising before their customers. These kinds of large online entities often see themselves as gateways between advertisers and the millions of customers who populate their networks and services. When such companies stand to benefit from putting advertising in front of their customers, then there are good reasons to be skeptical of their commitment to protecting consumers from unwanted commercial messages, esp. as the free, open internet becomes an increasingly privatized oligopoly of large proprietary networks owned by a few media firms. <br><br>If you doubt the potential dangers of this scenario or arrangement, then you ought to read the following report from Reuters about Microsoft's plans to sell space on a "whitelist" of "legitimate marketers" whose unsolicited commercial messages will be allowed past Microsoft's spam filters on Hotmail and MSN:<br><br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://money.excite.com/jsp/nw/nwdt_rt.jsp?section=news&cat=INDUSTRY&feed=reu&news_id=reu-n0416330&date=20040505" >money.excite.com/jsp/nw/nwdt_rt.&middot;&middot;&middot;20040505</A><br><br>Replace "spam" with "spyware" or even "advertising software" and convert the "spam"/"legitimate marketing" dichotomy into "spyware"/"adware" and you'll begin to get a sense for why I am wary of the efforts of large ISPs to assume the role of protecting their customers from "spyware."<br><br>Panel Five: Technological Responses to Spyware<br><br>Panelists:<br><br>U - Steven Bellovin, AT&T Fellow with AT&T Labs-Research<br>U - Jeffrey Friedberg, Director of Windows Privacy, Microsoft<br>P - David Moll, President, WebRoot (maker of SpySweeper)<br>P - Wayne Porter, Co-Founder and Primary Editor, SpywareGuide.com (distributor of X-Cleaner)<br>U - Daniel Weitzner, Technology & Society Domain Leader, World Wide Web Consortium; Researcher at MIT<br><br>Key:<br><br>X - industry/corporate friendly<br>U - unknown/undetermined<br>P - privacy friendly <br><br>Note: be sure to take a look at the photos of Panel 5 as well as the other other panels at Bill Pytlovany's blog page and Declan McCullagh's site:<br><br>Declan McCullagh - FTC Spyware Workshop Photos<br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://www.mccullagh.org/theme/ftc-spyware-workshop-apr04.html" >www.mccullagh.org/theme/ftc-spyw&middot;&middot;&middot;r04.html</A><br><br>Bill Pytlovany's Blog from the Workshop<br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://www.mysteryware.com/blog.html" >www.mysteryware.com/blog.html</A><br><br>A Familiar Discussion<br><br>Of all the panels at the FTC's Spyware Workshop of April 19, this is the panel that covered topics that would be most familiar to the readers of DSLR/BBR and other online security forums. The discussion of this panel was dominated by the topic of ActiveX controls -- a special class of browser plug-ins that are the primary components in the automated online installations of "spyware" by unscrupulous web sites and services, installations often dubbed "drive-by-downloads." The panelists discussed the problems with "drive-by-downloads" of ActiveX controls as well as a few potential solutions. While there was nothing overtly problematic or objectionable about the points made by the panelists (unlike Panels 1 and 4), Panel 5's discussion of technological solutions was lacking in some regard.<br><br>Microsoft & ActiveX Controls<br><br>The most important component of Panel 5 was the presentation by Jeffrey Friedberg of Microsoft, who offered a useful overview of the problems with automated installations of ActiveX controls as well as the changes that Microsoft is making to that download and installation process in Service Pack 2 for Windows XP, due to be released in the very near future. (See &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/spyware/friedberg.pdf" >www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/spywar&middot;&middot;&middot;berg.pdf</A> for a PDF version of Friedberg's PowerPoint presentation.) <br><br>Friedberg first demonstrated what he called the "normal download experience," which is user-initiated. Those familiar with "drive-by-downloads" of "spyware" will know that so many of the unscrupulous web sites that foist unwanted advertising software on users employ web pages that themselves initiate the download and installation of software, instead of users -- a large part of the reason that users find this software so disorienting and confusing. <br><br>Even with this user-initiated "normal download experience," however, there are still significant problems, because the ActiveX Security Warning box provides almost no useful information about the software to be installed or the potential security problems -- a point that I made in my "Anatomy of a Drive-by-Download" ( &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/dbd-anatomy.htm" >www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/dbd-anatomy.htm</A> ), which was one of the documents that I submitted to the FTC. Friedberg said almost nothing about this lack of useful information, though the gentleman sitting next to me at the workshop (identity unknown) provided a running commentary on Friedberg's presentation, muttering under his breath at such omissions.<br><br>Friedberg next presented what he dubbed "some common tricks" that software vendors use when foisting unwanted advertising software on unwitting users of Microsoft's Internet Explorer web browser (Microsoft's browser is currently one of the primary vehicles through which unwanted software is delivered to consumers' desktops). <br><br>Trick # 1 was "Program Name More Than Just a Name." MS designed the ActiveX Security Warning box to allow software vendors to insert the names for their programs into the box and provide a link which users can click on to get more information about the program, perhaps even the End User License Agreement. Some vendors, however, have gone well beyond supplying just a name for their software, inserting entire sentences of descriptions and information about their software, which I noted myself in my "Anatomy of a Drive-by-Download" ( &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/dbd-anatomy.htm" >www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/dbd-anatomy.htm</A> ). I understand why some vendors are doing this -- to supply consumers with more information about their programs right up front, though Friedberg is surely right to note that the ActiveX Security Warning box was simply not designed for this purpose, nor is it the ideal means or method for vendors to supply notice and disclosure about the functionality of their software. Still further, the practice of linking to the EULA through the Security Warning box is problematic because users might not know to click the link and thus may not ever see a license agreement, even though they effectively agree to its terms by clicking through the Security Warning box to consent to the software installation.<br><br>Trick # 2 was a "Pop-Under Exploit" in which web pages use a pop-under window (which appears behind the current browser window) that contains Object tags to initiate a "drive-by-download." What is so confusing about this "exploit" for consumers is that the software installation appears as if out of nowhere, with no warning whatsoever. Many consumers mistakenly assume that the software mentioned in the Security Warning box originates from the site they are visiting and mistake it for a plug-in of some sort necessary to view the content of the site. Indeed, so common is it for web sites to require the installation of special programs -- often in the form of ActiveX controls -- that it is completely understandable that many consumers would have gotten into the habit of simply clicking "Yes" whenever such a box appears. Nonetheless, this kind of installation arrangement is a dubious, even deceptive way for vendors to push their software on internet users.<br><br>Tricks # 3 and # 4 ("Cancel Means Yes" and "Faux Security Alert") were but two examples of the myriad ways that unscrupulous software vendors and web sites use deceptive GUI elements to trick users into "consenting" to the installation of otherwise unwanted advertising software. These kinds of abusive installation practices are really bottom of the barrel, but they are quite common among the advertising software industry, unfortunately.<br><br>Before turning to the changes made in Windows XP Service Pack 2 (SP2), Friedberg noted that IE users can unwittingly role out the welcome mat for unwanted software by lowering the Security settings for the Internet zone from the default "Medium" setting, which at least ensures that users see the ActiveX Security warning box. When users lower the Security settings for the Internet zone, they won't even see the Security Warning box -- unwanted software will simply install on their systems whenever they land on web pages that initiate the download and installation of ActiveX controls.<br><br>Friedberg's point was a good one, however, Friedberg didn't fully address the full range of problems with automated installations of ActiveX controls. Even at the Medium setting, users are being tricked into consenting to the installation of software they don't want or need. Still further, there is plenty of software that exploits security holes in Microsoft's software to bypass the Security Warning box altogether. <br><br>A better approach to Internet Explorer security is to lock down the Internet zone altogether -- making it at least as secure as the Restricted sites zone -- and add trustworthy sites that require the use of active content (ActiveX controls, Java applets, scripting) to the Trusted sites zone (see &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/btw/ie/ie-opts.htm" >www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/btw/i&middot;&middot;&middot;opts.htm</A> for instructions and &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/resource6.htm" >www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/resource6.htm</A> for a small program to automate the configuration process). If users are loath to tighten the Security settings for the Internet zone (which can lead to a raft of burdensome, inconvenient warnings and notices), then they should look into a Restricted sites "blacklist," which adds web sites and domains associated with advertisers and advertising software vendors to the Restricted sites zone (see &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/resource.htm" >www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/resource.htm</A> for one such list). Once added to the Restricted sites zone, these sites and domains will be unable to perform automated installations of ActiveX controls (among other things).<br><br>And, of course, users of alternative browsers such as Mozilla ( &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.mozilla.org/releases/" >www.mozilla.org/releases/</A> ), Firefox ( &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.mozilla.org/products/firefox/" >www.mozilla.org/products/firefox/</A> ), and Opera ( &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.opera.com/" >www.opera.com/</A> ) will not hesitate to point out that not only have all of these non-MS browsers offered pop-up blocking for several years now, but they are simply not vulnerable to the ActiveX exploits used by advertising software vendors to foist their software on Internet Explorer users.<br><br>Friedberg next turned to the "enhancements" Microsoft has made to Windows XP SP2. First, Microsoft has added a pop-up blocker to Internet Explorer, though it is turned off by default. When turned on, most pop-ups are suppressed and a discrete notice about the blocked pop-up is provided in an information bar just under the URL Address bar. As with Mozilla's built-in pop-up blocker, users have the ability to configure pop-up blocking site-by-site. Given that so many "drive-by-downloads" are initiated by pop-ups, this feature alone will improve the security of Internet Explorer users.<br><br>Second, SP2's Internet Explorer will suppress all automated installations of software not initiated by the user. Instead of popping up the well-known Security Warning box, SP2's Internet Explorer will display yet another discrete notice in the information bar near the top of the main browser window, which users can click on for more information and options.<br><br>Even when users do decide to initiate the download of ActiveX controls themselves, they will see a new and improved Security Warning box. Of interest is the ability for users to specify that software from certain vendors (identified by the digital certificates used to sign ActiveX controls) always be installed or never be installed. (Internet Explorer currently does provide something resembling this feature through the "Publishers" box on the Internet Options "Content" tab, however, users only have the option to trust software vendors/publishers, not distrust them.)<br><br>This feature has enormous potential for anti-spyware activists and vendors, who could build lists of digital certificates from known spyware vendors and add them to the Registry to automatically block the installation of unwanted software, much as the SpywareGuide block list ( &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.spywareguide.com/blockfile.php" >www.spywareguide.com/blockfile.php</A> ) and JavaCool's SpywareBlaster ( &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.wilderssecurity.net/spywareblaster.html" >www.wilderssecurity.net/spywareblaster.html</A> ) do already by setting the "kill-bit" for the CLSIDs of known spyware.<br><br>SP2's Internet Explorer also comes with a new "Add-on Manager," which gives user a convenient and powerful way to view and control the ActiveX controls that are installed on their systems. (Although current versions of Internet Explorer do provide something like this already through the Downloaded Program Files folder, that functionality is difficult to find for most users and occasionally unreliable.)<br><br>All in all, these new enhancements should significantly improve the security of Internet Explorer users who download and install SP2. There are, of course, several important caveats to this picture, which I will return to shortly. Those interested in getting more information about SP2 for Windows XP should consult the following documents and web pages at Microsoft's web site:<br><br>Windows XP Service Pack 2 - Security Information for Developers<br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://msdn.microsoft.com/security/productinfo/XPSP2/default.aspx" >msdn.microsoft.com/security/prod&middot;&middot;&middot;ult.aspx</A><br><br>Windows XP Service Pack 2 - Technical Preview Program<br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://www.microsoft.com/technet/prodtechnol/winxppro/sp2preview.mspx" >www.microsoft.com/technet/prodte&middot;&middot;&middot;iew.mspx</A><br><br>Changes to Functionality in Microsoft Windows XP Service Pack 2<br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://www.microsoft.com/downloads/details.aspx?FamilyID=7bd948d7-b791-40b6-8364-685b84158c78&DisplayLang=en" >www.microsoft.com/downloads/deta&middot;&middot;&middot;yLang=en</A><br>or &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.microsoft.com/technet/prodtechnol/winxppro/maintain/winxpsp2.mspx" >www.microsoft.com/technet/prodte&middot;&middot;&middot;sp2.mspx</A><br><br>Windows XP Service Pack 2: A Developer's View<br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://msdn.microsoft.com/security/productinfo/XPSP2/default.aspx?pull=/library/en-us/dnwxp/html/securityinxpsp2.asp" >msdn.microsoft.com/security/prod&middot;&middot;&middot;psp2.asp</A><br><br>Other Notes About ActiveX Controls<br><br>Although Friedberg's presentation was the highlight of Panel 5 and overshadowed almost everything else that was discussed, several of the other panelists did address ActiveX controls.<br><br>First, Wayne Porter of SpywareGuide ( &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.spywareguide.com/" >www.spywareguide.com/</A> ) explained the purpose and functionality of the ActiveX block list distributed by SpywareGuide. JavaCool, it should be noted, makes a similar block list available through his excellent SpywareBlaster program ( &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.wilderssecurity.net/spywareblaster.html" >www.wilderssecurity.net/spywareblaster.html</A> ). Both of these block lists "inoculate" Internet Explorer against the installation of unwanted spyware by setting the "kill-bit" on the CLSIDs of known spyware programs distributed as ActiveX controls. Combined with strengthened Security settings in Internet Explorer (see &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/btw/ie/ie-opts.htm" >www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/btw/i&middot;&middot;&middot;opts.htm</A> ) or a Restricted sites block list (see &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/resource.htm" >www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/resource.htm</A> ), such a block list can provide strong protection against the automated installation of unwanted software on the internet, though these block lists must be updated regularly to keep pace with the new varieties of spyware that appear on the Net almost daily.<br><br>Second, David Moll of Webroot, maker of the anti-spyware program Spy Sweeper ( &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.webroot.com/wb/products/spysweeper/index.php" >www.webroot.com/wb/products/spys&middot;&middot;&middot;ndex.php</A> ) as well as the Spy Audit program used by Earthlink ( &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.earthlink.net/spyaudit/" >www.earthlink.net/spyaudit/</A> ), discussed one of Webroot's new products. After dissing the "hobbyists" who had dominated the anti-spyware scene/market before the entry of Webroot with its Spy Sweeper product, Moll went on to describe a portable security scanner that Webroot has developed. It's an ActiveX control that users can download and run while on potentially insecure machines (a PC in an Internet cafe, for example). This portable security application scans the entire box for malicious code (keyloggers, system monitors, trojans, etc). Moll billed it as a way for users ensure that boxes they don't control are secure.<br><br>The irony of this "security application" was not lost on Steven Bellovin, Fellow with AT&T Labs-Research, also on the panel. Noting that mobile code is one of the biggest security problems in Windows, he quipped that Webroot's portable security scanner was one of the "scariest things" he had yet heard about at the workshop.<br><br>And Bellovin was right, of course, because what Moll had unwittingly pointed out is that ActiveX controls can be used to import and run completely foreign code of unknown provenance at the user's discretion on boxes that the user ostensibly shouldn't control.<br><br>Indeed, Moll was too focused on promoting his own products, unfortunately. Another of his gaffes was his off-hand remark to the audience that the topic of spyware was one that "none of us here had even heard about two years ago" (or something very close to that effect). DSLR/BBR regulars will know that "spyware" was a topic of discussion here almost four years ago. Where was Moll?<br><br>Wayne Porter also discussed Xblock's own X-Cleaner ( see &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/spyware/porter.pdf" >www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/spyware/porter.pdf</A> ), yet another anti-spyware application ( &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.xblock.com/" >www.xblock.com/</A> ) distributed by SpywareGuide.<br><br>Misc. Topics<br><br>There were a few other topics that were discussed on this "technological solutions" panel. Steve Bellovin addressed the role of firewalls in network security. A few of the other panelists exchanged remarks on improving notice and disclosure during software installations, including P3P-like measures that could be used to provide more information about software functionality to users during installations. To his credit, Daniel Weitzner of the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), one of the prime forces behind the P3P specification (see &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.w3.org/P3P/" >www.w3.org/P3P/</A> ), expressed his skepticism of such an adaptation of P3P, though he said he wouldn't completely dismiss the idea. <br><br>DSLR/BBR readers will know that I have nothing but contempt for P3P as a solution to online privacy problems, esp. its partial implementation in Internet Explorer 6.0's Privacy controls (and I am not alone in this regard). See:<br><br>"IE6 & P3P Are Not Panaceas"<br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/priv-pol.htm#ie6-p3p" >www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/priv-&middot;&middot;&middot;#ie6-p3p</A><br><br>"Internet Privacy w/ IE6 & P3P: A Summary of Findings"<br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/ie6-p3p.htm" >www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/ie6-p3p.htm</A><br><br>Internet Explorer 6.0 Resources<br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/resource5.htm" >www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/resource5.htm</A><br><br>P3P & Internet Explorer 6.0 Privacy Info<br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/info2.htm" >www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/info2.htm</A><br><br>To my thinking, regarding P3P as a solution to consumer privacy problems is a bit like thinking the solution to shady car dealerships and crooked mechanics is to give all consumers an 800 page Chilton's Auto Repair manual, with the idea that they could learn about cars and "negotiate" their "choices" with businesses from a strong position.<br><br>Problems Not Addressed<br><br>As useful and informative as the discussion of technological solutions on Panel 5 was, it failed to address several key issues.<br><br>First, all of the discussion of automated ActiveX control installations overshadowed the fact that another major route for the installation of spyware is through software bundling, where unwanted advertising software piggybacks on other "free" software that consumers want. I have yet to see a good proposal for improving notice, disclosure, and choice during the installation of bundled software.<br><br>Second, as welcome as Microsoft's Windows XP SP2 will be, its immediate effect will be limited. Many consumers with Windows XP will not know to download and install it. Still further, many consumers are still running older versions of Windows, and MS will apparently not be incorporating the enhancements to IE detailed above into older versions of Internet Explorer for other versions of Windows, leaving millions of consumers vulnerable. Even after OEMs begin pre-installing Windows XP SP2, the percentage of consumers who benefit from these new IE features will be comparatively small, so I don't anticipate that advertising software vendors will dispense with "drive-by-downloads" in the foreseeable future.<br><br>Third, none of the panelists discussed the problems with current anti-spyware software, which many consumers find too complex and confusing, and which must be updated constantly in order to be effective against the heavy barrage of new spyware on the Net. As I noted in my comments to the FTC (see Myths #5 and #6 in &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/ftc-comments.htm#myths" >www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/ftc-c&middot;&middot;&middot;tm#myths</A> ), even computer savvy users who diligently keep up with spyware developments struggle to keep this class of unwanted software off their systems. And anti-spyware vendors themselves often struggle to provide protection against the deluge of new advertising software on the Net.<br><br>All of these problems should have been addressed more forthrightly on Panel 5 in order to give the audience and the FTC a realistic picture of the potential uses of anti-spyware technology in the fight to keep users' desktops free of unwanted advertising software.