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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough in Security</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/r20038940</link>
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<language>en</language>
<pubDate>Wed, 02 Dec 2009 08:53:46 EDT</pubDate>
<lastBuildDate>Wed, 02 Dec 2009 08:53:46 EDT</lastBuildDate>

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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20053479</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/586276"><b>premio</b></A> : <div class="bquote"><small>said by  Daniel <A HREF="/useremail/u/168087"><IMG SRC="http://i.dslr.net/bb/profile.gif" ALT="See Profile" BORDER=0 WIDTH=16 HEIGHT=11></A> :</small><br><br><div class="bquote"><small>said by  premio <A HREF="/useremail/u/586276"><IMG SRC="http://i.dslr.net/bb/profile.gif" ALT="See Profile" BORDER=0 WIDTH=16 HEIGHT=11></A> :</small><br><br><div class="bquote"><small>said by  Daniel <A HREF="/useremail/u/168087"><IMG SRC="http://i.dslr.net/bb/profile.gif" ALT="See Profile" BORDER=0 WIDTH=16 HEIGHT=11></A>  :</small><br><br>Risk to home users: LOW<br>Risk to most corporate users: LOW<br>Risk to some very specific users in certain industries: MED to HIGH<br> </div>I disagree with the most corporate users rating. This method is so easy that a script kiddie will be able to do this in months.</div>But they still need the recently-logged-into corporate asset before they can even try. That's the point -- it's two pieces. They need the know-how PLUS physical access.<br><br>Not only that, but in a few months most vendors will have built controls into their products that reduce the risk even further.<br> </div>Physical access to an important laptop is INCREDIBLY easy if you rae a malicous entity who has already engineered your way into working for the target company.  I've seen executives leave their laptops on, and locked, with noone around for hours on end.  The chance gets more remote outside of the office, but still there.  Until this announcement I for one had always hybernated my laptop when traveling back and forth.  <br><br>Curious to how they will mitigate it.  The programmers example about keeping track of where memory dynamically moves information to is impossible?  Won't they have to go to hardware USB dongles?]]></description>
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<pubDate>Sun, 24 Feb 2008 13:03:16 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20052511</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/168087"><b>Daniel</b></A> : <div class="bquote"><small>said by  jig <A HREF="/useremail/u/279131"><IMG SRC="http://i.dslr.net/bb/profile.gif" ALT="See Profile" BORDER=0 WIDTH=16 HEIGHT=11></A> :</small><br><br><div class="bquote"><small>said by  Daniel <A HREF="/useremail/u/168087"><IMG SRC="http://i.dslr.net/bb/profile.gif" ALT="See Profile" BORDER=0 WIDTH=16 HEIGHT=11></A>  :</small><br><br>Not only that, but in a few months most vendors will have built controls into their products that reduce the risk even further.<br> </div> pthpt. i bet not. the problem has been around for decades.</div>True, but without this kind of attention and an environment where vendors who are so enthusiastic about outdoing each other.<br><small>--<br><A HREF="http://dmiessler.com">dmiessler.com</a> -- grep understanding knowledge</a></small>]]></description>
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<pubDate>Sun, 24 Feb 2008 09:07:56 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20052190</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/444625"><b>jansson_mark</b></A> : <div class="bquote"><small>said by  swhx7 <A HREF="/useremail/u/1376598"><IMG SRC="http://i.dslr.net/bb/profile.gif" ALT="See Profile" BORDER=0 WIDTH=16 HEIGHT=11></A> :</small><br><br>When I suggested, on the 2nd page, that this would solve the current problem (it could also be user-friendly, etc.) - you dismissed the idea saying it would be backdoored.<hr></blockquote><br>There is a difference in trusting onto ONE system (TPM) and trusting manufactorer X:s system (encrypted hdd).<br><br> <blockquote><small>quote:</small><hr>All this points to the question of how it can be verified that a hardware device - whether a crypto chip or a hard drive - is free from anti-owner subversions such as crypto backdoors or APIs for DRM. All I can think of is open specs, open schematics, and analysis by independent researchers.<hr></blockquote><br>Yes. And also, having many manufactorers who actually make different kinds of those systems also gives more security margin.]]></description>