<br><br>Concluding Remarks on Panel 5<br><br>Panel 5 offered some small amount of hope for users of Windows XP SP2, however, there was nothing from Panel 5 to suggest that radical improvements in anti-spyware technology may be in the offing, which is what is needed if such technology is to play a decisive role in solving the problems with spyware. Anti-spyware technology currently resembles that used by the anti-virus industry for its software. Indeed, I often tell beginning users that anti-spyware applications like Ad-aware ( &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.lavasoft.de/" >www.lavasoft.de/</A> ) and Spybot Search & Destroy ( &raquo;<A HREF="http://spybot.safer-networking.de/" >spybot.safer-networking.de/</A> ) work much like an anti-virus program, only they scan for spyware, not traditional malware (viruses, trojans, and worms).  <br><br>As such, anti-spyware technology has all the same vulnerabilities and shortcomings as anti-virus software, which has been around much longer, achieved much higher levels of market penetration and consumer adoption, and which is much more mature in some respects. Anti-spyware programs can provide strong protection against unwanted advertising software for a certain class of technically proficient users, but it is hardly a panacea -- at least not in its current forms. Those tempted to place too much faith in anti-spyware technology as a non-regulatory solution to the spyware problem would do well to remember the problems with anti-virus technology the next time a worm or virus swamps the internet and infests the computers of their friends, family, and co-workers, all of whom will probably have an anti-virus program.<br><br>On an unrelated note, I should report that my earlier comments on the Center for Democracy and Technology (see &raquo;<A HREF="/forum/remark,10018653~mode=flat~start=20#10038251">FTC Spyware Workshop: 1st Impressions</A> ) have prompted the CDT to get in touch with me. Not surprisingly, the CDT was less than thrilled with my assessment of their contributions to the fight against spyware. I am currently considering posting a more detailed explanation of my skepticism of the CDT's several actions and positions on the topic of spyware. If I do decide to post, it will be in this thread.<br><br>Also, I discovered that my name appears on one of WhenU's web pages:<br><br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://www.whenu-advertising-info.com/other.html" >www.whenu-advertising-info.com/other.html</A><br><br>On that site -- which is primarily devoted to presenting WhenU's software as "consumer friendly" -- WhenU reprints an article from The New York Times (without attribution, by the way) for which I was interviewed almost two years ago. Presumably WhenU reprinted that article on its site to hold up its own software as an alternative, "consumer-friendly" form of "adware" that is radically different from the "spyware" discussed in that article. That's certainly not a distinction that I would make, though. <br><br>In fact, in my comments to the FTC (see &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/ftc-comments.htm#typical" >www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/ftc-c&middot;&middot;&middot;#typical</A> ) I told the story of having to clean yet another of my students' computers of unwanted software ("spyware," "adware," whatever you choose to call it). One of the more obnoxious programs on that student's box was WhenU's advertising software, though she had no idea how or when it was installed. That's not too surprising, given the results of PC Pitstop's survey of WhenU users, most of whom were unaware of the software on their PCs (see &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/040413pcpitstop.pdf" >www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/&middot;&middot;&middot;stop.pdf</A> ).<br><br>There is but one panel left for me to discuss: Panel 6 (Government Responses to Spyware). This was an important panel, given the current amount of legislative activity on the issue of spyware. See the news links on my FTC Spyware Workshop page for more information on the several bills currently winding their way through Congress as well as several state legislatures:<br><br>The FTC's Spyware Workshop<br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/ftc-spyware.htm" >www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/ftc-spyware.htm</A><br><br>I anticipate that I will be posting my comments on that panel in the next few days.<br><br>All the best,<br><br>Eric L. Howes]]></description>
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<pubDate>Sun, 09 May 2004 00:31:14 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: FTC Spyware Workshop: 1st Impressions</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,10123932</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/378696"><b>eburger68</b></A> : Hi All:<br><br>Before I commence with my review of Panel 4 of the FTC's Spyware Workshop, let me point out that the FTC has posted a few more comments on its web site (#212-17):<br><br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/index.html" >www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/index.html</A><br><br>This new batch of comments includes a response from PC Pitstop to the submissions from WhenU and Gator.<br><br># 216 PC Pitstop-2 (04/27/04) <br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/040427pcpitstop2gatorwhenuresponse.pdf" >www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/&middot;&middot;&middot;onse.pdf</A><br><br>PC Pitstop points out that Gator's and WhenU's expressed interest in providing consumers forthright notice of installation (see &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/040419whenu-com.pdf" >www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/&middot;&middot;&middot;-com.pdf</A> and &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/040416clariacorporation.pdf" >www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/&middot;&middot;&middot;tion.pdf</A> ) is completely undercut by PC Pitstop's research results on (unwitting) users of these software programs (see &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/040315pcpitstop.pdf" >www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/&middot;&middot;&middot;stop.pdf</A> and &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/040413pcpitstop.pdf" >www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/&middot;&middot;&middot;stop.pdf</A> ), who are largely unaware of the software running on their computers.<br><br>Also of interest in this small batch is the submission from Pest Patrol, which had two representatives at the FTC's Workshop, including one on Panel 2.<br><br># 213 PestPatrol, Inc. (04/23/04) <br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/040423pestpatrolstatement.pdf" >www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/&middot;&middot;&middot;ment.pdf</A><br><br>Pest Patrol's statement is short (4 pages), but it usefully makes several important points, the most noteworthy of which is a call for consumer protection legislation to buttress or supplement other efforts and solutions:<br><br> <BLOCKQUOTE><SMALL>said by Pest Patrol:</SMALL><HR>We contend that only a combination of consumer education and protection, disclosure through legislation, and active prosecution will provide the answer needed to address the spyware threat, right now. None of these solutions by themselves is enough, and while we advocate and applaud industry self-regulation, we do not believe that it alone will be speedy enough or dramatic enough to address the spyware problem.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE><br><br>Unfortunately, Pest Patrol wasn't on Panel 4, which could have benefited from hearing a sober assessment of the prospects for "industry self-regulation" and "consumer education."<br><br>Panel Four: Industry Responses to Spyware &#150; Industry Best Practices and Working<br>with the Government<br><br>Panelists:<br><br>X - Brian Arbogast, Corporate Vice President, Identity, Mobile and Partner Services Group, MSN and Personal Services Division, Microsoft Corporation<br>X - J. Trevor Hughes, Executive Director, Network Advertising Initiative <br>X - Chris Kelly, Chief Privacy Officer and General Counsel, Spoke Software<br>X - Fran Maier, Executive Director & President, TRUSTe<br>X - Andrew McLaughlin, Senior Policy Counsel, Google<br>X - Jules Polonetsky, Vice President, Integrity Assurance, AmericaOnline, Inc.<br>U - John Schwarz, President and Chief Operating Officer, Symantec Corp.<br><br>Note: be sure to take a look at the photos of Panel 4 as well as the other other panels at Bill Pytlovany's blog page and Declan McCullagh's site:<br><br>Declan McCullagh - FTC Spyware Workshop Photos<br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://www.mccullagh.org/theme/ftc-spyware-workshop-apr04.html" >www.mccullagh.org/theme/ftc-spyw&middot;&middot;&middot;r04.html</A><br><br>Bill Pytlovany's Blog from the Workshop<br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://www.mysteryware.com/blog.html" >www.mysteryware.com/blog.html</A><br><br>Industry Technological Reponses<br><br>Although I had anticipated that the discussion on Panel 4 would be dominated by talk of "industry self-regulation" through voluntary "best practices," this panel did address one other important topic: technological responses within the industry itself -- esp. among ISPs and the like -- to "spyware." This discussion topic was clearly connected with some of the points made on Panel 2 regarding the cost of "spyware" to ISPs and OEMs, who shoulder significant and burdensome costs because of the technical support that they provide to end users, their customers. While the technological responses developed and deployed by industry are clearly worth discussion, I am still at a loss to explain why the FTC chose to place the panelists who took up this issue (primarily Arbogast of MSN, Polonetsky of AOL, and Schwarz of Symantec) on Panel 4, which was billed as a panel focusing on "best practices." By contrast, technological responses deployed by industry seem to have been a better fit on Panel 5, which directly addressed technological responses more generally.<br><br>Several of the panelists on Panel 4 echoed the complaints of those on Panel 2 in calling attention to the costs of "spyware" to businesses. Most importantly, Brian Arbogast not only reiterated the technical support costs borne by service providers like MSN, but he disclosed that roughly 50% of Windows crashes reported to Microsoft through the automated crash reporting facilities of later versions of Windows are attributable to "spyware" and "adware," confirming what those who work in the trenches every day combating "spyware" already know: that such software severely degrades the functionality and usability of PCs, a problem that goes well beyond any privacy concerns that might be raised by such software. Arbogast also previewed the presentation of Microsoft's Jeffrey Friedberg on Panel 5, who would present a short but useful summary of the problems with the installation process for ActiveX controls -- the key component in "drive-by-downloads" of "spyware" and "adware" -- and the changes that Microsoft is making to that process in Windows XP Service Pack 2, to be released in the very near future.<br><br>Google's Andrew McLaughlin also had a useful presentation (see &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/spyware/mclaughlin.pdf" >www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/spywar&middot;&middot;&middot;hlin.pdf</A> for a PDF version) in which he put a spotlight on what he billed a "Slimware Hall of Shame." McLaughlin gave several graphic examples of unscrupulous "spyware" or "adware" programs -- including CoolWebSearch and C2 Media's Lop.com -- that effectively "hijack" Google's pages and services on users' computers. McLaughlin noted that this not only damages Google's good name and degrades its brand in the market, but that it also generates a not insignificant volume of email from distraught and confused users who have come to rely on Google's search services. As with the comments of a few of the other panelsists, McLaughlin's presentation would have worked better on Panel 2, which addressed more fully the costs to businesses.<br><br>Such was also the case with the presentation and comments of Jules Polonetsky from AOL, who echoed the complaints of Dell, MSN, and Austin Hill (Zero Knowledge) regarding the volume of support calls and problems caused by  "spyware" and "adware" among AOL's customers. Polonetsky also gave a short overview of the "spyware" protection to be incorporated into AOL's standard software package (see &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/spyware/polonetsky.pdf" >www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/spywar&middot;&middot;&middot;tsky.pdf</A> ). Mike Healan notes ( &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.spywareinfo.com/newsletter/archives/0404/24.php" >www.spywareinfo.com/newsletter/a&middot;&middot;&middot;4/24.php</A> ) that this software is based on Aluria's Spyware Eliminator, a reputable anti-spyware product. This decision by AOL, announced back in January ( &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A57314-2004Jan5?language=printer" >www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dy&middot;&middot;&middot;=printer</A> ), mirrors Earthlink's own efforts to provide its customers with "anti-spyware" software (Earthlink uses Webroot's software) and is an important step in distributing effective tools to hapless internet users who are besieged by unwanted advertising software.<br><br>As welcome as these contributions from major online entities are, these companies nonetheless have adopted stances and policies towards the issue of "spyware" that are deeply troubling. All three companies signed the NetCoalition letter opposing the Utah anti-spyware bill ( &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.netcoalition.com/index.asp?Type=B_BASIC&SEC={A5677952-F73C-42F3-9A2B-0426A898DF83}" >www.netcoalition.com/index.asp?T&middot;&middot;&middot;898DF83}</A> ). In that letter the industry questions bill's prohibition against installing software without notice to the user and without providing a conspicuous, usable uninstallation method. This letter, which mirrors the several statements made by the BSA (Business Software Association, a Microsoft-dominated industry group -- see &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.bsa.org/usa/press/newsreleases/E-Spying-BSA-Urges-Congress-to-Ban-Behavior-Not-Technology.cfm" >www.bsa.org/usa/press/newsreleas&middot;&middot;&middot;logy.cfm</A> and &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/040323bsaspywaretestimony.pdf" >www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/&middot;&middot;&middot;mony.pdf</A> ), also defends the use of "adware" and "popups" for targeted advertising, raising serious questions about the commitment of these companies to protecting consumers from unwanted and intrusive commercial software and messages. Indeed, Arbogast and McLaughlin both reiterated their companies' opposition to governmental regulation in their remarks on Panel 4 -- a depressing spectacle, given what both had already demonstrated about the nature of this invasive, destructive "spyware" and "adware."<br><br>Although the technological solutions discussed and previewed on Panel 4 are important contributions to the fight against "spyware" and "adware," they cannot be regarded as part of a larger industry response to the problem that would be an adequate solution to the complaints of consumers and internet users. At the very least, all of these companies have an uneven track record on consumer privacy, which should come as no surprise given the fact that these companies are in the business themselves of putting advertising before their customers. Thus, while these companies do have incentives to provide their customers with protection against some forms of unwanted advertising software, they are also in a position themselves to benefit from and exploit such software and advertising, putting millions of consumers in the uneasy position of seeking protection from intrusive advertising by relying on firms who have strong incentives to exploit it. That these firms have already gone on the record to defend certain forms of "adware" does nothing to inspire confidence in their ability to represent or defend the interests of their customers.<br><br>Indeed, the largest problem with the industry reponses to "spyware" and "adware" is that, coupled with their publicly expressed interest in defending advertising software, they move us closer to an online world in which consumers are utterly dependent on and at the mercy of paternalistic corporate entities who dominate and control every aspect of their online experiences, effectively nullifying the promise of the internet to provide citizens and consumers with an unprecedented level of autonomy in a communications medium. As the consolidation of large media firms into large oligopolies -- which already own most of the largest ISPs, cable providers, DSL providers, and content providers, not to mention phone companies who control large swaths of the hardware backbone of the internet itself -- proceeds at a breakneck pace, it is not unreasonable to anticipate that we are not that very far from an online world that is divided up into several large corporate fiefdoms. These proprietary online empires could set strict limits on the kinds of content or software allowed over their proprietary networks, structure every aspect of their customers' "online experience" to channel consumers into their own e-marketing services, and exploit advertising software themselves to push unwanted commercial content down on users, even as they provide protection against "unapproved"/"unauthorized" advertising software from other properietary networks and entities. <br><br>Indeed, as I remarked in a recent post here on DSLR/BBR ( &raquo;<A HREF="/forum/remark,9898401~mode=flat">What's the *motivation* for hijack-ware?</A> ), advertising software has the potential to be enormously attractive to such large online commercial entities because it represents an incredibly powerful means of "pushing" commercial content down on hapless users and establishing control over their "online experience" in order to advance the proprietary interests of corporations:<br><br> <BLOCKQUOTE><SMALL>said by Eric L. Howes:</SMALL><HR>(This advertising) technology is promising -- at least from the perspective of the advertising community. This technology -- hijackware, spyware, ad-ware, or whatever you choose to call it -- has an enormous potential attraction for advertisers: the ability to put advertising right on users' desktops, to convert their computers into fancy direct marketing machines, and to capture eyeballs in a way no other form of online advertising has yet been able to do.<br><br>Remember the rage in the media some years ago over "push" technology? (And this enthusiasm for "push" technology was largely confined to the media -- ordinary actual users hated it.) "Push" technology promised to solve one nasty problem for traditional media folks -- esp. advertisers -- created by the internet: namely, the independence and autonomy of internet users. Commercial advertisers prefer a captive audience with little autonomy. Despite all the blather about responding to consumer demand, they'd rather control a medium where they can "push" content down to users rather than respond to the demands of users -- it's simply much easier and less expensive to do it that way. "Push" technology died a predictable death because users hated it -- they wanted to be in control of their online experience, not let their use of the internet turn into a high-tech version of TV.<br><br>In truth, "push" technology hasn't completely died: it went into hibernation or incubation and was reborn as "spyware" or "hijackware" or "ad-ware" -- whatever you prefer to call it. "Hijackware" is merely the latest incarnation of "push" technology. And it is enormously attractive to advertisers. This kind of software technology allows advertisers to grab eyeballs, so to speak, right on the desktop and push unwanted commercial content down on users who have tremendous difficulty escaping it. For advertisers it's a dream come true: the ultimate captive audience. For normal web surfers it's the ultimate nightmare.<br><br>As I said, the technology has a bad reputation right now, and many advertisers have stayed away -- for now. But that's changing. At the moment this kind of technology is more prevalent on porn sites and crackz/warez sites. But remember: it is well known that the online porn industry serves as a kind of "test bed" for new technologies and business practices. Technologies and practices that were once the exclusive province of porn sites just a few years ago are now commonplace on the "mainstream" internet. Moreover, as any number of spyware distributors themselves have argued, spyware could very well become an attractive means for large, "mainstream" online entities to push their commercial messages on users, especially given the problems that have plagued the online advertising industry over the past few years.<br><br>We're already seeing signs of this growing interest among "mainstream" commercial entities, as I pointed out above. Not only are outfits like WhenU and Claria attracting investors and clients, but very large and respected online entities have gone to bat against the anti-spyware legislation recently introduced into the Utah state legislature and the U.S. House of Representatives. (...) If you read carefully, you'll notice that once you get past the usual nonsense about "stifling innovation" and so forth their real concern becomes quite clear: that such anti-spyware legislation could kill the hijackware advertising market. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE><br><br>Thus, while such online giants would be expected to provide protection against advertising software from other online entities with whom it had no established commercial relationship, these giants would likely see fit to exploit the technology themselves to force their own commercial content down on users caught within the web of their oligopolistic networks. These online giants already see themselves as gatekeepers of sorts, controlling access to attractively large pools of consumers. In such an environment, the distinction that the industry seeks to make between illegitimate "spyware" and legitimate "adware" would simply be reproduced on a much larger level as these online media giants embedded their own preferred and protected forms of advertising software into the software layer of their networks and took steps to shield their captive customers from competing, external commercial messages. As I concluded in that earlier post:<br><br> <BLOCKQUOTE><SMALL>said by Eric L. Howes:</SMALL><HR>At the risk of sounding alarmist, I would say that we stand on the threshold of a potentially enormous change in the way normal folks use the internet and the kind of autonomy they have -- the amount of control they can exert over their online experience. There are powerful entities who would prefer to turn the free, open internet into one vast corporate playground -- a high tech version of TV -- and "hijackware"/"spyware"/"adware" could very well be one of the technologies that allows them to realize their radical agenda.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE><br><br>We are not there yet, but the panelists on Panel 4 who discussed the technologies being deployed by large online businesses against "spyware" and "adware" did almost nothing to inspire confidence in their companies' larger, long-term commitment to protecting consumers from invasive advertising and marketing.<br><br>"Industry Self-Regulation"<br><br>The main focus on Panel 4 was not technological responses from industry, however, but rather "industry self-regulation" through the creation of "best practices" or standards that would enable businesses to interact with internet users and consumers in an ethical manner. As I noted earlier, this is the FTC's own preferred method for addressing the problem of "spyware." Although I've already expressed my contempt for such a concept in numerous other places -- including the first post in this thread where I disparaged it as "oxymoronic doublespeak at its bureaucratic finest" -- the idea of "industry self-regulation" deserves a few more words to help readers understand just what this term actually represents.<br><br>All of the panelists on Panel 4 expressed strong reservations about the potential effects of governmental regulation, recommending an industry effort to craft a set of "best practices" as a preferable alternative to legislation and governmental intrusion into the marketplace. Their comments echoed those of earlier panels, esp. Panel 1, which was similarly dominated by industry representatives and apologists. The most vocal supporters of "industry self-regulation" on Panel 4, however, were J. Trevor Hughes of the Network Advertising Initiative -- an industry front group at forefront of industry public relations initiatives to head off governmental oversight and regulation of the advertising industry ( &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.networkadvertising.org/" >www.networkadvertising.org/</A> ) -- and Fran Maier of TRUSTe ( &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.truste.org/" >www.truste.org/</A> ), the organization whose third-party trustmark initiative was loudly hailed a few years ago as the solution to privacy problems on the internet but whose toothless audit program has largely served as a public relations front for industry exploitation of consumer privacy (see &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,51624,00.html" >www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,&middot;&middot;&middot;,00.html</A> ; &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.msu.edu/~larose/es2003post.htm" >www.msu.edu/~larose/es2003post.htm</A> ; and &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/priv-pol.htm#no-guarantee" >www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/priv-&middot;&middot;&middot;uarantee</A> ). <br><br>What was remarkable about the discussion of "industry self-regulation" on Panel 4 was its utterly vaporous quality, even allowing for the thin and sorry history of co-opted public policy and corporate malfeasance on which the discussion necessarily had to build. The several enthusiasts for "industry self-regulation" largely repeated the term "best practices" over and over, breathlessly exclaiming over its wonderous potential for facilitating "consumer choice" and avoiding the evils of governmental regulation. What none of them did, however, is suggest what these "best practices" might look like, what they would do, or who would be following them. Nor was it explained what enforcement mechanisms might be put in place to compel compliance, though presumably Truste or some similar initiative might play some role. <br><br>Indeed, one of the industry reps on the panel remarked that "best practices" would necessarily have to be pluralistic and flexible -- that there could be no single set of "best practices" because we couldn't impose inflexible solutions on corporations. That kind of talk should leave no doubt in anyone's mind that "best practices" are simply not intended to set high standards for corporate behavior, but rather to allow corporations to make them into whatever happens to be convenient.<br><br>In one of the more nauseating moments of the afternoon, FTC Commissioner Mozelle Thompson quipped that the FTC was happy to hear the views of the large companies represented on the panel because they were truly the "elected" representatives of consumers. The corporate reps smiled at this bit of bureaucratic groveling before business interests, as Thompson was in fact chirpily parotting one of Corporate America's most cherished and noxious propaganda lines -- namely that the market is equivalent to democracy, and that the public, democratic institutions in which citizens actually participate (or are supposed to participate) are comparatively illegitimate. On this view, America is a democracy of consumers -- one dollar, one vote -- rather than a democracy of citizens.<br><br>Despite the vacuous discussion of "industry self-regulation" on this panel, we actually do have a good idea of what it means based on the history of earlier industry efforts at establishing "best practices." Industry self-regulation largely means that the industry will launch a massive public relations campaign to convince users that its software is not objectionable. The more massive the public relations campaign, the more successful it will be judged to be. This is completely consistent with Commissioner Swindle's estimation of the success of earlier "industry self-regulation" efforts. In his video-taped remarks shown before Panel 2 in the morning ( &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/spyware/remarks_swindle.pdf" >www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/spywar&middot;&middot;&middot;ndle.pdf</A> ), Swindle noted:<br><br> <BLOCKQUOTE><SMALL>said by Commissioner Swindle:</SMALL><HR>The debate that has ensued about spyware reminds me of the early dialogue we had about privacy policies, that was filled with a lot of emotion and calls for regulation. As a result of a continuing and energetic dialogue between industry, government, and consumer groups, industry responded to the public&#146;s demand for greater disclosure and better privacy notices &#151; without legislation. Today, almost 100% of the most frequently visited websites offer some form of privacy notice.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE><br><br>Anyone who is familiar with corporate "privacy policies" will know that these policies have almost nothing to do with regulating actual business practices -- they are merely public relations methods for companies to paint big smiley faces over their privacy-invasive practices ( &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/priv-pol.htm#that" >www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/priv-pol.htm#that</A> ).<br><br>Notice that on Swindle's account, the mere posting of privacy policies counts as success and proves that a solution to earlier online privacy problems was in fact reached. It does not matter what those privacy policies say or what the behavior of the companies who post them happens to be. In this bizarre world, the public relations campaign is itself evidence of its own success.<br><br>If this industry fantasy of "self-regulation" is allowed to preempt strong governmental action to protect consumers, much the same will happen on the spyware issue. It will not matter how many people's computers are being hijacked, how many desktops are trashed with unwanted advertising, or how invasive corporate data gathering becomes -- it will only matter that the industry posts "consumer-friendly" notices on its web sites and in its license agreements to say in so many words: "We're not spyware, we're adware." (See &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/priv-pol.htm#example" >www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/priv-&middot;&middot;&middot;#example</A> for a comparative lesson in what weak protections current corporate privacy policies provide.)<br><br>Some would counter that earlier self-regulation initiatives were not just "public relations" campaigns, but were actually substantive efforts to change the privacy landscape by providing improved notice and disclosure, which are important parts of the four Fair Information Practices. But these privacy policies and related efforts simply cannot be regarded as substantive efforts to provide meaningful notice and choice because:<br><br>* these privacy policies almost always give the companies an "out" by allowing them to revise them without notice or penalty, rendering these documents well nigh worthless on an informational level;<br><br>* like so many of the EULAs used by advertising software companies, these privacy policies often consist of slippery, unreadable legalese designed to bury unpleasant information beneath a mountain of fine print;<br><br>* there is no strong monitoring to provide consumers with reliable information about the actual privacy practices of businesses, thus denying consumers the ability to make truly informed choices;<br><br>* there are no strong enforcement mechanisms to give potential corprorate offenders effective incentives to abide by their stated privacy practices instead of merely hyping them in an effort to persuade consumers to consent to their invasive software and services.<br><br>And indeed we have plenty of examples where companies have in fact: 1) revised their privacy policies when they became too inconvenient; 2) broken their privacy policies with no substantial penalty ( &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/priv-pol.htm#that" >www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/priv-pol.htm#that</A> ). In this kind of environment those privacy policies DO NOT serve as adequate notice and disclosure because no consumer could ever be expected to seriously trust the information provided in those policies and make decisions upon them. They are nebulous, and function more as public relations efforts than anything else.<br><br>"Industry self-regulation" and "best practices" would almost certainly be just more of the same.<br><br>"Consumer Education"<br><br>Although billed as one of the topics for Panel 6, "consumer education" was an important part of the discussion on Panel 4 as well, because "consumer education" and "industry self-regulation" go hand in hand. Both are billed as means to improve "notice" and "choice." "Industry self-regulation" ideally means that companies will provide consumers will better notice and disclosure about their privacy practices, and "consumer education" (facilitated and promoted by public bodies like the FTC and private entities like Truste and the NAI) will give consumers the knowledge to make sense of these posted notices and make informed choices and decisions about their online behavior. <br><br>As with "industry self-regulation," the term "consumer education" deserves "scare quotes" because its actual meaning diverges significantly from what we mean by "education" in other areas of our lives. For most folks, education means a dynamic learning process or experience through which learners acquire ever more powerful means to make sense of the world and act intelligently within it so as to lead richer, more rewarding, fulfilling lives. At its best, education is an individual and collective endeavor that facilitates empowerment, growth, and community. It's the process through which individuals grow ever more capable of connecting with the world and around them and working productively within their communities for a meaningful life.<br><br>For the industry, however, it means something entirely different. "Consumer education" largely means a preferred body of knowledge or world view that the industry attempts to implant in consumers' heads in order to facilitate proper consumer behavior and consumers' good regard for corporations. Put baldly, when the industry talks of "educating consumers about spyware," "consumer education" effectively means two things:<br><br>a) "We're not going to change our business practices; you'll simply have to learn how to live with them."<br><br>b) "The problem isn't our software, it's what you think about it."<br><br>In other words, "consumer education" in this scheme of things isn't really education as we normally understand it; rather, it's public relations and propaganda -- manipulating consumers into the "correct" ways of thinking about the software. And this was made perfectly clear by the several industry representatives on Panels 1 and 4, who insisted over and over that we get it into our heads that their software is "adware" not "spyware." Indeed, one of the representatives on Panel 4 (though just who I am at a loss to recall) let the cat out of the bag when he or she helpfully explained that "we need to educate consumers so that they understand what this software really is." A more naked, forthright statement of just what the industry has in mind for consumers would be hard to come by.<br><br>Concluding Remarks on Panel 4<br><br>As anticipated earlier ( &raquo;<A HREF="/forum/remark,9986136~mode=flat">FTC Spyware Workshop Panelists - Worries...</A> ), Panel 4 was a depressing display of self-indulgent, corporate public relations. Panel 4 was useful though in highlighting two important issues:<br><br>1) It would be a mistake to regard the problem of "spyware" as a fringe issue that involves only dubious, fly-by-night scam artists, rogue web sites, and pushy marketers who nip at consumers' heels when they veer off the beaten track of the "mainstream internet." That may have been true a few years ago, when bewildering varieties of commercial malware began appearing on porn and warez sites and somewhat more polished forms of advertising software began piggybacking on "free software" downloaded from the internet. That time is long past, though, and the problems with "spyware" and "adware" are now better understood as part of a larger story or process that involves the ongoing consolidation of media interests and the threatened takeover of the free internet by corporate oligopolies. No longer a problem on the margins of the internet, obnoxious corporate crapware threatens to become increasingly central to the efforts of large media giants to control their customers' "online experience" and transform the internet into an e-marketing dystopia.<br><br>2) It would also be a mistake to regard the FTC's Spyware Workshop as being only or even primarily a public venue for exploring ways to offer consumers the protection they need from unwanted, invasive, destructive advertising software. Indeed, there is a good case to be made that the workshop actually served as a public relations vehicle for corporate interests attempting to get political leverage and mount public opposition against the spate of anti-spyware legislation at the federal and state levels. Coming right at the start of legislative debates over anti-spyware regulation, the workshop gave corporate entities a prominent stage on which to showcase their own preferred non-solution to the "spyware" problem. Put baldly, the FTC Spyware Workshop was less about protecting consumers from unscrupulous advertising software vendors than it was about protecting corporate interests with designs on consumers' desktops from governmental regulation.<br><br>Such remarks will undoubtedly raise the hackles of those sympathetic to commercial interests, however, I think this understanding of the workshop was only confirmed this past week by the performance of Commissioner Mozelle Thompson and FTC bureau director Howard Beales before the House subcommittee on Energy and Commerce (see &raquo;<A HREF="/forum/remark,10106664~mode=flat">FTC Goes to Bat for Spyware Industry</A> for the details). The performance of the CDT before the same panel was scarcely less contemptible.<br><br>In closing, I should remark that I am surprised that the FTC has not yet posted a transcript of the six panels, though perhaps it will be forthcoming this next week. I am already anticipating that the transcript will underscore the wiliness of human memory, and I will be happy to make corrections and emendations to these posted remarks where my own memory of the workshop has proved to be less than completely reliable.<br><br>-----<br><br>Note: those interested in an eye-opening discussion of the disturbing changes in the media landscape in this country and around the world -- both online and off -- could do worse than to consult the following works:<br><br>* Ben Bagdikian. The New Media Monopoly. Boston: Beacon, 2004. ISBN: 0-8070-6187-5<br><br>* Robert W. McChesney. Rich Media, Poor Democracy: Communication Politics in Dubious Times. New York: The New Press, 1999, 2000. ISBN: 1-5658-634-6<br><br>* Robert W. McChesney & John Nichols. Our Media, Not Theirs: The Democractic Struggle Against Corporate Media. New York: Seven Stories, 2002. ISBN: 1-58322-549-8<br><br>* Lawrence Lessig. Code, and Other Laws of Cyberspace. New York: Basic, 1999.<br><br>* Lawrence Lessig. The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World. New York: Random House, 2001.<br><br>* Lawrence Lessig.  Free Culture: How Big Media Uses Technology and the Law to Lock Down Culture and Control Creativity. New York: Penguin, 2004. ISBN: 1-59420-006-8. Online edition available: &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.helptools.net/netdoc/starthelp.php?doc=4&grp=4&js=1" >www.helptools.net/netdoc/starthe&middot;&middot;&middot;p=4&js=1</A><br><br>And for a hilarious, acidic critique of the "market as democracy" line, see:<br><br>* Thomas Frank. One Market Under God: Extreme Capitalism, Market Populism, and End of Economic Democracy. New York: Anchor, 2000. ISBN: 0-385-49504-8.<br><br>-----<br><br>Best,<br><br>Eric L. Howes]]></description>
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<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/779741"><b>Khaine</b></A> : Thanks Eric for all of your hard work.<br><br>I hope that the FTC in the future will make a clear decision about spyware/adaware/crapware/malware]]></description>
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<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/378696"><b>eburger68</b></A> : Hi, again:<br><br>Mike Healan has now posted his own extensive comments on the workshop in his latest SpywareInfo newsletter:<br><br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://www.spywareinfo.com/newsletter/archives/0404/24.php" >www.spywareinfo.com/newsletter/a&middot;&middot;&middot;4/24.php</A><br><br>Mike seems a bit more upbeat about the CDT's contribution to Panel 1 -- definitely worth your time to read what Mike has to say.<br><br>Best,<br><br>Eric L. Howes]]></description>
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<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/668609"><b>EGeezer</b></A> : Eric, <br><br>Thanks very much for taking all this time and effort to summarize what would otherwise be an insurmountable task of analysis of transcripts and news for those of us who were not in attendance to see the testimony and gauge the presenters personally. <br><br>I've sent the link to this topic to several who have a stake in reducing the tremendous risks and costs associated with spyware/adware. My hope is that significant pressure will come from the business sector who is presently becoming aware of the negative implications of silently installed code that gathers unspecified information and forwards it to unspecified entities for unspecified uses. For an example of what I mean, readers may want to peruse the BBR news link &raquo;<A HREF="/shownews/42920">Business getting the message on Spyware</A> for an example. <br><br>Thanks again - good luck buttonholing the decision makers! <br><br>EG <br><SMALL>--<br>Support RFC 1926</SMALL>]]></description>
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<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/378696"><b>eburger68</b></A> : Hi All:<br><br>My comments on the remaining panels at the FTC's SpywareWorkshop of April 19 will not be nearly as extensive and involved as those on Panels 1 and 2, which provided plenty of fodder for discussion and dissent.<br><br>Before I proceed with my discussion of Panel 3 (Privacy Risks), let me point out that the FTC has now made available on its web site most of the PowerPoint presentations from corporate representatives in PDF format:<br><br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/spyware/index.htm" >www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/spyware/index.htm</A><br><br>Of particular interest is Bryson Gordon's presentation on the "growth of non-viral threats" (courtesy of McAfee), which clearly indicates that the number of adware installations has exploded over the past year. Sometime in the near future the FTC will also be posting a transcript of the panel discussions from the workshop.<br><br>Panel Three: Privacy Risks<br><br>Panelists:<br><br>P - Ray Everett-Church, Chief Privacy Officer, TurnTide, Inc.<br>P - Evan Hendricks, Editor-Publisher, &#147;Privacy Times&#148;<br>P - Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Associate Director, Electronic Privacy Information Center<br>U - James H. Koenig, Esq., Chief Practice Co-Leader, Privacy Strategy and Compliance, PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP<br>X - Ronald Plesser, Esq., Piper Rudnick LLP<br><br>Note: be sure to take a look at the photos of Panel 3 as well as the other other panels at Bill Pytlovany's blog page and Declan McCullagh's site:<br><br>Declan McCullagh - FTC Spyware Workshop Photos<br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://www.mccullagh.org/theme/ftc-spyware-workshop-apr04.html" >www.mccullagh.org/theme/ftc-spyw&middot;&middot;&middot;r04.html</A><br><br>Bill Pytlovany's Blog from the Workshop<br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://www.mysteryware.com/blog.html" >www.mysteryware.com/blog.html</A><br><br>Compared with the concrete discussion of problems with spyware and adware on Panel 2, Panel 3's discussion of "privacy risks" was much less pointed and, at times, became next to somnolent. <br><br>"Spyware" & the Issue of Privacy<br><br>I should remark at the outset of my own comments on Panel 3 that I am somewhat suspicious of discussions of "spyware" that put too much emphasis on privacy risks, because I regard such a focus to be a potential distraction from the full array of harms that "spyware" and "adware" impose on victims of all kinds. That's not to say the privacy is not an important topic when discussing "spyware"; it's merely to say that a focus on privacy issues risks forcing a discussion of the impact of "spyware" into overly narrow channels and, at times, even plays right into the hands of the advertising software industry, which above all else seeks to exempt itself and its software from the category of "spyware" or whatever it is that consumers happen to be complaining about. <br><br>One of the ways the industry does that is to emphasize the non-invasive, non-intrusive nature of the data gathering and transmission performed by its software. To folks with only a casual familiarity with the issue of "spyware," this may seem like a strange argument to make, but the "spyware" or "adware" industry actually does manage to get quite a bit of traction from this argument. To do so, the advertising software industry makes several points:<br><br>1) The data its software gathers is usually not "personally identifiable" -- meaning that the data its software gathers is not uniquely tied to one person or individual. For example, your name, email address, Social Security number, street address, and other similar information are all "personally identifiable" information in that they are uniquely tied to you and tend to allow others to identify or target you specifically from the mass of other people on the Net or in your community. Such information points specifically to you and, in some sense, is actually part of your identity.<br><br>By contrast much of the information that advertising software gathers is non-personally identifiable -- meaning that the data may pertain to your demographic characteristics, your computer and its software, or even your behavior on the internet, but that data in and of itself isn't uniquely part of your identity because others will have similar data tied to them. One perfect example of this kind of non-personally identifiable data is click-throughs on banner ads. Another example is certain kinds of demographic data and marketing preferences (age, weight, race, purchasing habits, media interests, etc.). That kind of data in and of itself doesn't uniquely identify you as an individual.