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<pubDate>Sun, 24 Feb 2008 05:45:23 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20050582</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/279131"><b>jig</b></A> : <div class="bquote"><small>said by  Daniel <A HREF="/useremail/u/168087"><IMG SRC="http://i.dslr.net/bb/profile.gif" ALT="See Profile" BORDER=0 WIDTH=16 HEIGHT=11></A> :</small><br><br>Not only that, but in a few months most vendors will have built controls into their products that reduce the risk even further.<br> </div> pthpt. i bet not. the problem has been around for decades.<br><br>other than the DRM aspects of some encryption schemes, there always needs to be some way to get into the encrypted space when the user forgets their password. fuse-based schemes aren't going to work for that, but keeping all data online would. of course, keeping it all online almost precludes the need for a laptop in the first place. and, your password to online access is still sniff-able.<br><br>basically, i see this as a public service announcement in three areas: <br><br>1) for those who want to carry their laptop overseas, encrypting areas of your HD isn't going to be enough if you've been targeted for a search.<br><br>2) for those that keep other's private information on their laptop, for whatever reason, we have yet another way to point out how negligent that can be without some serious rules. at some point someone is going to sue over negligent safeguarding of important data, and a NYTimes article will be great evidence for "should have known".<br><br>3) for those that fear a laptop theft, the value of stolen laptops just got bumped a little. if the thief doesn't have to install a new OS AND can access whatever info is on the laptop, he probably gets more money either through collateral operations or in the outright sale (though no smart thief would keep the original OS for long, too many things like lapjack floating around).<br><br>it should increase everyone's vigilance in all three areas.]]></description>
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<pubDate>Sat, 23 Feb 2008 20:06:51 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20049968</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/1376598"><b>swhx7</b></A> : <div class="bquote"><small>said by  jansson_mark <A HREF="/useremail/u/444625"><IMG SRC="http://i.dslr.net/bb/profile.gif" ALT="See Profile" BORDER=0 WIDTH=16 HEIGHT=11></A> :</small><br><br>Im just wondering...<br>This is good example why hardware based encryption would be just soooooo much better alternative ... Why the heck there arent any hw-based encryption tools available that ACTUALLY WORK and are secure?!? </div><br>When I suggested, on the 2nd page, that this would solve the current problem (it could also be user-friendly, etc.) - you dismissed the idea saying it would be backdoored.<br><br>There have already been some proposals for hardware encryption on HDDs and other PC components - but the techie community has rejected them because of the obvious potential for the tech being used for DRM instead of security for the user. In fact, whenever there is some news of such devices being developed, it's clear there is more incentive for the manufacturers to sell the users to the copyright cartel than for anyone to look after users' interests.<br><br>So now you're the one proposing it. How do you answer these criticisms? My suggestion, above, was a chip with some of the anti-tamper characteristics of TPM, but with the user control that actual TPMs are designed to prevent.<br><br>All this points to the question of how it can be verified that a hardware device - whether a crypto chip or a hard drive - is free from anti-owner subversions such as crypto backdoors or APIs for DRM. All I can think of is open specs, open schematics, and analysis by independent researchers.]]></description>
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<pubDate>Sat, 23 Feb 2008 18:00:08 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20049924</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/168087"><b>Daniel</b></A> : <div class="bquote"><small>said by  premio <A HREF="/useremail/u/586276"><IMG SRC="http://i.dslr.net/bb/profile.gif" ALT="See Profile" BORDER=0 WIDTH=16 HEIGHT=11></A> :</small><br><br><div class="bquote"><small>said by  Daniel <A HREF="/useremail/u/168087"><IMG SRC="http://i.dslr.net/bb/profile.gif" ALT="See Profile" BORDER=0 WIDTH=16 HEIGHT=11></A>  :</small><br><br>Risk to home users: LOW<br>Risk to most corporate users: LOW<br>Risk to some very specific users in certain industries: MED to HIGH<br> </div>I disagree with the most corporate users rating. This method is so easy that a script kiddie will be able to do this in months.</div>But they still need the recently-logged-into corporate asset before they can even try. That's the point -- it's two pieces. They need the know-how PLUS physical access.<br><br>Not only that, but in a few months most vendors will have built controls into their products that reduce the risk even further.<br><small>--<br><A HREF="http://dmiessler.com">dmiessler.com</a> -- grep understanding knowledge</a></small>]]></description>