<br><br>2) The data gathered by advertising software is often anonymous or used in aggregate form. As we just noted, your behavior on the internet or with banner ads isn't personally identifiable, and while advertising software often collects that data, it usually doesn't tie it to you specifically (through your name, email address, SSN#, etc.). The data about your behavior remains "anonymous," as it were, though this software does assign you a unique identifying number (GUID) so that your behavior, marketing preferences, and demographic data can distinguished from that of other anonymous individuals. Thus, advertising software can gather useful data for the purposes of "targeted advertising" while allowing individuals to remain anonymous. <br><br>Advertising software vendors also tend to use this kind of data in aggregate form, meaning that they'll take the data from you and others like you and analyze it as a group for marketing purposes. The data about your demogrpahic characteristics and internet behavior is lumped together with others so that marketing firms can conduct research on broad social and cultural trends, preferences, and other behavior that helps advertisers respond to and shape the market.<br><br>3) Any data gathered is collected with after giving users prior "notice" and acquiring their "consent" through the use of a EULA and/or privacy policy that users click through before the software is installed, either as a bundled addition to other software (e.g., KaZaA, with all of its piggybacking adware programs) or an automated online installation via a web site (a "drive-by-download"). <br><br>Note that I've used "scare quotes" for the words "notice" and "consent," because although the law -- at least as it has been explained to me -- currently regards the EULAs and privacy policies used by these programs to be adequate methods to provide notice and acquire consent, I and others see enormous problems with the use of these legal documents in software installations. Users either do not fully understand or recognize what they are in fact consenting to by clicking through these EULA boxes, or they may not even see those boxes under some circumstances. (For more on this problem, see my "The Anatomy of a Drive-by-Download" -- &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/dbd-anatomy.htm" >www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/dbd-anatomy.htm</A> .)Indeed, these are the primary reasons why, I strongly suspect, so many users report being completely unaware of software like Gator and WhenU on their systems even though both of those pieces of software provide EULAs and privacy policies. <br><br>Whatever users' problems with these forms of notice -- which are completely inadequate in my view and which allow vendors to exploit users' ignorance of computers, the internet, and the law for proprietary gain -- they do give adware vendors the wherewithal to stand up in front of forums like the FTC's workshop and maintain that they do in fact provide users notice and acquire their consent prior to installation of their software.<br><br>Now, there are certainly plenty of exceptions to three points that I summarize above. Some "spyware" or "adware" does collect personally identifiable information, and once collected that personally identifiable information makes other data collected potentially non-anonymous (depending on how all that data is stored and used by the vendor). Even that kind of software, however, almost always uses a EULA and privacy policy, thus giving the vendors in question the ability to claim that their software is not in fact "spyware" because they acquired the user's consent before installation. Still other software exploits known security holes in Microsoft's software to hijack users' browsers and install software without presenting users with a EULA at all.<br><br>Nonetheless, the larger, more prominent advertising software vendors -- the ones with the most established business models -- tend to gather data about users and their behavior in the manner I've summarized above. Coupled the use of a EULA, the fact that the data gathered about users is anonymous and non-personally identifiable means that advertising software vendors can tell regulatory agencies like the FTC that its software is "privacy friendly." <br><br>This is one of the reasons that I regard an exclusive focus on "privacy risks" when discussing "spyware" -- which the term "spyware" seems to invite, by the way -- to be a potentially useless distraction. The harms and impacts of "spyware" and "adware" go far beyond the collection of data -- whether that data be anonymous and non-personally identifiable or not. Most "spyware" damages users and their computers because of other behavior such as browser hijacking, obnoxious pop-up advertising on the desktop, degradation of PC stability and performance, and the addition of unwanted toolbars and other things to users' desktops and browsers. Indeed, when I tell folks that the biggest problem with "spyware" is not so much the "spying" but the other things that it does to users and their PCs -- in sum, rendering computers nearly unusable and thus denying people the use of their own computers -- I often get a puzzled reaction. But that's one of the effects of the term "spyware," which simply distracts us from the full range of problems with advertising software.<br><br>"Contextual Advertising" & Other Distractions<br><br>Almost none of these points made it into the discussion on Panel 3 of the FTC's Spyware Workshop, which tended towards abstract discussions of privacy principles and the efforts of advertisers to provide users adequate "notice" and "choice." The discussion (at least as I remember it) even veered into the consideration of the impact of keyloggers and other such system monitoring utilities on corporate networks and the security of corporate secrets. (This is another reason that I hate the word "spyware" -- because it tends to confuse advertising software with other software that is deployed by nefarious individuals for their own purposes and interests.) At such points, the discussion had effectively veered completely off track (undoubtedly much to the delight of companies like WhenU, Claria/Gator, and C2 Media, which delight in distinguishing their own software from keyloggers and the like).<br><br>Ray Everett-Church -- who submitted some of the more useful written comments to the FTC (see &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/040319everett-church.pdf" >www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/&middot;&middot;&middot;urch.pdf</A> ) and who is an expert witness in one of the lawsuits against Gator/Claria -- also raised the issue of "contextual advertising" and its impact on the internet businesses who see their own web pages and advertising hijacked or overlaid with advertising created by client software on users' systems (e.g., WhenU and Gator). <br><br>As obnoxious as this kind of advertising is and as destructive as it may be to some businesses on the internet, I am nonetheless uneasy with its inclusion as a topic in the discussion conducted by Panel 3 on "privacy risks." First, it took the discussion of "privacy risks" to consumers completely off-topic, as the focus was then put on the impact of Gator and WhenU's advertising on other internet advertisers. Second, any discussion of "contextual advertising" tends to narrow the discussion to a small handful of advertising software vendors, leaving many of the biggest offenders completely out of consideration (esp. browser hijackers and the like). Third, when internet advertisers insist that they have some sort of "right" not to have their advertising or web pages obscured or modified by client software installed on users' desktops, I fear that such a principle could be extended to all kinds of software -- including ad blockers and other privacy software installed by users. Put another way, I fear that advertisers could be asserting a right to control what appears on users' systems or in users' browsers, and that this broad right could be used to deny users the ability to control what is displayed on their own PCs. I should note that I have no legal training, so it may be entirely possible within a legal framework to negotiate the Scylla and Charybdis of going after "contextual advertisers" without undercutting users' rights to control their own systems. Just how that would be done, I do not know. Whatever the case, "contextual advertising" takes us far afield from the "privacy risks" to end users.<br><br>EPIC.org & Fair Information Practices<br><br>As I noted just above, much of the discussion on Panel 3 tended towards the abstract. Chris Jay Hoofnagle of the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC.org) did manage to bring the discussion around to several useful points, though. First, Hoofnagle was the only panelist at the entire workshop to point the finger at Microsoft for providing the technological means for advertising software vendors to confuse and bamboozle users, install software without their full knowledge and understanding or meaningful consent, and hijack their browsers and PCs. Hoofnagle rightly noted that Microsoft's overly powerful ActiveX technology -- with its integration of mobile code straight into the operating system as well as the confusing manner in which ActiveX controls are installed through Internet Explorer -- opens too many doors for advertising software vendors to walk through and puts users on the defensive.<br><br>Second, though, Hoofnagle usefully pointed out that Panel 3's discussion of privacy principles -- or, more formally, Fair Information Practices -- tended to reduce those principles to but two of four (notice and choice), when in fact internet users ought to be extended protection through a full range of Fair Information Practices, which include:<br><br>1) Notice -- the right of users to be given adequate information about the behavior, functionality, and information practices of software, web sites, and the companies involved;<br><br>2) Choice (consent) -- the ability of users to opt-in or opt-out of the information gathering and other uses of information;<br><br>3) Access (control) -- the ability of users to view information collected about them and even correct that information or withdraw it from use;<br><br>4) Security -- the right of users to expect that personally sensitive data collected from and about them will be stored in a secure manner.<br><br>Third, Hoofnagle specifically pointed to Ben Edelman's research on WhenU (see &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/040319edelman.pdf" >www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/&middot;&middot;&middot;lman.pdf</A> ) and suggested that Edelman may have in fact established a case that WhenU is collecting and transmitting information in violation of its own privacy policy.<br><br>Hoofnagle's comments were a refreshing change from those of several of the other panelists, who enthused over the privacy initiatives of industry front groups like the Network Advertising Initiative (NAI), as if these organizations could be trusted or expected to do anything substantive to protect users' privacy in the face of voracious industry demands for access to users' desktops -- the next frontier or market in online advertising -- and all manner of data about users and their online behavior.<br><br>Concluding Remarks on Panel 3<br><br>Panel 3 was the last panel of the morning before lunch. Although the discussion of this panel was at times a bit dry and disconnected from "privacy risks" to consumers, it did manage in some way to extend the discussion from Panel 2 of "spyware" and its impact on users. The first panel after lunch -- Panel 4 (Industry Responses to Spyware) -- returned us to the "spyware" industry's preferred playing field, a completely imaginary landscape in which "educated" consumers are offered "choice" by well-meaning companies who inundate their desktops with "useful" and "informative" advertising, all under the beneficent gaze of the FTC, which recognizes that its proper role is to step aside and let the industry "self-regulate" its relationship with consumers.<br><br>The FTC's transcript of the workshop should be coming out shortly. Even if arrives before I can finish my discussion of Panels 4-6 -- all of which addressed "solutions" of one sort or another to the problem of "spyware" -- I will continue these comments nonetheless.<br><br>All the best,<br><br>Eric L. Howes]]></description>
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<title>Re: FTC Spyware Workshop: 1st Impressions</title>
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<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/327578"><b>hayc59</b></A> : Eric, Very Nice Reading Indeed:)<br>Thank You<br><SMALL>--<br>~9.11.01~~Never Forget~</SMALL>]]></description>
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<title>Re: FTC Spyware Workshop: 1st Impressions</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,10060847</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/378696"><b>eburger68</b></A> : Hi All:<br><br>Let me continue my review of and comments on the remaining five panels at the FTC's Spyware Workshop this past Monday (April 19). As with my review of Panel 1, I'll update where appropriate the "rating" that I assigned each panelist in a previous thread ( &raquo;<A HREF="/forum/remark,9986136~mode=flat">FTC Spyware Workshop Panelists - Worries...</A> ):<br><br>X - industry/corporate friendly<br>U - unknown/undetermined<br>P - privacy friendly<br><br>Panel Two: Security Risks and PC Functionality<br><br>Panelists:<br><br>U - Maureen Cushman, Legal Counsel, U.S. Consumers, Dell<br>P - John Gilroy, Technology Contributor for The Washington Post and Co-Host of WAMU&#146;s &#147;The Computer Guys&#148; program<br>U - Bryson Gordon, Senior Manager, Product Management Group, McAfee Security, Consumer Division<br>P - Austin Hill, Co-Founder and Chief Privacy Expert, Zero-Knowledge Systems<br>P - Roger Thompson, Vice President, Product Development, Pest Patrol<br>P - Michael Wood, Vice President of Sales, USA and Canada, Lavasoft<br><br>Note: be sure to take a look at Bill Pytlovany's blog for photos of Panel 2 as well as the other other panels:<br><br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://www.mysteryware.com/blog.html" >www.mysteryware.com/blog.html</A><br><br>Following the frustrating opening of the FTC's Spyware Workshop with Panel 1's industry consensus view, Panel 2 was encouraging in that the effects of spyware on consumers were finally laid on the table. Where the discussion on Panel 1 had at times seemed completely disconnected from the reality of consumers' experience with spyware, Panel 2 not only returned the discussion to a solid grounding in the actual impact of spyware on hapless internet victims, but it demonstrated that spyware is imposing serious costs on many businesses as well. <br><br>Effects on Businesses<br><br>Maureen Cushman led off this panel by describing the impact of spyware on Dell and Dell's customers and support services. As reported in Declan McCullagh's report on the workshop ( &raquo;<A HREF="http://zdnet.com.com/2100-1104_2-5195222.html" >zdnet.com.com/2100-1104_2-5195222.html</A> ), Cushman stated that spyware has become "a huge technical support issue" for Dell, which is inundated with technical support calls from users whose systems have been trashed by spyware. One has to assume that other OEMs and their customers are similarly affected, however, it was important to hear from Dell, one of the largest of the OEMs.<br><br>Readers here at DSLR/BBR might remember that just a few months ago Dell was in the news because of an unfortunate -- and quickly reversed -- decision to refuse to give customers information about how to remove spyware when customers called Dell customer support (see the our discussion here: &raquo;<A HREF="/forum/remark,8625165~root=security,1~mode=flat">Dell does not support the removal of spyware</A> ). After an enormous outcry and a wave of bad publicity on the Net (see esp. the open letter to Dell organized by SpywareInfo: &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.spywareinfo.com/articles/dell/support_letter.pdf" >www.spywareinfo.com/articles/del&middot;&middot;&middot;tter.pdf</A> ), Dell backtracked and announced that it would partner with Pest Patrol to provide spyware removal support for its customers ( &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.spywareinfo.com/newsletter/archives/1203/10.php#Dell" >www.spywareinfo.com/newsletter/a&middot;&middot;&middot;php#Dell</A> ). As deplorable as Dell's original decision was, it should give us yet another indication of the severity of the problems that spyware causes for Dell.<br><br>Unfortunately, Cushman contributed very little beyond her opening statement, listening quietly for most of the remainder of the panel. Nonetheless, Dell's contribution was an important one, for it puts the lie to the ubiquitous line from the advertising software industry that its software is simply a benign, "pro-consumer" form of advertising that merely supports free content on the Net. In fact, spyware imposes real costs on individuals, organizations, and businesses outside advertising software vendors and their immediate customers and victims.<br><br>Two other panelists on Panel 2 reinforced this important point. Bryson Gordon of McAfee brought with him a line graph detailing the growth of unwanted software installations on users' computers over an 8 month period. From August 2003 to March 2004, the number of installations detected by McAfee exploded from 2 million to 14 million, with roughly 85% of those installations being what the industry prefers to call "adware." What was notable about McAfee's numbers was what they demonstrated about the growth of "adware" versus other forms of unwanted software (e.g., "spyware," keyloggers," etc.). Where the lines for these other forms of unwanted software remained relatively flat over the 8 month period (with installations of keyloggers so comparatively small as to be almost not worth mentioning), the yellow line for "adware" installations soared dramatically above the others, leaving no doubt as to what is driving the problems behind consumer complaints about installations of unwanted software.<br><br>These numbers, it should be noted, come on the heels of the recent report by Earthlink and Webroot that consumers' computers are simply being overrun by spyware ( &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.earthlink.net/about/press/pr_spyAudit/" >www.earthlink.net/about/press/pr_spyAudit/</A> ), with most internet connected computers having some sort of spyware and the average number of spyware items per computer being 28. Such numbers are unsurprising. From my work with college students at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, I know that almost every single one of their computers is infested with spyware, and the vast majority of them either don't know it (they usually attribute their computers' problems to "viruses") or don't know how to remove it. Still further, McAfee's numbers on the dramatic growth of unwanted software installations mirror my own, admittedly "soft" numbers on the spyware explosion over the past year (see &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/crap-count.htm#table1" >www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/crap-&middot;&middot;&middot;m#table1</A> ). <br><br>As with Dell's comments, McAfee's presentation was important inasmuch as it confirmed what those of us who work in the trenches every day know from hard experience: that the problem with unwanted advertising software has exploded in the past year or so, and that the key factor in driving waves of distraught users into support forums like ComputerCops.biz and SpywareInfo.com (to name but two of many on the Net devoted to spyware removal) is what the industry would have us believe is a harmless form of commercial software that consumers knowingly and willingly install and which is radically different in its effects than "spyware." We know differently, however, and McAfee's numbers lend our position support because they demonstrate that it is the dramatic growth of "adware" that lies behind the surge in consumer complaints, not some narrow class of "spyware" or other more traditional forms of "malware." Indeed, Gordon commented that "spyware" and "adware" now represent "a larger technical support problem than viruses" -- a judgment that most volunteers who toil away at SpywareInfo and ComputerCops would readily agree with. Despite what the advertising software industry would have the public (and the FTC believe), it is "adware" -- their products -- that consumers are largely complaining about, not some narrowly construed class of "spyware."<br><br>This damning picture of "spyware" and "adware" and its effects on users and businesses was buttressed by Austin Hill of Zero-Knowledge Systems. After arriving a bit late to the panel, Hill explained how spyware causes ISPs an enormous amount of grief because internet users usually turn to their internet providers as a first line of support when they encounter problems with their use of the internet. Even though ISPs are not technically responsible for the damage that spyware and adware cause its customers, those customers often do not know where else to turn when their browsers are hijacked, their internet connections slowed or broken, or their desktops deluged with pop-ups. Thus, advertising software vendors effectively shift or impose major costs on to innocent third parties, who have very little choice but to shoulder the technical support burden if they wish to retain their businesses and their good name. The ISP business, it should be noted, is a cut-throat one with narrow margins, and technical support calls for spyware-related problems are far more costly and involved than typical support incidents, averaging 25 minutes according to Hill. OEMs who provide technical support to end users reportedly try to keep technical support calls under 10 minutes, so calls of 25 minutes and over can only represent a major burden to ISPs, many of whom are struggling to stay in the black.<br><br>Not surprisingly, larger ISPs have started to partner with anti-spyware vendors to offer their customers spyware detection and removal support, as Dell has through its partnership with Pest Patrol. Earthlink was the first major ISP to offer its customers anti-spyware software ( &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.earthlink.net/home/software/spywareblocker/" >www.earthlink.net/home/software/&middot;&middot;&middot;blocker/</A> ), and AOL and MSN have also recently incorporated anti-spyware software into their software packages or offerings ( &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A57314-2004Jan5?language=printer" >www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dy&middot;&middot;&middot;=printer</A> ). What smaller, less established ISPs -- esp. mom-and-pop dial-up operations -- are doing is not known. There is no reason to think that the smaller players in the ISP business are any less affected by spyware and adware than the major players such as Earthlink, AOL, and MSN.<br><br>One aspect of the effects of spyware that was not directly addressed on this panel was the impact on businesses and organizations that maintain their own computer networks. The FTC's collection of comments from the public ( &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/index.html" >www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/index.html</A> ) is filled with complaints from IT staff at large corporations as well as small business owners, many of whom are spending an inordinate amount of time repairing damage to their companies' PCs and deploying anti-spyware solutions on their systems and networks to minimize the ill-effects of this invasive, destructive advertising software. (See this article for advice to corporate IT staff on minimizing the effects of spyware on corporate computer networks: &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.windowsecurity.com/articles/Spyware_Adware_Programs.html" >www.windowsecurity.com/articles/&middot;&middot;&middot;ams.html</A> ; and see this article for numbers on the prevalence of spyware on corporate networks: &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.websense.com/company/news/pr/Display.php?Release=030205122" >www.websense.com/company/news/pr&middot;&middot;&middot;30205122</A> ). Spyware and adware can also pose serious problems for university computer networks, as documented by a recent study at the University of Washington ( &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.cs.washington.edu/homes/tzoompy/publications/nsdi/2004/spyware.html" >www.cs.washington.edu/homes/tzoo&middot;&middot;&middot;are.html</A> ). <br><br>Whether we look at businesses with customers to support (ISPs, OEMs, software vendors, et al) or businesses and organizations who are supporting employees with internet access through corporate networks, spyware and adware cut a wide swath of destruction, imposing significant costs on a wide variety of innocent third-parties.