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<pubDate>Sat, 23 Feb 2008 17:50:54 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20049663</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/586276"><b>premio</b></A> : <div class="bquote"><small>said by  Daniel <A HREF="/useremail/u/168087"><IMG SRC="http://i.dslr.net/bb/profile.gif" ALT="See Profile" BORDER=0 WIDTH=16 HEIGHT=11></A> :</small><br><br>Risk to home users: LOW<br>Risk to most corporate users: LOW<br>Risk to some very specific users in certain industries: MED to HIGH<br> </div>I disagree with the most corporate users rating. This method is so easy that a script kiddie will be able to do this in months.  The Risk to corporate users would be medium, because although the probability is low that a script kiddie will also steal a laptop, it will occur because we all know young h4x0rs will do this; some just to try out this cool new hack.  If they feel guilty they can always return the laptop when their done and colect a reward.<br><br>Now that the ease is well known, a corporation will have a due digilence to fix the problem.  FISMA regulations require sufficient encryption, and now the risk to the company is the cost of negligence and not the actual risk of information.]]></description>
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<pubDate>Sat, 23 Feb 2008 16:56:11 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20049555</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/658856"><b>javaMan</b></A> : <div class="bquote"><small>said by  Shamayim <A HREF="/useremail/u/692752"><IMG SRC="http://i.dslr.net/bb/profile.gif" ALT="See Profile" BORDER=0 WIDTH=16 HEIGHT=11></A> :</small><br><br><div class="bquote"><small>said by  jansson_mark <A HREF="/useremail/u/444625"><IMG SRC="http://i.dslr.net/bb/profile.gif" ALT="See Profile" BORDER=0 WIDTH=16 HEIGHT=11></A> :</small><br><br>There are [a] dozen...NSABACKDOORED... versions<br> </div>How do you know?<br> </div>He works for the NSA and just thought he'd share.]]></description>
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<pubDate>Sat, 23 Feb 2008 16:33:35 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20049451</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/692752"><b>Shamayim</b></A> : <div class="bquote"><small>said by  jansson_mark <A HREF="/useremail/u/444625"><IMG SRC="http://i.dslr.net/bb/profile.gif" ALT="See Profile" BORDER=0 WIDTH=16 HEIGHT=11></A> :</small><br><br>There are [a] dozen...NSABACKDOORED... versions<br> </div>How do you know?<br><small>--<br><A HREF="http://www.whoisjesus.org">Who is Jesus? and Why it matters (to YOU).</a><br></small>]]></description>
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<pubDate>Sat, 23 Feb 2008 16:10:25 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20049076</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/1215698"><b>mikenolan7</b></A> : I think your risk evaluation is pretty good. The only place besides Starbucks where I think this may be a concern is in airports/train stations. A group could decide that a significant number of laptops there belong to business travelers. There might be enough machines with trade secrets on them that are in sleep or hibernate to make it worth grabbing whatever they could get their hands on and have a little shop nearby playing RAM games.<br><br>I would also be concerned about insiders being able to grab SSL/SSH machine keys at server farms without logging in. Many of the typical recommendations to protect those machines by not allowing booting from removable media, password on GRUB, etc. could be bypassed by removing RAM. I believe the keys are loaded whenever the server is running, whether or not anyone is logged in. Hot swappable RAM is a real risk, they wouldn't even have to power cycle the machine.]]></description>
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<pubDate>Sat, 23 Feb 2008 14:52:27 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20049073</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/444625"><b>jansson_mark</b></A> : Im just wondering...<br>This is good example why hardware based encryption would be just soooooo much better alternative. Think about it. Think about HDD with build-in encryption:<br>- Attach it to 5,25" slot like CDrom.<br>- To use it, you have to put in smart card to its own reader and type in PIN code (reader and keypad are in the same slot/device, easily accesible and visible). Without them, it doesnt even register to BIOS as hdd.<br>- Seed used for encryption is kept in tamper-proof chip on the device that kills itself if device is tampered. <br>- Encryption keys are stored encrypted in the tamper-proof smart card.<br>- Encryption is AES-Twofish-Serpent in XTS mode in both smart card and in hdd.<br>- Any time you take card off, the hdd goes down and becomes un-registered even from BIOS.<br><br>puff.<br><br>Why the heck there arent any hw-based encryption tools available that ACTUALLY WORK and are secure?!? There are dozen snakeoil-shitty-DES-ECB-NSABACKDOORED-POS versions available, but nothing thats actually secure and yet pretty easy to use.<br><small>--<br>My computer security & privacy related homepage &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.markusjansson.net" >www.markusjansson.net</A> <br>Use HushTools or GnuPG/PGP to encrypt any email before sending it to me to protect our privacy.</small>]]></description>
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<pubDate>Sat, 23 Feb 2008 14:51:57 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20048927</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/1140294"><b>Blackbird</b></A> : <div class="bquote"><small>said by  LanDroid2 <A HREF="/useremail/u/1127543"><IMG SRC="http://i.dslr.net/bb/profile.gif" ALT="See Profile" BORDER=0 WIDTH=16 HEIGHT=11></A> :</small><br><br><blockquote>Dave said  Then you or the CIO should be fired for gross negligence.  Put the records on a secured server in a locked room. There is then little concern about someone stealing the server RAM before it has had time to get cold.</blockquote><br>Hey cool, way to kick ass, but what you're really saying is anyone who puts data of any value on a laptop is guilty of gross negligence.  Is that realistic even if methods like whole disc encryption are used?  No!<br><br>Knowledge of this problem has already expanded from geeky security forums to the NY Times.  Stop the finger pointing and get on with solutions...  </div>I think what he's saying is more along the lines that anyone who puts "other people's data" on a laptop is guilty of negligence. It cuts right to the heart of a major part of the whole data security issue: who is responsible (and to what degree) for protecting OPD that has come into their possession, particularly sensitive and private data? It is hard to conceive of a valid reason for OPD to be on a laptop in the first place, especially a laptop that is taken out of the facility... that stuff should reside on the organization's secured servers - and <b>stay only</b> on those servers.<br><br>That keeping OPD strictly on secured servers is <i>not</i> currently a universal practice indicates clearly the pervasive casual attitude so many players have with regard to OPD. It's not <i>their</i> data - so its loss and the consequences will be somebody else's problem. That results in functional negligence. Excuses used: it's the thiefs fault... it's the airline's fault... it's the hotel's fault... it's the car-rental's fault... it's Microsoft's fault... it's the data subject's fault... it's somebody else's fault. It's the fault of everyone except the people who made the choice (and it <i>is</i> a choice) to expose somebody else's sensitive data to less-than-sensitive handling, either procedurally or personally. Personal convenience is trumping sound custodial responsibility.<br><br>The most critical "fix" for attacking this problem is to hold the custodians of OPD (at all corporate levels) legally accountable for mis-handling the data entrusted to their possession - including taking it where it doesn't belong on a mobile laptop. And that needed accountability must first start with the cultural and legal recognition that custodians even have responsibilities in this area. We have such a <b>long</b> way to go...<br><small>--<br>If God wanted us to work with electrons, He'd make them big enough to see...</small>]]></description>