<br><br>Effects on Users<br><br>Though they focused less on the costs of spyware to businesses, John Gilroy (radio host and tech journalist), Roger Thompson (Pest Patrol), and Michael Wood (Lavasoft) all made key contributions to the discussion of spyware's ill effects on users. Gilroy was esp. good, as he explained in forthright, even dramatic terms, how overwhelmed users struggle with spyware. Gilroy's anecdotes of his dealings with spyware victims should be familiar to anyone who works with average users on a daily basis, and he confirmed what we know: that normal internet users have little idea how to keep this software off their systems or how to repair the damage when it is installed, usually without their full knowledge, consent, and understanding. Average computer and internet users are utterly at the mercy of spyware/adware vendors, who have essentially built business models on exploiting people's ignorance of computers and the internet. Thus it is little wonder that they would be turning in droves to their ISPs and OEMs as well as online forums such as ComputerCops.biz and SpywareInfo.com for assistance. As Gilroy and several of those who contributed comments to the FTC noted (see, for example, my own comments: &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/ftc-comments.htm#typical" >www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/ftc-c&middot;&middot;&middot;#typical</A> ), end users can even face expensive bills from computer repair shops and services in order to clean up the mess left by spyware and adware.<br><br>Roger Thompson of Pest Patrol backed up Gilroy's account by supplying a view from inside a major anti-spyware vendor. Thompson noted that Pest Patrol has added an enormous number of detections for new "pests" to its detection database in the past year or so, far outstripping the number of new detections added in previous years. He also described the serious effects of spyware on the usability of computer systems. In one test that he ran, Thompson reported seeing a dramatic increase in boot time on a test PC loaded with one type of spyware (115 seconds to 415 seconds) as well as a similar increase in web page loading time (4-5 seconds to 20-30 seconds). These anecdotal numbers agree with my own experiences with spyware. In my comments to the FTC ("The Anatomy of a Drive-by-Download" -- &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/dbd-anatomy.htm" >www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/dbd-anatomy.htm</A> ), I described the effects of C2 Media's software package on my own test PC in similar terms:<br><br> <BLOCKQUOTE><SMALL>said by Eric L. Howes:</SMALL><HR>My system slowed dramatically, becoming increasingly sluggish as more programs executed and loaded into memory. ... Web surfing speed also declined, presumably because there were so many programs exchanging data with external network entities (uploading information, downloading advertisements) and consuming bandwidth. I even experienced random browser crashes, undoubtedly because of the sheer number of pop-ups, toolbars, and programs clambering for attention on my system.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE><br><br>The effects of spyware on one of my student's computers were even more serious, rendering her computer almost unusable and breaking her internet connection (see my comments to the FTC: &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/ftc-comments.htm#typical" >www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/ftc-c&middot;&middot;&middot;#typical</A> ).<br><br>Indeed, poor PC and internet performance is one of the most frequent complaints among spyware and adware victims, ranking right up there with unwanted pop-ups and browser modifications. Later in the day on Panel 4 (Technological Solutions), Brian Arbogast of Microsoft reported that 50 percent of Windows crashes reported to Microsoft through Windows' automated crash reporting facility are attributable to spyware or adware. Again, such numbers will come as no surprise to the many volunteers who help spyware and adware victims on the Net on a daily basis. It is an understatement to say that these forms of unwanted advertising software simply *trash* users' PCs, and the job of cleaning up the mess, as we saw just above, proves to be a costly one for users, internet volunteers, ISPs, OEMs, and other businesses.<br><br>Those who doubt the severe damage that spyware and adware can do to PCs should spend some time going through the posts and HijackThis! logs of users at the several support forums that specialize in assisting spyware/adware victims:<br><br>SpywareInfo<br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://www.spywareinfo.com/forums/index.php?showforum=30" >www.spywareinfo.com/forums/index&middot;&middot;&middot;forum=30</A><br><br>ComputerCops.biz<br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://www.computercops.biz/forum67.html" >www.computercops.biz/forum67.html</A><br><br>Cexx.org<br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://boards.cexx.org/viewforum.php?f=1" >boards.cexx.org/viewforum.php?f=1</A><br><br>Net-Integration<br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://forums.net-integration.net/index.php?showforum=32" >forums.net-integration.net/index&middot;&middot;&middot;forum=32</A><br><br>Tech Support Guy<br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://forums.techguy.org/f54-s.html" >forums.techguy.org/f54-s.html</A><br><br>Wilders.org<br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://www.wilderssecurity.com/forumdisplay.php?f=26" >www.wilderssecurity.com/forumdis&middot;&middot;&middot;php?f=26</A><br><br>TomCoyote<br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://forums.tomcoyote.com/index.php?showforum=27" >forums.tomcoyote.com/index.php?showforum=27</A><br><br>The everyday reality of spyware and adware is quite a bit different from what the advertising software industry would have you believe.<br><br>Concluding Remarks on Panel 2<br><br>Right before the start of Panel 2 we were shown videotaped remarks from Commissioner Swindle, who expressed his regrets at not being able to attend the workshop. Though he acknowledged the raft of consumer complaints about spyware and adware, he quickly brushed aside calls for government intervention to protect consumers from the ravages of spyware and adware. Instead, Swindle chirpily recommended "industry self-regulation," parroting the all-too-familiar cliches from the industry about the ill effects of governmental regulation on "innovation," technology, and the wondrous brave new world of our increasingly corporatized internet. Coming so soon after the obstructionist travesty that was Panel 1, Swindle's remarks cast a pall over the remainder of the day's discussion of unwanted advertising software, for Swindle had effectively signaled to all that no action would be forthcoming from the FTC. <br><br>The remarks from the participants on Panel 2 on the widespread and severe effects of spyware and adware on internet users, businesses, and other organizations only underscored what the costs of Swindle's fantasy of "industry self-regulation" would be for the innocent victims of unwanted advertising software. Indeed, in light of the bleak picture painted by the panelists on Panel 2, Swindle's comments seemed retrospectively as if they had been beamed down from Neptune, though those familiar with Swindle's record at the FTC on consumer privacy issues should have been unsurprised by his performance, for Swindle has long been one of the industry's strongest allies on the commission.<br><br>Nonetheless, Panel 2 put the costs of unwanted advertising software -- whether we call it "adware" or "spyware" -- squarely before the FTC and the workshop's audience. The industry representatives on Panel 1, including WhenU's Avi Naider, had attempted to advance the fiction that "adware" -- a miraculously "consumer-friendly" form of advertising software that most consumers have, strangely enough, yet to encounter -- is crucially different from "spyware," the ostensible focus of the FTC's workshop. C2 Media's Jason Lucas reiterated this bit of industry propaganda in his most recent comments to the FTC ( &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/040414lucas2.pdf" >www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/&middot;&middot;&middot;cas2.pdf</A> ):<br><br> <BLOCKQUOTE><SMALL>said by C2 Media:</SMALL><HR>A number of (the) public comments (to the FTC about spyware) indicate a misperception about "adware" and how it differs from "spyware" ... Legitimate adware is installed with an EULA and uninstaller --- usually in exchange for a free software product or service. Adware does not monitor or "spy" on a user. Adware only exists as an advertising channel to a subscriber base, much like cable networks retain time blocks on all channels on their network to display advertising. The user has agreed to be a subscriber of that particular advertising network in exchange for a product or service. With the acceptance of an EULA, this becomes a binding contractual agreement between the two parties. If a user believes his computer has been "invaded" by an advertising network associated with software he previously had chosen to install, he remains free at all times to simply uninstall it and "opt out" of the advertising network.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> <br><br>Lucas, Naider, and the rest of the advertising software industry seem to think that if they simply repeat this "adware vs. spyware" line often enough, the reality of consumer complaints about and experiences with advertising software will somehow morph to fit their own preferred world view. The advertising software industry would have the public, the FTC, and legislators at the state and federal level believe that their software is different from this narrow class of admittedly bad software called "spyware," and that consumers have no complaint with its own allegedly innocuous advertising software. "Whatever consumers are complaining about," the industry alleges, "it certainly can't be *our* software."<br><br>The panelists of Panel 2 let the air out of this public relations gas bag, demonstrating in dramatic terms and with hard numbers that it is indeed "adware" that consumers are complaining about -- the very kinds of software the industry is so keen to defend. Coupled with PC Pitstop's reports that most users of such "adware" as Gator and WhenU are unaware of the software on their systems (see &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/040413pcpitstop.pdf" >www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/&middot;&middot;&middot;stop.pdf</A> and &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/040315pcpitstop.pdf" >www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/&middot;&middot;&middot;stop.pdf</A> ) as well as Ben Edelman's demonstration that these forms of "adware" are hardly the innocuous, privacy-friendly forms of software the industry pretends them to be (see &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/040319edelman.pdf" >www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/&middot;&middot;&middot;lman.pdf</A> ), Panel 2's remarks should leave us with little doubt about the true nature of the "spyware" problem and which kinds of software need to be reigned through strong governmental action, even if some of the commissioners at the FTC are still a bit hard of hearing ( &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/04/21/ftc_spyware_workshop/" >www.theregister.co.uk/2004/04/21&middot;&middot;&middot;orkshop/</A> ).<br><br>I will continue my review of the remaining four panels at the FTC's Spyware Workshop over the next few days as time permits.<br><br>Best,<br><br>Eric L. Howes]]></description>
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<pubDate>Sat, 24 Apr 2004 14:56:40 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: FTC Spyware Workshop: 1st Impressions</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,10047654</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/856950"><b>jap</b></A> :  <BLOCKQUOTE><SMALL>said by  B <A HREF="/useremail/u/229804"><IMG SRC="http://i.dslr.net/bb/profile.gif" ALT="See Profile" BORDER=0 WIDTH=16 HEIGHT=11></A>:</SMALL><HR>Huh?  I thought you said this was your own home PC?  Don't you trust your own habits?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE><br><br>Good lord, NO. What sorta bore do you take me for? (don't answer that)]]></description>
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<pubDate>Thu, 22 Apr 2004 23:31:16 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: FTC Spyware Workshop: 1st Impressions</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,10047527</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/378696"><b>eburger68</b></A> : Bobby:<br><br>You wrote:<br><br> <BLOCKQUOTE><SMALL>said by  Bobby_Peru <A HREF="/useremail/u/827318"><IMG SRC="http://i.dslr.net/bb/profile.gif" ALT="See Profile" BORDER=0 WIDTH=16 HEIGHT=11></A>:</SMALL><HR>Do you think the chances of success of taking the Utah statue as a starting point in a net-based campaign to gather support for lobbying for serious legislation are as dismal as they may appear?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE><br><br>As depressing as some aspects of the FTC Workshop might appear, I'd be wary of drawing hasty conclusions about the prospects for anti-spyware legislation based solely on the outcome of that workshop. <br><br>In some respects, the FTC Workshop was one of the spyware industry's stronger cards. They had an agency that is largely not supportive of a regulatory approach to protecting consumers' privacy, and the workshop was designed to showcase the industry's preferred "solution": "industry self-regulation." I'm not so sure that the spyware industry will get such a friendly hearing in other venues.<br><br>One thing to keep in mind is that this industry is its own worst enemy. Try as it might to portray itself as a mainstream, consumer-friendly form of advertising, most if not all of its core practices are deeply offensive, and people tend to recoil in horror when they actually understand how this industry does business and treats consumers. <br><br>Still worse, the industry is damaging other businesses -- not only businesses who bear the costs of cleaning up their networks, but other businesses who are seeing their web sites and services hijacked and their brand names damaged in the public eye. Still other businesses (OEMs, ISPs, et al) are incurring significant costs as spyware causes trouble for their customers. In quite a number of ways, the spyware industry imposes significant costs on a wide range of businesses and organizations that are not its customers, clients, or primary victims, and these "negative externalities" (that is, bad effects on those outside of the core market transaction) are gaining the industry many enemies.<br><br>Thus, I think it instructive that the Utah state legislature passed its anti-spyware bill, whatever flaws some folks may think it has. Stephen Urquhart, State Representative in the Utah House of Representatives, spoke on Panel Six, and he was quite impressive. Urquhart was one of the prime movers behind the Utah legislation, and he wasn't buying any of the flim-flam objections and diversions from the industry, quickly batting them down. He spoke directly and authoritatively to the issues, taking the audience through a PowerPoint slide show of some industry's shadier tactics. <br><br>Coming at the end of a long day, his comments caused me to sit back in my seat and think, "Wow! This guy really gets it!" I wish we could clone the guy about 500 times over and slip the clones into office somehow. You'll have to wait for the official transcript (out in 10 days or so) to see those comments in full. <br><br>Change won't happen overnight, obviously, and it will require the efforts of many to get the message to legislators and others in a position to do something about the problem. We're at a very early stage in the process of seeking governmental action and redress on this issue. <br><br>The spyware industry has powerful allies and proven set of tactics for advancing its obstructionist, anti-consumer agenda. Though such tactics worked in the past to head off previous privacy legislation, I'm much less confident those tactics will work in the future for them on this particular issue.<br><br>The industry might succeed in putting off action this year, but the problem will only get worse because this industry simply can't help itself when it sees vulnerable internet users ripe for exploitation. Industry self-regulation won't work, because the vendors involved won't be able to restrain themselves, and public relations campaigns (which is what "industry self-regulation" amounts to) can only do so much to convince people that they are not in fact be used and abused. Moreover, this industry is increasingly being challenged in the court of law, and its legal bills are mounting. Though Gator and WhenU have been largely successful in fending off lawsuits, they are at the point where they face a bleak, expensive future of endless litigation fraught with potentially dangerous, unexpected outcomes. The lawyers for WhenU, Gator, and other similar companies will not lack for billable hours.<br><br>Ultimately, this issue will come to a head. It's just a matter of when.<br><br>Best,<br><br>Eric L. Howes]]></description>
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<pubDate>Thu, 22 Apr 2004 23:19:19 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: FTC Spyware Workshop: 1st Impressions</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,10047508</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/795407"><b>SnowyOne</b></A> : from one of Eric's links<br><B>Mozelle Thompson, a commissioner at the Federal Trade Commission, said it is too early for Congress and the states to pass laws to ban "spyware," the Washington Post reported Tuesday. Rather, technology businesses should teach consumers how to avoid falling victim to identity theft scams and other dangers spyware poses, he said.</B><br>My opinion only...<br>So it seems to me Mozelle Thompson acknowledges the existence of "spyware", but believes it's someone elses responsibility to clean it up. I can remember when my own children thought that way too. Thankfully they have shed that immaturity & have since grown into responsible adults.<br><SMALL>--<br>Dave said "By the way, 4294967295 is just another way to write -1".</SMALL>]]></description>
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<pubDate>Thu, 22 Apr 2004 23:17:00 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: FTC Spyware Workshop: 1st Impressions</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,10047476</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/229804"><b>B</b></A> : <br>Huh?  I thought you said this was your own home PC?  Don't you trust your own habits?<br><br>-- B<br><SMALL>--<br>In a realm outside causality and function</SMALL>]]></description>
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<pubDate>Thu, 22 Apr 2004 23:13:35 EDT</pubDate>
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<item>
<title>Re: FTC Spyware Workshop: 1st Impressions</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,10047454</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/856950"><b>jap</b></A> :  <BLOCKQUOTE><SMALL>said by  B <A HREF="/useremail/u/229804"><IMG SRC="http://i.dslr.net/bb/profile.gif" ALT="See Profile" BORDER=0 WIDTH=16 HEIGHT=11></A>:</SMALL><HR> <BLOCKQUOTE><SMALL>What about Option 3: surf safely and/or use a browser other than IE, don't install garbage software infested with spyware, and be careful with all executable files and e-mail attachments?  (Working as a non-admin is a good idea too, but is unworkable for most.)</SMALL><HR></BLOCKQUOTE><br><br>Ahh yes, the "stay above the fray" approach.  Sorry, not practical.  Not even based in reality.  This isn't a problem you can blame-shift to user behavior.]]></description>
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<pubDate>Thu, 22 Apr 2004 23:10:04 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: FTC Spyware Workshop: 1st Impressions</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,10047359</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/229804"><b>B</b></A> :  <BLOCKQUOTE><SMALL>said by  jap <A HREF="/useremail/u/856950"><IMG SRC="http://i.dslr.net/bb/profile.gif" ALT="See Profile" BORDER=0 WIDTH=16 HEIGHT=11></A>:</SMALL><HR>Bingo.  Though at the public machines I used to admin a local system image re-cast every night - or when someone hit the "rebuild this PC" button on the desktop.  I'm -tonight- trying to decide which approach will be less work for my homePC: try to unhook all the MScrap from the sys partition & maintain a clean, updated image or keep constantly sweeping with 4-8 scanners that don't get everything anyway.<br> <HR></BLOCKQUOTE><br><br>What about Option 3: surf safely and/or use a browser other than IE, don't install garbage software infested with spyware, and be careful with all executable files and e-mail attachments?  (Working as a non-admin is a good idea too, but is unworkable for most.)<br><br>-- B<br><SMALL>--<br>In a realm outside causality and function</SMALL>]]></description>
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<pubDate>Thu, 22 Apr 2004 22:59:04 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: FTC Spyware Workshop: 1st Impressions</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,10047320</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/856950"><b>jap</b></A> : <SMALL>Damonlab said:<br>"Maybe it is time to start thinking about ghosting every machine and pushing out a clean image once a month."</SMALL><br><br>Bingo.  Though at the public machines I used to admin a local system image re-cast every night - or when someone hit the "rebuild this PC" button on the desktop.  I'm -tonight- trying to decide which approach will be less work for my homePC: try to unhook all the MScrap from the sys partition & maintain a clean, updated image or keep constantly sweeping with 4-8 scanners that don't get everything anyway.]]></description>
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<pubDate>Thu, 22 Apr 2004 22:55:57 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: FTC Spyware Workshop: 1st Impressions</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,10046770</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/827318"><b>Bobby_Peru</b></A> : Thanks Eric for _all_ of your many efforts, including taking the time for such informative updates as these.  It's tough to find the positive in such experiences when they only serve to highlight just how far every aspect of life has been commodified, and democracy distorted.  We are no longer even citizens, as much as "consumers" "between the forceps and the stone." So few seem sufficiently aware enough to care, far less to resist.<br><br>Do you think the chances of success of taking the Utah statue as a starting point in a net-based campaign to gather support for lobbying for serious legislation are as dismal as they may appear?]]></description>