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<pubDate>Sat, 23 Feb 2008 14:21:24 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20048604</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/658856"><b>javaMan</b></A> : Perhaps I've overlooked something but while WDE is the current fad, I don't see it as essential to good security and in a way, overkill.  In most cases, unless there is some special custom software on the machine, it is the data that really needs protection.  In my case, I use a PGP encrypted volume file to protect my critical data.  I mount the volume at startup and there is no key stored in memory to be at risk when the volume is unmounted--it is configured to unmount at sleep as well.  Even though the risk from this attack is minimal to most users, it seems more practical in general to use encrypted virtual disks to protect what really need protection rather than relying on WDE for the entire drive.<br><br>By the way, here is a <A HREF="http://www.pgp.com/newsroom/cold_boot_attack_response.html">response</a> for PGP users on the topic of this attack for anyone interested.<br><small>--<br>Woe unto them that call evil good, and good evil; that put darkness for light, and light for darkness. . . Isa. 5:20</small>]]></description>
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<pubDate>Sat, 23 Feb 2008 12:56:19 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20048389</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/156437"><b>dave</b></A> : <div class="bquote"><small>said by  russotto <A HREF="/useremail/u/214274"><IMG SRC="http://i.dslr.net/bb/profile.gif" ALT="See Profile" BORDER=0 WIDTH=16 HEIGHT=11></A> :</small><br><br><blockquote> Great news for police who grab criminals computers and can now get the encrypted data off. At least for a while anyway.<br> </blockquote><br><br>Not really.  If the criminals pull the plug when they hear the "BLAM BLAM BLAM Police", too much time will have passed.  If they don't pull the plug at all, the issue is moot.  Only if they pull the plug when the cop is right on top of them (and ready with some freeze spray) does it make a difference.<br> </div>Yes, exactly.  The sky is not, in fact, falling on most users.<br>----<br><br>There seem to be two cases where this is useful:<br><br>1) The system is shut down as soon as the physical attack starts, and is captured within a few minutes - the only place the 'secret' exists is in decaying RAM.<br><br>In short, this approach prolongs the data-at-risk window by a few minutes, nothing more.  As you point out, if they haven't powered off the machine, then this new attack is not going to be used.<br><br>2) The system is captured in a powered-up state but its defences cannot be pentrated (strong 'unlock' password, for example)<br><br>FWIW, in the second state, persuading it to hibernate seems like a more fruitful approach to attack than RAM transplantation.<br><br>Most laptops seem to be configured for hybrid suspend (sleep then hibernate), so I think they'll obligingly store those volatile RAM keys to persistent storage, which is much more convenient for attackers.  (And remember, we're dealing with careless laptop owners, so I don't think one can claim they'll have turned that feature off).]]></description>
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<pubDate>Sat, 23 Feb 2008 12:12:49 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20048319</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/1070900"><b>nwrickert</b></A> : <div class="bquote">The best scenario here is someone at Starbucks being identified as the head of XYZ corporation that holds highly sensitive information. A group of professional criminals track him, stalk him, and then steal his laptop and do the cold-RAM trick within moments after getting it.<br><br>Very possible, but not a serious risk for most users.</div>Yes, that was also my assessment of the risk.  It isn't anything I will be losing sleep over, but then I don't work for the XYZ corporation.<br><small>--<br>AT&T dsl; Westell 327w modem/router; SuSE 10.1; firefox 2.0.0.12</small>]]></description>
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<pubDate>Sat, 23 Feb 2008 11:54:43 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20048254</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/692752"><b>Shamayim</b></A> : <div class="bquote"><small>said by  TKJunkMail <A HREF="/useremail/u/594412"><IMG SRC="http://i.dslr.net/bb/profile.gif" ALT="See Profile" BORDER=0 WIDTH=16 HEIGHT=11></A> :</small><br><br>Great news for police who grab <strike>criminals</strike> suspects' computers and can now get the encrypted data off. At least for a while anyway.<br> </div>There, that's better.<br><small>--<br><A HREF="http://www.whoisjesus.org">Who is Jesus? and Why it matters (to YOU).</a><br></small>]]></description>