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<pubDate>Thu, 22 Apr 2004 22:02:55 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: FTC Spyware Workshop: 1st Impressions</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,10038251</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/378696"><b>eburger68</b></A> : Hi All:<br><br>Now that I've a bit more time, let me extend and expand upon my earlier comments on the FTC Spyware Workshop. I'll organize these comments around the six panels. Since I've now had a chance to see the panelists in action and listen to their contributions, I'll update where appropriate the "rating" that I assigned each panelist in a previous thread ( &raquo;<A HREF="/forum/remark,9986136~mode=flat">FTC Spyware Workshop Panelists - Worries...</A> ):<br><br>X - industry/corporate friendly<br>U - unknown/undetermined<br>P - privacy friendly<br><br>Panel 1: Defining, Understanding, and Disseminating Spyware<br><br>Panelists:<br><br>X - Ed Black, President & Chief Executive Officer, Computer & Communications Industry Association<br>X - Mark Bohannon, General Counsel & Senior Vice President Public Policy, Software & Information Industry Association<br>X - Marty Lafferty, Chief Executive Officer, Distributed Computing Industry Association<br>X - Avi Naider, President & Chief Executive Officer, WhenU.com, Inc.<br>X - Ari Schwartz, Associate Director, Center for Democracy and Technology<br><br>Note: see Bill Pytlovany's blog ( &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.mysteryware.com/blog.html" >www.mysteryware.com/blog.html</A> ) for photos of the panel one participants.<br><br>Protecting Commercial Interests, not the Public<br><br>In the first post of this thread I described how this panel initially described the term "spyware" as too difficult to pin down, only to do a complete about-face when they sought to distinguish their own software (or the software of the interests that they represented) from "spyware."<br><br>This panel was not only predictable, but frustrating and even enraging. In my own comments on the term "spyware" ( &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/junkware.htm" >www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/junkware.htm</A>  ) I wrote: "Definitions and terms ought to help us understand the world and grapple with the problems that it presents, not stand in the way of our efforts to solve those problems." None of the panelists for panel one was interested in crafting a definition of "spyware" that would address the problems of consumers, however. <br><br>This panel should have been striving to define spyware (technologically, behaviorally, or otherwise) in order to help the FTC and legislators identify the kinds of software that consumers are complaining about so as to give those consumers relief from the obnoxious, destructive business practices of advertising software vendors. Instead what these panelists did was attempt to exempt their own software and the software of their clients from the category of "spyware" in order to protect their own interests. Indeed, that pretty much sums up this panel: instead of working to protect consumers, this panel was more interested in protecting themselves. And to its great shame and discredit, the Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT) did almost nothing to challenge that agenda (more on the CDT in a bit).<br><br>A few of the panelists were quite open about what they were attempting to do, stating flatly that "adware is simply different than spyware, and people have got to understand that" -- as if they alone could establish the difference through some sort of declarative fiat without the input or suggestions of others. This was but one of several moments during the day when the arrogant, obstructionist, anti-consumer agendas of those represented on various panels were nakedly on display and visible to all who cared to look.<br><br>Just why the FTC would choose for a panel charged with defining "spyware" panelists whose only contribution would be the plea "whatever it is, it's not what we're doing" is beyond me. The public was not represented on this panel at all (despite the presence of the CDT, for reasons I provide below), and the panel did nothing to protect or advance the interests of the public, only a narrow class of commercial interests.<br><br>WhenU's Avi Naider<br><br>One of those commercial interests was WhenU.com, represented by its chief executive Avi Naider, who insisted at one point that the word spyware "was never meant to include software-based advertising...It's pro-consumer; it's pro-competition; it's pro-competitive. (It's) one of the most promising technologies that exists on the Internet today" ( &raquo;<A HREF="http://zdnet.com.com/2100-1104_2-5195222.html" >zdnet.com.com/2100-1104_2-5195222.html</A> ). Setting aside the fact that the term "spyware" was first used in this context during the summer of 2000 to describe advertising software from such companies as Aureate/Radiate and Cydoor, Naider's assertions are simply preposterous. <br><br>Nothing about WhenU's software is "pro-consumer." Rob Cheng and Dave Methvin of PC Pitstop have effectively demonstrated ( &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/040413pcpitstop.pdf" >www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/&middot;&middot;&middot;stop.pdf</A> ) that the vast majority of consumers with WhenU's software are simply not aware of its existence on their computers. Moreover, Ben Edelman's research on WhenU ( &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/040319edelman.pdf" >www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/&middot;&middot;&middot;lman.pdf</A> ) strongly suggests that WhenU is likely violating its own privacy policy by collecting and transmitting personally sensitive data. Finally, Stephen Urquhart, State Representative in the Utah House of Representatives, showed WhenU's license box during panel 6 -- a box so small that it effectively discourages users from looking too closely at the terms of agreement. Given that Naider consistently maintained that what sets "adware" (and WhenU's software) apart from "spyware" is the provision of notice and disclosure during installation that allows consumers to make an informed choice to voluntarily install WhenU's software, these failings are quite damning.<br><br>Naider claimed that, contrary to the numbers presented by PC Pitstop, most users do knowingly consent to the installation of WhenU's software. As evidence he offered the fact that of 100 million WhenU installations, consumers had uninstalled WhenU's software in 80 million of those cases. Naider reasoned that if 80 percent of users who installed his software were able to uninstall it, then the consumers must have been aware of the software from the outset. This argument is extremely flawed, however, because Naider provided no information about the nature and performance of those uninstallations or even how WhenU managed to calculate the number of uninstallations (Does the uninstaller report back to WhenU? Is WhenU simply subtracting the number of active users from the number of known installations?).<br><br>I strongly suspect that the vast majority of those WhenU uninstallations represent consumers who discovered WhenU's software on their systems after the fact and somehow managed to uninstall it. Many of those users may have discovered WhenU's software through the use of an anti-spyware app such as Ad-aware or Spybot Search & Destroy. Still others may have discovered the software when they turned to a knowledgeable third party (a friend, a computer repair shop) for help with their computers. Whatever the case, the number of uninstallations tells us very little about the circumstances of the installations themselves and whether consumers were properly informed of the software installation and the functionality of that software. On this issue as with so many others, Naider was simply spinning fairy tales.<br><br>Naider's claim that his software is represents one of "most promising technologies that exists on the Internet today" would be laughable were it not indicative of the enormity of the threat that this class of software poses to consumer autonomy on the internet. As I remarked in an earlier post ( &raquo;<A HREF="/forum/remark,9898401~mode=flat">What's the *motivation* for hijack-ware?</A> ), this software technology is indeed regarded as "promising" by advertisers and media companies because it seems to offer commercial interests the ability to control consumers' experience of the internet through "push technology." For consumers themselves, however, nothing about this technology is "promising" -- it is an unmitigated disaster. <br><br>Indeed, in my own comments to the FTC ( &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/ftc-comments.htm" >www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/ftc-comments.htm</A> ), I told the story of helping one of my students remove unwanted software from her PC -- software that had all but trashed the computer and rendered it unusable. One of the more obnoxious pieces of software on that box was WhenU, which interfered with my student's use of her computer and which she no idea how to remove (much less an idea how it had gotten on her box in the first place). <br><br>That the first panel at the FTC's Spyware Workshop offered Naider's WhenU as a representative example of "adware" (as opposed to "spyware") is instructive, given what else was demonstrated about WhenU's software by later panelists and other workshop participants. Even this lame attempt to distinguish "adware" from "spyware" fell through because the software in question turns out to be exactly the kind of software that consumers are complaining about. Anyone working daily in trenches to protect the public against "spyware" could have explained this problem to the panel, but the panel did not have any reliable, recognized representatives of the public's interest.<br><br>Anti-Spyware Legislation<br><br>Almost all of the panelists expressed their strong disapproval of anti-spyware legislation such as the bill recently passed in the Utah House, citing potential problems with an overly broad definition of "spyware" that could make illegal perfectly innocuous, and even popular types of software. The examples offered up by the panel, were simply laughable. One panelist asserted that instant messaging software" would become illegal under the Utah bill, yet failed to explain just how or why such would be the case. Another example pointed to was security software and updates; again, the panelist failed to explain clearly how such software would be illegal under the Utah bill.<br><br>One other type of software offered up as an example of "collateral damage" resulting from the Utah bill was parental control software (i.e., software used by parents to censor porn on home computers to protect children). The panelist who used this example asserted that since the Utah bill requires software to "provide a method ... by which a user may quickly and easily disable and remove the software from the user's computer" ( &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.le.state.ut.us/~2004/bills/hbillenr/hb0323.htm" >www.le.state.ut.us/~2004/bills/h&middot;&middot;&middot;0323.htm</A> ), parental control software would be illegal since it protects itself against uninstallation by children. This argument is, of course, absurd on its face because such software does provide an uninstallation method to the parents who install the software in the first place.<br><br>The Utah bill's requirement of an uninstallation method provoked still more comments from one of the panelists, who warned users to "be careful what you ask for." His argument was that most consumers are unaware of the vast majority of software that is installed on their systems because a good part of that software is installed as part of a larger program (e.g., Microsoft Office or Windows). Indeed, the uninstallation requirement raises the question of just how "software" itself, which is almost infinitely modular, is to be defined. (Interestingly, this very question was at the heart of the Microsoft anti-trust case because MS asserted that Internet Explorer was not a separate software program, but rather an integral part of the Windows operating system.) If software vendors were required to provide uninstallation methods for all software, it was argued, they might be forced to provide uninstallers for software that was critical to the functioning of programs that consumers knowingly installed and even the operating system and computer itself. Thus, consumers would be at risk of uninstalling critical software components and rendering their programs and computers inoperable. <br><br>This objection has some merit, but at the end of the day it cannot be taken as a reason to reject the uninstallation requirement. At best, it means that legislators need to take care that the uninstallation requirement apply only to uniquely defined software modules that are installed independently of other software on the computer, and that software manufacturers be given leeway to protect software modules that are indeed critical to the functioning of the PC. <br><br>Allowing software vendors to install software behind consumers' backs without providing an uninstallation method is simply bad business. Indeed, it is precisely because so many advertising software vendors have neglected to provide conspicuous, reliable uninstallation methods that consumers have resorted to questionable, ad hoc uninstallation methods that risk damaging their computers or rendering them unusable. An uninstallation requirement for advertising software would only reduce the likelihood that consumers would unwittingly damage their systems.<br><br>Bad Behavior vs. Bad Technology<br><br>Almost all of the panelists urged FTC to focus on "bad behavior" or "practices" instead of technology. Although this distinction does have much to recommend it, such a distinction still needs to be fleshed out with concrete examples, none of which were offered by the panelists themselves. Is homepage hijacking, for example, a technology or a behavior? Is the use of contextual pop-up advertising a technology or a behavior? Is the addition of porn-related toolbars to users' browsers a technology or a behavior? <br><br>I would argue that each of these examples represents behavior in the sense that they are business practices embodied in code. I strongly suspect, however, that the panelists who urged a focus on "behavior" over "technology" would prefer a much narrower definition of "behavior" so as to hamstring legislatures and governmental agencies and prevent them from taking action against the more obnoxious business practices of the advertising software vendors.<br><br>The Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT)<br><br>This seems a good point to address the performance of the Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT), represented on panel one by Associate Director Ari Schwartz. Careful readers of my previous comments on the workshop panelists ( &raquo;<A HREF="/forum/remark,9986136~mode=flat">FTC Spyware Workshop Panelists - Worries...</A> ) will note that I have changed the CDT's rating from U (unknown/undetermined) to X (industry/corporate friendly). There are several good reasons for that change. <br><br>In the several documents that the CDT has released over the past six months (see &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.cdt.org/privacy/spyware/" >www.cdt.org/privacy/spyware/</A> ), including its comments to the FTC ( &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/040305centerfordemocandtech.pdf" >www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/&middot;&middot;&middot;tech.pdf</A> ), the CDT has attempted to position itself as the leading representative of the public's interest on the issue of spyware. The CDT has even filed one complaint with the FTC against the company behind SpyWiper, a notorious software vendor that used deceptive scare tactics to stampede users into buying its "anti-spyware" product.<br><br>While it is tempting to regard the CDT as a potentially useful voice on this issue, its several actions and initiatives cast doubt on its ability to represent the public's interest. The CDT's performance on panel one was simply abysmal, as it did nothing to resist the agenda being advanced by the commercial interests represented on the panel, effectively leaving the public without a strong voice on a question (how to define "spyware") that is absolutely critical to addressing the problems with "spyware." Instead of challenging the other panelists' attempts to protect their own commercial interests, Ari Schwartz sat silently by, blithely allowing one panelist after another to exempt themselves and their software from the category of "spyware" and enabling them to promote an obstructionist agenda that threatens to prevent any action whatsoever being taken to protect the public's interest.<br><br>The CDT's preferred course of action, it would seem, is "industry self-regulation" -- an absurd concept that I disparaged in an earlier post. To this end, the CDT has put together a "Consumer Software Working Group," outlined in a position paper that it distributed at the workshop (also available online: &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.cdt.org/publications/pp_10.07.shtml" >www.cdt.org/publications/pp_10.07.shtml</A> ). At the outset of that paper, the CDT states:<br><br> <BLOCKQUOTE><SMALL>said by CDT:</SMALL><HR>The Consumer Software Working Group is a diverse community of public interest groups, software companies, Internet service providers, hardware manufacturers, and others that<br>are seeking consensus responses to the concerns raised by practices that harm consumers.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE><br><br>The name of this "working group" is extremely misleading, though. Among the industry interests represented are:<br><br>America Online<br>Business Software Alliance<br>Claria Corporation<br>Dell, Inc.<br>Distributed Computing Industry Association<br>EarthLink<br>eBay<br>Google<br>Information Technology Industry Council<br>Internet Commerce Coalition<br>Microsoft<br>Network Advertising Initiative<br>Privacilla.org<br>Sharman Networks<br>TRUSTe<br>WhenU<br>Yahoo!<br><br>In fact, two of these members were on panel one with the CDT (the DCIA and WhenU). <br><br>There are several other members of this "working group":<br><br>Center for Democracy and Technology<br>Consortium of Anti-Spyware Technology Vendors<br>Consumer Action<br>CryptoRights Foundation<br>Electronic Frontier Foundation<br>Lavasoft<br>Peter Swire, Moritz College of Law of the Ohio State University2<br>Webroot Software<br><br>Several of these individuals, organizations, and companies certainly do represent the public's interest in some way. Still others are of dubious and questionable value as advocates for the public interest, however, either because their stance on spyware is unknown (Peter Swire) or because their statements to date cast doubt on their ability to fully understand the threat of spyware to the public interest (EFF, CDT).<br><br>However one chooses to tally up this list of members, it is clear that this is not a "consumer" group that represents the interests of the public, but rather an industry protection racket whose sole goal is to use the false promise of "industry self-regulation" as a roadblock to strong governmental action that might give consumers relief from the bad practices and intrusive technologies of commercial interests. <br><br>As I have noted in several other places (see &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/priv-pol.htm#that" >www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/priv-pol.htm#that</A>) "industry self-regulation" initiatives -- including privacy policies, as well as such complementary efforts as 3rd party trustmarks (e.g., Truste and the like) and P3P compact policies -- are best understood not as strong policy initiatives designed to curb unscrupulous business practices, but rather as public relations efforts designed to allow the advertising and marketing industry to continue using its preferred practices and technologies with a minimum of public protest. Rather than reigning in objectionable corporate behavior, these efforts are designed to minimize public resistance to invasive advertising technologies and thus support the ability of commercial interests to use those technologies, of which one of the more "promising" instances is "spyware" or advertising software itself.<br><br>These public relations campaigns need the support of other reputable organizations, however, to lend such PR efforts credibility and give the appearance that "industry self-regulation" might be a viable alternative to governmental regulation and consumer protection. And that is the role the CDT appears to be playing on this issue. The CDT's working group gives commercial interests the public relations cover they need in order to protect their technologies and business practices from governmental oversight and regulation. Crucially, the CDT's working group provides these companies with the "positive," "consumer friendly" umbrella they so desperately desire when facing critical scrutiny from the media.<br><br>I don't doubt that the CDT would take strong exception to these criticisms of its role to date on the spyware issue. Indeed, I would expect that the CDT would protest that their working group is an attempt to find common ground on an issue that threatens to divide commercial interests from the public and that this "common ground" has a much better chance of building solutions that protect the public's interest without crippling the commercial potential of the internet.<br><br>It is difficult to discount the value of finding "common ground" on a vexing issue like "spyware," which implicates the interests of a wide variety of people, companies, and organizations. Given the past results of "industry self-regulation," however, it is even more difficult to take this kind of "self-regulatory" effort seriously. The industry headed off previous attempts to provide consumers with strong privacy protection online by using the promise of "industry self-regulation." As I noted in my comments to the FTC ( &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/ftc-comments.htm" >www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/ftc-comments.htm</A> ):<br><br> <BLOCKQUOTE><SMALL>said by Eric L. Howes:</SMALL><HR>What the industry came up with...has been something less than a smashing success. Faced with serious consumer complaints about privacy violations, the industry essentially declared, "Let them eat privacy policies!" Even the addition of a meager supplementary diet of P3P compact policies and third-party trustmarks has done little to satisfy or assuage consumers' privacy concerns. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE><br><br>There is very little evidence that these earlier "self-regulatory" initiatives have done much of anything to change the way businesses, esp. those in the advertising industry, ply their trade on the Net ( &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/priv-pol.htm#that" >www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/priv-pol.htm#that</A> ). If anything, the advertising industry has become even more aggressive in its efforts to swamp consumers with intrusive advertising, turning even now to "spyware" technology itself to convert users' computers computers into fancy direct marketing platforms. Given that sorry history, there is no reason to think these latest examples of "self-regulation" on the "spyware" issue will be any different. It is difficult to believe that companies the industry groups involved in the CDT's "working group" are at all interested in changing their business practices; it is much more believable that they are simply interested in changing the public's perception of their practices and technologies.