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<pubDate>Sat, 23 Feb 2008 11:36:22 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20047969</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/214274"><b>russotto</b></A> : <blockquote> Great news for police who grab criminals computers and can now get the encrypted data off. At least for a while anyway.<br> </blockquote><br><br>Not really.  If the criminals pull the plug when they hear the "BLAM BLAM BLAM Police", too much time will have passed.  If they don't pull the plug at all, the issue is moot.  Only if they pull the plug when the cop is right on top of them (and ready with some freeze spray) does it make a difference.]]></description>
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<pubDate>Sat, 23 Feb 2008 10:23:48 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20047870</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/168087"><b>Daniel</b></A> : Risk to home users: LOW<br>Risk to most corporate users: LOW<br>Risk to some very specific users in certain industries: MED to HIGH<br><br>So, the attacker needs to:<br><br>1. Have physical access to the system.<br>2. But not while the computer's been off for any significant period of time.<br><br>The best scenario here is someone at Starbucks being identified as the head of XYZ corporation that holds highly sensitive information. A group of professional criminals track him, stalk him, and then steal his laptop and do the cold-RAM trick within moments after getting it.<br><br>Very possible, but not a serious risk for most users. <br><br>The other issues arise from using sleep mode when sensitive data is in RAM, but that still requires 1) the theft, and 2) the high-level criminal group that both knows there's worthwhile data there and is able to pull off what they need to do.<br><br>And for the home user I just don't see much of a risk at all. Remember, the requirement is INDIVIDUAL targeting for a LOCAL attack. What criminal is going to take the risk of a breaking/entering or assault or even a vanilla bag snatch for a target that isn't guaranteed to have valuable data on it?<br><br>Thoughts?<br><small>--<br><A HREF="http://dmiessler.com">dmiessler.com</a> -- grep understanding knowledge</a></small>]]></description>
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<pubDate>Sat, 23 Feb 2008 09:48:12 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20047845</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/594412"><b>TKJunkMail</b></A> : Great news for police who grab criminals computers and can now get the encrypted data off. At least for a while anyway.]]></description>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20047845</guid>
<pubDate>Sat, 23 Feb 2008 09:37:10 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>The artworld anticipated this</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20047555</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/692752"><b>Shamayim</b></A> :  :)<div class="borderless"><TABLE WIDTH=95% align=center border=0 CELLPADDING=4"><TR><TD ALIGN=CENTER VALIGN=CENTER BGCOLOR=#FFFFFF nwrap COLSPAN=3 WIDTH=100%><A HREF="/speak/slideshow/20047555?c=1278599&ret=L2ZvcnVtL3IyMDAzODk0MC54bWw%3D"><IMG class="apic" BORDER=0 TITLE="48397 bytes" WIDTH=600 HEIGHT=436 SRC="/r0/download/1278599.thumb600~cf36be35cccc4075fa961c3344f6d42e/Surrealism_Dali_Persistence-of-Memory.jpg/thumb.jpg" ALT="Click for full size"></A><br>"Persistence of Memory" - Salvador Dali</TD></TABLE></div>]]></description>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20047555</guid>
<pubDate>Sat, 23 Feb 2008 07:18:38 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20047344</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/279131"><b>jig</b></A> : you can't copyright ideas.]]></description>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20047344</guid>
<pubDate>Sat, 23 Feb 2008 03:11:51 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20047106</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/1486194"><b>genewitch</b></A> : <div class="bquote"><small>said by  AB <A HREF="/useremail/u/1346679"><IMG SRC="http://i.dslr.net/bb/profile.gif" ALT="See Profile" BORDER=0 WIDTH=16 HEIGHT=11></A> :</small><br><br>Concerns about this very thing when using WDE (whole disk encryption) in the latest version of TrueCrypt. No easy solution, apparently.<br><br>I just use straight volume encryption with TrueCrypt, and have it set to not cache passwords. I also have Windows set to clear the pagefile on shutdown. I lose no sleep.<br><br>I'm confident that if anyone can find a way to fix this issue in WDE, it's the fine and brilliant folks at TrueCrypt.<br> </div>I run my windows boxes without a pagefile. And i'd assume that ram clears itself on a power cycle? One would hope. if not, the first person to come up with ram that clears itself like that would make a ton of money :-) (copyright 2008 Genewitch)]]></description>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20047106</guid>