<br><br>That the CDT would support these kinds of "self-regulatory" initiatives is both depressing and unsurprising. The CDT has been a strong supporter of P3P (see &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.cdt.org/privacy/pet/p3pprivacy.shtml" >www.cdt.org/privacy/pet/p3pprivacy.shtml</A> ), for example, despite the lack of evidence that P3P has done anything to protect consumers' privacy online some three years after its implementation in Internet Explorer 6.0 (see &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/priv-pol.htm#ie6-p3p" >www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/priv-&middot;&middot;&middot;#ie6-p3p</A> ). Thus, when the CDT then goes before Senate Communications Subcommittee on the issue of "spyware" and advocates a P3P-like standards initiative to address the problems with spyware (see p. 9 of &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.cdt.org/testimony/20040323berman.pdf" >www.cdt.org/testimony/20040323berman.pdf</A> ), that organization effectively forfeits any claim to be taken seriously as a representative of the public's interest.<br><br>Concluding Remarks on Panel 1<br><br>At the end of FTC's Spyware Workshop on Monday I happened to chat up someone else in the anti-spyware camp who had been to several meetings on the "spyware" issue, including at least one meeting of the CDT's working group. Her remarks on the Spyware Workshop and those in attendance were striking. She pointed out that the Spyware Workshop was filled with industry representatives and lobbyists of one sort or another. This group of representatives and lobbyists has participated in many other similar events: they have been at the FTC's previous workshops on online privacy; they have been in the offices of Senators and Representatives whenever legislation was being considered that might threaten the interests they represent; they have been at all the Congressional hearings conducted over the past few years on these kinds of issues. Wherever and whenever things were happening in Washington that might threaten their interests, they've been there to ensure that absolutely nothing happened that might stop their clients from doing exactly what they're doing right now.<br><br>The first panel at the FTC's Spyware Workshop was a striking example of how successful these interests can be in protecting their preferred business practices and technologies. This outcome was not unexpected. In the first remarks that I made back in February on the FTC's Spyware Workshop ( &raquo;<A HREF="/forum/remark,9458905~mode=flat">Tired of being hijacked? TELL the FTC!</A> ), I noted that<br><br> <BLOCKQUOTE><SMALL>said by Eric L. Howes:</SMALL><HR>the FTC workshop ... could mean that we're at the start of a Federal discussion of the "spyware" problem, which until now has received almost no attention.<br><br>What are the potential outcomes of that process? There are three broad outcomes, so far as I can see:<br><br>1) Nothing gets done<br><br>The FTC wrings its hands over the problem but eventually agrees with the commercial crapware industry that government regulation is a bad thing; that the industry "self-regulation" is much more effective and even preferable; that consumers are being offered "choice" in the form of EULAs, commercial anti-spyware applications, browsers settings, and vendor provided uninstallers; that consumer education is all that is needed from the FTC for the "spyware" problem to solve itself. Everyone involved will give themselves a pat on the back for protecting consumer choice, respecting the beauty of the market, for committing themselves to self-regulation and consumer education, and then they will go home, having done absolutely nothing.<br><br>2) A CAN SPYWARE Act<br><br>The FTC works with the commercial crapware industry to craft legislation for Congressional adoption. This legislation will distinguish between "spyware" and "adware" by imposing a minimal set of requirements for software installation (a EULA for example). This minimal set of requirements will not stop the usual suspects from doing what they're already doing, but it will allow the industry to proclaim that their software conforms to strict government regulatory standards. It will also allow the FTC to prosecute a small number of the more unscrupulous "spyware" pushers, thus giving the larger players protection from unwanted competition.<br><br>3) Real "Spyware" Regulation<br><br>The FTC actually responds to consumer outrage (as it did with the Do Not Call legislation) and, to the horror of the commercial crapware industry, pushes Congress to adopt legislation that would place real restrictions on the abusive tactics of the commercial crapware industry.<br><br>Outcomes #1 and #2 are the preferred outcomes for the commercial crapware industry. Outcome #3 would be a disaster.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE><br><br>So far, the industry has succeeded in achieving outcome # 1. Several of the news articles written about the Workshop noted just this:<br><br>Few solutions pop up at FTC adware workshop<br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://zdnet.com.com/2100-1104_2-5195222.html" >zdnet.com.com/2100-1104_2-5195222.html</A><br><br>What's the Best Way to Stop Spyware?<br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://www.pcworld.com/news/article/0,aid,115765,00.asp" >www.pcworld.com/news/article/0,a&middot;&middot;&middot;5,00.asp</A><br><br>FTC Urges Industry Solutions to Spyware<br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://www.internetnews.com/xSP/article.php/3342471" >www.internetnews.com/xSP/article.php/3342471</A><br><br>FTC commissioner opposes anti-spyware laws<br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://washingtontimes.com/upi-breaking/20040420-084534-4186r.htm" >washingtontimes.com/upi-breaking&middot;&middot;&middot;186r.htm</A><br><br>'Spyware' Eludes Easy Answers<br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A25231-2004Apr19.html" >www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ar&middot;&middot;&middot;r19.html</A><br><br>The FTC's Workshop is but one step in a longer process, though, and I would urge those who care about protecting consumers and Netizens from obnoxious, invasive commercial crapware not to become too discouraged at the outcome of this Workshop, which was entirely expected. There are still two anti-spyware bills in Congress. Moreover, Utah has passed its own anti-spyware bill, and other states are still considering bills of their own.<br><br>I do plan to discuss the remaining five panels, though my comments on those later panels won't be nearly as extensive as these comments on the first panel. The first panel was perhaps the most important of the panels; it was also the most discouraging and enraging.<br> <br>Comments on, criticisms of, and questions about this long post are, as always, most welcome.<br><br>All the best,<br><br>Eric L. Howes]]></description>
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<pubDate>Wed, 21 Apr 2004 22:22:59 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>My Notes from the Workshop</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,10036562</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/0"><b>anon</b></A> : My notes from the workshop -- a little late, for which I apologize, but better late than never.<br><br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://www.benedelman.org/news/042104-1.html" >www.benedelman.org/news/042104-1.html</A><br><br>Ben Edelman<br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://www.benedelman.org" >www.benedelman.org</A>]]></description>
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<pubDate>Wed, 21 Apr 2004 19:20:13 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: FTC Spyware Workshop: 1st Impressions</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,10030273</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/378696"><b>eburger68</b></A> : Hi All:<br><br>Just wanted to let you know that I have seen all the responses in this thread to my original post. Unfortunately, I simply don't have time tonight to expand on my initial comments. As is the case with Dave, Rob, Paul, and the other anti-spyware folks who attended the workshop, I'm busy catching up with email and other things that piled up during my absence. I will try to post additional comments tomorrow afternoon or evening, though (and there is plenty still left to be said).<br><br>A few quick notes, though:<br><br>First, the FTC has posted still more comments (# 172-188). Of interest in this batch is a second submission from Jason Lucas of C2 Media (aka, Lop.com):<br><br># 181: Lucas-2 (04/14/04)<br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/040414lucas2.pdf" >www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/&middot;&middot;&middot;cas2.pdf</A><br><br>I opined in an earlier thread about C2 Media's first batch of comments:<br><br>&raquo;<A HREF="/forum/remark,9745185~mode=flat">Lop.com Goes to the FTC</A><br><br>And, of course, the longest of the three documents that I submitted to the FTC is a step-by-step analysis of a C2 Media "drive-by-download":<br><br>The Anatomy of a Drive-by-Download<br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/dbd-anatomy.htm" >www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/dbd-anatomy.htm</A><br><br>This second batch of comments from C2 Media is also worth a read, because Lucas frames these new comments as a reponse to the critiques of anti-spyware advocates. Although he doesn't point to my comments by name, it's pretty clear that he is in fact responding to my "drive-by-download" document, which uses a C2 Media as the central example.<br><br>I won't bother responding to the several points he makes (though I do intend to after I get some sleep). I think you'll find C2 Media's response less than convincing.<br><br>Second, I want to respond quickly to what Dave Leary had to say on the issue of new legislation/regulations:<br><br> <BLOCKQUOTE><SMALL>said by Dave Leary:</SMALL><HR>In all fairness to the FTC, remember they do not create laws, Congress does.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE><br><br>Yes, that's quite true, but that doesn't mean that the executive branch, generally, and federal agencies, specifically, don't participate in the creation of new legislation and regulations. In fact, it's quite common for government agencies to work with members of Congress to craft new legislation to address problems and issues that fall within their regulatory purview.<br><br>At the close of the workshop I did in fact ask someone from the FTC if we could expect the FTC to work with legislators on anti-spyware legislation or even to encourage its adoption. The answer I received was a quick shake of the head and a very quiet, "No..."<br><br>If you go back and look at my earlier postings here at DSLR, that answer shouldn't surprise you at all. Indeed, my reading of this Spyware Workshop is that its main purpose was to bring industry representatives together to talk very publicly about "industry self-regulation" and thus give the industry a bit of PR leverage in their efforts to resist spyware legislation at the state and federal level.<br><br>Finally, a quick notice that I have updated my FTC Spyware Workshop page. <br><br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/ftc-spyware.htm" >www.staff.uiuc.edu/~ehowes/ftc-spyware.htm</A><br><br>It now includes more news articles and links to still further information and research relevant to this issue. In addition to the PC Pitstop surveys introduced at the workshop, there were several other reports from Dell, Microsoft, McAfee, and others that were presented at the workshop and which I'll be trying to track down so that you all can see some of what we saw on Monday.<br><br>Bill P of WinPatrol has been adding more material to his blog as well (including, now, photos of all six panels):<br><br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://www.mysteryware.com/blog.html" >www.mysteryware.com/blog.html</A><br><br>In any case, I'll be back tomorrow with more comments on several burning issues. And I anticipate that several of the other anti-spyware folks in attendance at the workshop will be posting their own impressions and reactions as well.<br><br>Best,<br><br>Eric L. Howes]]></description>
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<pubDate>Wed, 21 Apr 2004 01:50:07 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: FTC Spyware Workshop: 1st Impressions</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,10029553</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/575771"><b>mens rea</b></A> :  <BLOCKQUOTE><SMALL>said by eburger68:</SMALL><HR>The FTC is not interested in encouraging new regulations or legislation concerning "spyware" or advertising software. Commissioner Swindle (head of the FTC) indicated as much in the videotaped remarks that were played after the first panel this morning. The FTC is much more interested in encouraging what it calls "industry self-regulation," which involves the advertising industry itself establishing a set of "best practices" that would allow it to "play nice" with consumers<HR></BLOCKQUOTE><br>Why is it when bureaucrats get together the find new and exciting terminology that essentially allows them to do nothing. It's just "optics".;) <br><br>Where is there an incentive anywhere in any type of business for "industry self regulation"? When profits are weighed against personal privacy with no sanction for intrusion upon the latter there is absolutely no reason for "self regulation".  Hasn't the position of the adware/spyware camp been all along that there is no problem?<br><br>As far "best practices" are concerned I shudder to think how low the standard may go, after all the industry is the one doing the potential regulating and defining what is "best".  Again present conduct best exemplifies what now passes for ethical business practices amongst industry proponents.  I think the fox is now amongst the chickens.<br><br>Thanks for the update Eric.<br><br>Regards <br><br>   ]]></description>
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<pubDate>Wed, 21 Apr 2004 00:06:06 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: FTC Spyware Workshop: 1st Impressions</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,10029441</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/983621"><b>IBPirate</b></A> : Eric,<br>thanks for the in-attendance narrative. My email comment to the FTC, and what I teach all of my users, and whomever else asks, is that our choice must be to make a conscious choice to OPT IN to ANY of these ... things. The choice must be ours, not pushed upon most because of their ignorance.  These ...Q$#%%... could easily make a very small page that uses ONE screen to explain their desired activities and the reader can make the choice at the end of that screen to accept, or reject on a Permanent basis, what is being offered.<br>  Mr Naider, or any of the others, regardless of their blandishments of "making the Internet 'FREE' and a 'pleasurable experience' are uninvited guests to my computer (read Home)and I actively choose the right to do with them as I do the rats that attempt to take up residence in my  woodpile.  Hunt them down and ... um, reduce their life light to 0 lumins:mad:]]></description>
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<pubDate>Tue, 20 Apr 2004 23:52:42 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: FTC Spyware Workshop: 1st Impressions</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,10028056</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/980831"><b>GodKhaine</b></A> : Man I AM LOSING ALL RESPECT FOR THE GOV'T, I had my cd player stolen from my car the day before Easter and I only have liability stuck on the car to pick up a new window, so I ask the cop what would happen if they get caught... a few days in jail if that and a misdemeanor, SOOOO I ask what would happen if I was to assault the thief.... COULD BE SUED. I SWEAR I'M GONNA KILL THE A$$HOLES AND ANY STUPID POLITICIAN/ADWARE/SPYWARE SUPPORTER. ARGH :mad::mad:<br>I don't care if this is treason I'll gladly tell the FBI or whoever but if the gov't can't aid and listen to the people it's supposed to protect then get rid of the (EXPLETIVELY DELETED by me) POLITICIANS.<br><br>P.S. Thanks a million Eric, just wish there was more people like you and everyone else who hates bad companies/politicians.]]></description>
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<pubDate>Tue, 20 Apr 2004 21:36:29 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: FTC Spyware Workshop: 1st Impressions</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,10027719</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/730983"><b>linicx</b></A> : I think before we start talking about FCC and laws we all need to understand there are two types of criminal today: civil and violent. No, I do not mean crimes. If I walk up to you and punch you in the nose I go to jail. If you come to my house and steal my new $5000 mower nothing happens unless I start a civil suit. There is no such thing as criminal prosecution anymore unless you are a drug dealer, killer or pedophile.  These sophomoric morons who create havoc in the form of spyware, pop up ads, keystroke loggers, etc., are not going to stop unless they have a list of incentives like the spammer in Michigan received.   <br><br>Finding them and publishing their name, address, email, phone number, names and ages of their children, type of vehicle they drive, plate number, where they work and shop, etc., is the only kind of incentive they understand. In their world what they do is very cool. <br><br>"Do unto others as they would do unto you..." thus said the Lord.    <br><br>Just my two cents; I'm tired of being ripped off and jerked around. <br><SMALL>--<br>No windows; No gates; Apple inside</SMALL>]]></description>
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<pubDate>Tue, 20 Apr 2004 21:01:12 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: FTC Spyware Workshop: 1st Impressions</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,10027431</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/352846"><b>antdude</b></A> : FYI. &raquo;<A HREF="http://zdnet.com.com/2100-1104_2-5195222.html" >zdnet.com.com/2100-1104_2-5195222.html</A>]]></description>
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<pubDate>Tue, 20 Apr 2004 20:34:19 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: FTC Spyware Workshop: 1st Impressions</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,10027225</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/381367"><b>damonlab</b></A> : This spyware stuff has got to stop.  It has worked its way into my home computer, friend's computers, business computers, etc.<br><br>You show me a Windows computer with no spyware, and I will show you a computer that is a clean install without the user having more than 5 minutes online.<br><br>So far, the best tools I have found to combat spyware are AdAware and Spybot.  Both are good to recommend for personal use.  Spybot is free for commercial use.  AdAware requires a licensing fee for commercial use.  Most businesses are always tight on budget, so very few will pay for AdAware.  <br><br>Even with AdAware and Spybot, some spyware simply can not be eliminated.  I have seen systems with NO VIRUSES, NO TROJANS, and they were just hosed with spyware.  Far too much spyware for even AdAware or Spybot to take care of. <br><br>Maybe it is time to start thinking about ghosting every machine and pushing out a clean image once a month. ]]></description>
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<pubDate>Tue, 20 Apr 2004 20:13:30 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: FTC Spyware Workshop: 1st Impressions</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,10026438</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/377417"><b>ctceo</b></A> : Commissioner Swindle? My My Isn't that an ironic last name for the head of the Federal Trade Commision, ROFLMAO!!!<br><br>courtesy, dictionary.com:<br><br>swin&middot;dle    ( P )  Pronunciation Key  (swndl)<br>v. swin&middot;dled, swin&middot;dling, swin&middot;dles <br>v. tr.<br>To cheat or defraud of money or property. <br>To obtain by fraudulent means: swindled money from the company. <br><br>v. intr.<br>To practice fraud as a means of obtaining money or property.<br><br>n. <br>The act or an instance of swindling.<br><br>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<br>[Back-formation from swindler, one who swindles, from German Schwindler, giddy person, cheat, from schwindeln, to be dizzy, swindle, from Middle High German, from Old High German swintiln, frequentative of swintan, to disappear.] <br><SMALL>--<br>K8T Neo - 2GB DCDDR400 - AXP 64 3400+ - 3DLabs WC4 7210 - CL Audigy 2 PP - WD SATA150 36GB + Hitachi GST 250GB - Plextor PX708A + Sony CRX300A - Dual 535 Watt PSU's, Full Tower El Cheapo Case W/ Sound Padding & Thermal vents.</SMALL>]]></description>
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<pubDate>Tue, 20 Apr 2004 18:52:38 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: FTC Spyware Workshop: 1st Impressions</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,10022493</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/0"><b>anon</b></A> : In all fairness to the FTC, remember they do not create laws, Congress does.<BR><BR><br><br>If you would like to learn about the Commissioners you can find their bios at &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.ftc.gov/bios/commissioners.htm" >www.ftc.gov/bios/commissioners.htm</A>. The Chairman is Timmothy Muris. The term is seven years and there can be no more than three from either party. When there is a vacancy, the President nominates and the Senate approves the candidate.]]></description>
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<pubDate>Tue, 20 Apr 2004 10:58:12 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: FTC Spyware Workshop: 1st Impressions</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,10022439</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/675365"><b>Bubba</b></A> : Yes Eric....As always, Thanks for keeping us well informed about the adware workshop and what appears to be a brain fart by the FTC. The foxes protecting the chicken coop ?<br><br><B>Kind of OT</B><br> <BLOCKQUOTE><SMALL>said by  BillPStudios <A HREF="/useremail/u/990514"><IMG SRC="http://i.dslr.net/bb/profile.gif" ALT="See Profile" BORDER=0 WIDTH=16 HEIGHT=11></A>:</SMALL><HR>This could be an entirely different thread but the Coalition of Anti-Spyware Technology vendors proudly announced their newest member today. New.net<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Agree about a new thread since 99.9 % of the malware software\reg file entries discussed in this Forum have <I>New.net</I> listed as badware in one form or another. Tell me your throwing out a belated April Fool's :)<br><SMALL>--<br><A HREF="http://www.zonelabs.com/store/content/company/teamz.jsp">*Team Z* Member</A></SMALL>]]></description>
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<pubDate>Tue, 20 Apr 2004 10:51:35 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: FTC Spyware Workshop: 1st Impressions</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,10022076</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/992993"><b>dmethvin</b></A> : Hi guys, this is Dave Methvin from PC Pitstop. I just wanted to say it was great getting together with Eric, BillP, and the others at this meeting. Too bad we couldn't slap the cuffs on some of those folks while we had them in the room. ;)<br><br>Although Eric's probably right that the FTC won't take any quick action to create new rules, I think there is a good chance that some of the active lawsuits are going to make headway. Also, the paper from Ben Edelman that Eric mentions could be the basis for some action against Whenu for violating their own privacy policy.<br><br>All this political lobbying has put me a bit behind in posting content and impressions on the PC Pitstop site, so I guess I should get cracking on that! ]]></description>
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<pubDate>Tue, 20 Apr 2004 09:55:52 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: FTC Spyware Workshop: 1st Impressions</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,10020976</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/356416"><b>Link Logger</b></A> : I don't think its possible to regulate this industry, how would you enforce it, so anything that comes out of this is certainly a step in the right direction, be it likely a very small step, but a step never the less and likely a short lived step as adware, spyware, etc have competition as well and if the competition ignores the rules then its likely everything is back to free for all mode, or some companies go out of business and then everything is back to free for all mode so there is really no escaping this continuing adventure.<br><br>Blake<br><SMALL>--<br>Vendor: Firewall Logging Software &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.SonicLogger.com" >www.SonicLogger.com</A> - SonicWall and 3Com &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.LinkLogger.com" >www.LinkLogger.com</A> - Linksys, Netgear and Zyxel</SMALL>]]></description>
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<pubDate>Tue, 20 Apr 2004 03:12:07 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: FTC Spyware Workshop: 1st Impressions</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,10020947</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/795407"><b>SnowyOne</b></A> : There isn't any panacea.<br>But getting together a bunch of S**Ware Advocates to at least define what is not acceptable to even THEM gives a solid baseline for further discussion.<br>The whole idea is you gotta learn to crawl before you walk & learn to walk before you run.<br>I'd rather see delayed well thought out regulations than knee-jerk reactions that are either unenforceable or won't survive a contested lawsuit.<br><SMALL>--<br>Dave said "By the way, 4294967295 is just another way to write -1".</SMALL>]]></description>
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<pubDate>Tue, 20 Apr 2004 03:00:55 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: FTC Spyware Workshop: 1st Impressions</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,10020902</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/229804"><b>B</b></A> :  <BLOCKQUOTE><SMALL>said by  Link Logger <A HREF="/useremail/u/356416"><IMG SRC="http://i.dslr.net/bb/profile.gif" ALT="See Profile" BORDER=0 WIDTH=16 HEIGHT=11></A>:</SMALL><HR>operation offshore (a lot of it already has moved) to where people think FTC is the name of a boy band or something.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE><br><br>And the girls love the hit single 2Cool2Spy4U.<br><br>I Googled Swindle a bit (not that there's anything wrong with that) and found an interesting set of quotes at &raquo;<A HREF="http://zdnet.com.com/2100-1105-956708.html:" >zdnet.com.com/2100-1105-956708.html:</A><br><br> <BLOCKQUOTE><SMALL>quote:</SMALL><HR> Why would someone who is breaking the law pay any attention to the law? It's so difficult to catch 'em. You just wonder what the effect would be. Good people who obey laws probably don't send out a whole lot of spam. Bad people who like to rip people off probably won't pay a lot of attention to the law, since they'll do it anyway.[...]You're going to hear the First Amendment argument, "I have a right to market." They're going to continue to do this until they're taught that it's destructive, that it's harmful. That's one of the principles of the OECD guidelines that talks about democracy and ethics. Be aware that you can hurt other people.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE><br><br>He's talking about spam here, but how, exactly, are spyware companies more trustworthy?  Can you believe this is the same person talking as the one Eric described above regarding spyware "self-regulation"?  Does this man have ANY idea of the scum he's dealing with?<br><br>-- B]]></description>
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<pubDate>Tue, 20 Apr 2004 02:44:47 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: FTC Spyware Workshop: 1st Impressions</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,10020848</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/795407"><b>SnowyOne</b></A> : The reason Commissioner Swindle is not Congressman Swindle is that he calls'em as he sees them.<br>His refusal to pander to special interest concerns doomed his political (elected) career.<br>Betcha didn't know that when he ran for Congress someone cybersat his name. He is still a little hissed off over that. That's the type of expierience & oversite I like to see in that position of authority.<br><SMALL>--<br>Dave said "By the way, 4294967295 is just another way to write -1".</SMALL>]]></description>
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<pubDate>Tue, 20 Apr 2004 02:28:19 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: FTC Spyware Workshop: 1st Impressions</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,10020803</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/356416"><b>Link Logger</b></A> :  <BLOCKQUOTE><SMALL>said by  eburger68 <A HREF="/useremail/u/378696"><IMG SRC="http://i.dslr.net/bb/profile.gif" ALT="See Profile" BORDER=0 WIDTH=16 HEIGHT=11></A>:</SMALL><HR>The FTC is much more interested in encouraging what it calls "industry self-regulation," which involves the advertising industry itself establishing a set of "best practices" that would allow it to  "play nice" with consumers.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>Is this guy on glue or something???  What motivation does this industry have for any form of self-regulation, best practices or to play nice with consumers and why hasn't this motivation already self-regulated the industry?  Next question, who exactly does the FTC think they are and I think this is the point they realize in that there really isn't anything they can do to regulate this cr@p, as the internet doesn't understand borders, so its easy to move this sort of operation offshore (a lot of it already has moved) to where people think FTC is the name of a boy band or something.<br><br>I fully wish and dream about the day when some of this junk goes buh-bye, but its too easy and the money is too good, so it won't ever go away, and it is slowly killing the internet IMHO (I'm talking about more then just adware, spyware etc, but the whole concept of the internet as nothing more then a huge scam marketing tool).<br><br>Blake<br><SMALL>--<br>Vendor: Firewall Logging Software &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.SonicLogger.com" >www.SonicLogger.com</A> - SonicWall and 3Com &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.LinkLogger.com" >www.LinkLogger.com</A> - Linksys, Netgear and Zyxel</SMALL>]]></description>
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<pubDate>Tue, 20 Apr 2004 02:18:55 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: FTC Spyware Workshop: 1st Impressions</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,10020462</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/229804"><b>B</b></A> : <br>I guess so, although frankly it sounds disingenuous.  I mean, many Internet transactions are already taxed (e.g. whenever your vendor has a local presence); and there are already plenty of massive databases of our buying habits -- they're called credit agencies; and as far as I understand (which is not a lot) it's up to the individual vendors to handle the bookkeeping....  It really just sounds as if he was playing to his audience there...<br><br>-- B<br><SMALL>--<br>In a realm outside causality and function</SMALL>]]></description>
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<pubDate>Tue, 20 Apr 2004 01:18:00 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: FTC Spyware Workshop: 1st Impressions</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,10020248</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/795407"><b>SnowyOne</b></A> : <B>"I'm ignorant here; does the FTC get flushed out if there's a different President come January?"</B><br><br>I don't know the answer to that question, but I hope not.<br>The following quote is from Commissioner Swindle.<br>"According to Orson Swindle, a Federal Trade Commission member and past Hawaii political candidate, taxing Internet transactions "is not a nice scenario." <br>"By tracking individual transactions, the government would create a massive database that knows all your finances, your buying patterns and your personal preferences -- and all that is controlled by the government," Swindle told a Tax Foundation of Hawaii luncheon crowd this week. He also gave a radio address and spoke to the Rotary Club of Honolulu on the issue during his most recent visit to our state." <br>That type of position is a very healthy one.<br>For the full transcript (short) visit <A HREF="http://www.bizjournals.com/pacific/stories/2000/01/17/editorial3.html">here</A>.<br><SMALL>--<br>Dave said "By the way, 4294967295 is just another way to write -1".</SMALL>]]></description>
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<pubDate>Tue, 20 Apr 2004 00:41:56 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: FTC Spyware Workshop: 1st Impressions</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,10020189</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/229804"><b>B</b></A> : <br>Wow, they must have had a lot of spyware in Windows 3.1.<br><br>-- B<br><SMALL>--<br>In a realm outside causality and function</SMALL>]]></description>
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<pubDate>Tue, 20 Apr 2004 00:33:01 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: FTC Spyware Workshop: 1st Impressions</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,10020094</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/990514"><b>BillPStudios</b></A> : Nope, I didn't get Eric on my camera.<br>I'm still so stunned about the Coast welcoming New.net that I couldn't sleep so I'll expand on some of Eric's comments.<br><br>Avi Naider from WhenU said 100 million users have installed WhenU programs and 80 million have removed it.<br>He was suggesting this was a positive thing in demonstrating users really do have a way to Uninstall the software they had once agreed to install.  According to research surveys by PC Pitstop 86% of those remaining users aren't even aware they have it on their system. Interesting business model.<br><br>You can call it adware if you want but its still generating complaints.  According to Bryson Gordon from McAfee Security, 86% of their problem reports from their VirusScan were not viruses but were Adware. They defined 3% as Spyware.<br><br>Microsoft was there showing off features added to Windows XP SP2 which looked good. Their dialog showing BHO's and Toolbar add-ons was pretty cryptic especially when compared the screen we display in our WinPatrol program but it's a step in the right direction. I'm not sure how useful it is showing the GUID to help the average user decide if they want to keep a program or not.<br><br>The funniest comment was from Microsoft's Brian Arbogast on Panel Four. According to Microsoft, 50% of system crashes are caused by spyware.  I didn't think Windows was suppose to crash anymore but at least now we know it's due to spyware. ;)<br><br>Bill Pytlovany<br>BillP Studios]]></description>
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<pubDate>Tue, 20 Apr 2004 00:19:59 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: FTC Spyware Workshop: 1st Impressions</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,10019889</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/229804"><b>B</b></A> : <br>No Eric pictures though.<br><br>Hey, Avi and Ari look worried.  I hope that's a good sign.<br><br>-- B<br><SMALL>--<br>In a realm outside causality and function</SMALL>]]></description>
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<pubDate>Mon, 19 Apr 2004 23:54:30 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: FTC Spyware Workshop: 1st Impressions</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,10019851</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/990514"><b>BillPStudios</b></A> : Eric,<br><br>  I agree, it was a pleasure to meet you and all the other amazing folks who showed up for this event.  Even though I only recently returned to the hotel, and am exhausted but I did update my blog page with a photo of panel six and some other comments.  &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.mysteryware.com/blog.html" >www.mysteryware.com/blog.html</A><br><br>  I also included a link to a press release that wasn't mentioned at the workshop.  This could be an entirely different thread but the Coalition of Anti-Spyware Technology vendors proudly announced their newest member today.  New.net.<br><br>More to come...<br><br>Bill Pytlovany<br>BillP Studios]]></description>
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<pubDate>Mon, 19 Apr 2004 23:50:41 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: FTC Spyware Workshop: 1st Impressions</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,10019699</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/874633"><b>anthrorules</b></A> : Thanks for keeping us updated...I saw a news story about this in Yahoo! yesterday.]]></description>
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<pubDate>Mon, 19 Apr 2004 23:34:28 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: FTC Spyware Workshop: 1st Impressions</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,10019303</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/229804"><b>B</b></A> : <br>Eric, thank you SO much for keeping us so well informed.<br><br>The regulators want to encourage "self-regulation"?  Uhhhhh, okay.  Like the chilling "self regulation" of FCC fines for poopy jokes, or the self-regulation of car makers left to their own devices and and 10 MPG Escalades?  Great stuff.<br><br>I'm ignorant here; does the FTC get flushed out if there's a different President come January?<br><br>-- B<br><SMALL>--<br>In a realm outside causality and function</SMALL>]]></description>
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<pubDate>Mon, 19 Apr 2004 22:54:05 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>FTC Spyware Workshop: 1st Impressions</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,10018653</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/378696"><b>eburger68</b></A> : Hi All:<br><br>I don't have much time to write, but I thought I'd update you on what happened today at the  FTC's Spyware Workshop. When I get home I'll post more complete comments.<br><br>As most of you know, the FTC's Spyware Workshop was today. We've talked about this workshop in several previous threads:<br><br>&raquo;<A HREF="/forum/remark,9458905~mode=flat">Tired of being hijacked? TELL the FTC!</A> <br>&raquo;<A HREF="/forum/remark,9587358~mode=flat">Telling the FTC About Spyware: A Few Tips...</A> <br>&raquo;<A HREF="/forum/remark,9745185~mode=flat">Lop.com Goes to the FTC</A> <br>&raquo;<A HREF="/forum/remark,9818820~mode=flat">What I Told the FTC about Spyware...</A> <br>&raquo;<A HREF="/forum/remark,9864340~mode=flat">A Guide to Spyware Comments Filed w/ the FTC</A> <br>&raquo;<A HREF="/forum/remark,9898401~mode=flat">What's the *motivation* for hijack-ware?</A> <br>&raquo;<A HREF="/forum/remark,9986136~mode=flat">FTC Spyware Workshop Panelists - Worries...</A> <br><br>The workshop started today at 9 am and was hosted in the the FTC's Conference Center in Washington D.C. The workshop was structured around six discussion panels, with roughly five panelists per panel. See...<br><br>&raquo;<A HREF="/forum/remark,9986136~mode=flat">FTC Spyware Workshop Panelists - Worries...</A><br><br>...for my earlier comments on those panels and panelists.<br><br>One question that I might as well answer right now is one that I know many of you will ask: will any new regulations or legislation emerge from today's workshop to regulate or  even outlaw spyware or practices associated with the advertising software industry? The  answer is a simple one: No.<br><br>The FTC is not interested in encouraging new regulations or legislation concerning "spyware"  or advertising software. Commissioner Swindle (head of the FTC) indicated as much in the videotaped remarks that were played after the first panel this morning. The FTC is much more interested in encouraging what it calls "industry self-regulation," which involves the advertising industry itself establishing a set of "best practices" that would allow it to  "play nice" with consumers. As I've indicated in several previous posts on this board as well as in the comments that I submitted to the FTC, I regard "self-regulation" as oxymoronic doublespeak at its bureaucratic finest.<br><br>Rather than belabor the point in the short time I have, let me describe what else happened at this workshop.<br><br>Panel 1 (definitions of spyware/adware) was as bad as I expected it to be. Dominated by industry representatives or those friendly to the industry, the panel came to a consensus very early (and even noted that they were all essentially in agreement). What was odd about  that consensus is the way is shifted in response to the issues on the table. The panelists initially all agreed that it would be fruitless to get hung up on a term like "spyware," and  that it would be much more productive to focus on "bad practices." Now, this is exactly what we anti-spyware folks have been saying for some time. So, for a moment, I almost thought that the something productive might actually be taking place, despite my initial fears.<br><br>No such luck. After agreeing that definition disputes would be best avoided, the panel did a complete 180 degree turn when the question of distinguishing "adware" from "spyware" was  raised. At that moment every one of them (with the possible exception of Ari Schwartz of the  CDT) became suddenly very interested in nailing down a definition of "spyware" so as to distinguish their own software (or the software of the interests they represented) from  "spyware." The message from the panel was essentially exactly as I predicted it would be:  "Spyware is illegitimate software; adware is legitimate software. We do adware not spyware."<br><br>Indeed, Avi Naider from WhenU pursued exactly this line, claiming that most WhenU users were  quite aware of the installed software on their computers. In a somewhat bizarre move, Naider attempted to back this claim up by pointing out that of roughly 100 million WhenU  installations, 80 million had been uninstalled. He claimed that the fact that users had uninstalled WhenU demonstrated that they were aware of the installations. There are all  kinds of problems with this argument, which I won't bother to cover here.<br><br>Suffice it to say it was at that moment that Rob Cheng and Dave Methvin of PC Pitstop (the outfit sued by Gator/Claria last fall, by the way) began distributing their new survey of WhenU users that tells quite another story: over 80% of WhenU users are NOT even aware that the software is installed on their computers. See PC Pitstop's 2nd set of comments:<br><br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/040413pcpitstop.pdf" >www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/&middot;&middot;&middot;stop.pdf</A><br><br>...for the write-up of that survey. And see their 1st set of comments...<br><br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/040315pcpitstop.pdf" >www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/&middot;&middot;&middot;stop.pdf</A><br><br>...for their earlier survey with Gator/GAIN users, also quite damning.<br><br>Needless to say, this caused a minor ruckus with WhenU's attorney, who was not amused that Rob and Dave were distributing numbers that undercut what her client had just told the workshop. Naider himself also approached Rob and Dave, asking why they were picking on WhenU were there were plenty of worse actors out there. What WhenU's official response to Rob and  Dave's survey will be is not yet known.<br><br>WhenU had a bad day all around. After Avi Naider's appearance on the first panel, things went quickly downhill from there. The low point for WhenU must have come during Panel 3, when Chris Jay Hoofnagle from the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC.org) pointed out that Ben Edelman's research, which reported the results of some extremely clever and tenacious packet sniffing, raised the prospect that WhenU was violating its own privacy policy by collecting and transmitting certain personally sensitive data. See Ben Edelman's research results here:<br><br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/040319edelman.pdf" >www.ftc.gov/os/comments/spyware/&middot;&middot;&middot;lman.pdf</A><br><br>The fourth panel (industry self-regulation) was almost as bad as the first. Most of the  panelists simply talked about what a wonderful success previous self-regulatory efforts had been (privacy polices, P3P, et al), and insisted that the industry be given the time to address the problems of spyware itself.<br><br>Beyond the first and fourth panels, though, things went rather well for those hoping to get Washington's attention on this issue. A number of panelists on the second, third, and fifth panels effectively described the problems with spyware and the great difficulties that consumers face in trying to prevent spyware from being installed on their computers or removing after it is installed.<br><br>Audience members (including this author) were allowed to put questions to the panelists, but we had to do so via question cards submitted to an FTC employee for vetting. Of the five questions I submitted over the course of the day, one was accepted and read to one of the  panels. (I asked how panelists could place such faith in consumer education when 10 plus years of education on viruses and antivirus software has been a demonstrable failure. None of the panelists addressed the question square-on.) Some of the other anti-spyware folks got some of their own questions accepted as well, though the answers they received were often less than responsive.<br><br>I must say that the nicest part of this past few days has been meeting with and talking with  the many anti-spyware folks who attended. Rob Cheng and Dave Methvin of PC Pitstop organized  an informal get together on Sunday afternoon/evening. In attendance were Paul Laudanski of  Computer Cops, Mike Healan of SpywareInfo, Bill Pytlovany of WinPatrol, Steve Reutter of  Pest Patrol, and Ben Edelman, the Harvard grad student who's done several important studies  of GAIN's and WhenU's advertising software. Our conversation was lively and productive. On  Monday I got to meet Michael Wood of Lavasoft and several folks from WebRoot (makers of  SpySweeper). Needless to say that I found all of these folks to be great fun and right sharp -- just the kinds of people you'd love to spend many hours hanging out with. Too bad it had to end so soon.<br><br>I've really not much more time to post right now. I'll have to save other comments (and  answers to questions that any of you might have) for a later time. The FTC will be posting transcripts of today's sessions in roughly 10 days time. Also, the FTC plans to issue a  report in response to today's workshop. And be sure to check out Bill Pytlovany's blog from the workshop here:<br><br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://www.mysteryware.com/blog.html" >www.mysteryware.com/blog.html</A><br><br>He's even got a photo of Panel 1 (with WhenU's Avi Naider).<br><br>If you do have any questions about today's workshop, feel free to post them here. I'll try  to answer them as soon as possible. Perhaps some of the other attendees would care to pitch  in with their own observations and reactions.<br><br>Best,<br><br>Eric L. Howes]]></description>
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<pubDate>Mon, 19 Apr 2004 21:55:01 EDT</pubDate>
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