<pubDate>Sat, 23 Feb 2008 00:54:57 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20046834</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/1127543"><b>LanDroid2</b></A> : <blockquote>Dave said  Then you or the CIO should be fired for gross negligence.  Put the records on a secured server in a locked room. There is then little concern about someone stealing the server RAM before it has had time to get cold.</blockquote><br>Hey cool, way to kick ass, but what you're really saying is anyone who puts data of any value on a laptop is guilty of gross negligence.  Is that realistic even if methods like whole disc encryption are used?  No!<br><br>Knowledge of this problem has already expanded from geeky security forums to the NY Times.  Stop the finger pointing and get on with solutions...  <br><br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/22/technology/22chip.html?em&ex=1203829200&en=fcb9fd1d351c8d5e&ei=5087%0A" >www.nytimes.com/2008/02/22/techn&middot;&middot;&middot;=5087%0A</A>]]></description>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20046834</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 22 Feb 2008 23:28:16 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20046815</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/214274"><b>russotto</b></A> : This vector doesn't really change much.  Security software already needs to<br><br>1) Ensure that keys are kept in non-pageable RAM<br>2) Make sure keys are cleared when they are no longer needed and<br>3) Make sure keys are cleared during sleep. <br><br>All this adds is<br><br>4) Make sure keys are cleared during (orderly) power-down.]]></description>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20046815</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 22 Feb 2008 23:23:06 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20046592</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/279131"><b>jig</b></A> : <div class="bquote"><small>said by Anon users :</small><br><br>Always Use 256-bit encryption, 50% foul is 128-bit secured :></div> i believe they're saying that isn't true... that once they have 50% of a key, they can get the rest in much less time than cracking a key of 50%*bit-length.<br><br>also, this attack really isn't against machines that have been powered off, it goes after machines that have been put to sleep or that use MS's new fandango vista secure crap. either way, 99% of the secure machines i've seen do not force complete shut down when the lid closes (executives hate that). <br><br>as far as the TPM - if a password is ever typed in while the computer is running something higher than DOS, i don't think there's currently a sure-fire way to erase any trace from ram. i suppose with some extension of the no-execute bit hardware, maybe you could at least segregate the area that needed to be overwritten, so that the process would be easier to control. ]]></description>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20046592</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 22 Feb 2008 22:34:23 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20046542</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/279131"><b>jig</b></A> : <div class="bquote"><small>said by  dave <A HREF="/useremail/u/156437"><IMG SRC="http://i.dslr.net/bb/profile.gif" ALT="See Profile" BORDER=0 WIDTH=16 HEIGHT=11></A> :</small><br><br>Put the records on a secured server in a locked room. There is then little concern about someone stealing the server RAM before it has had time to get cold.<br> </div> the problem is that users keep themselves logged in or have a copy of the access keys to the server on their laptops. large very secure firms use a personal pager-like device that updates the key every 15 minutes or so, but there's still a window. if they don't use the pager-key system, then the password/key could very well still be in ram.]]></description>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20046542</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 22 Feb 2008 22:25:20 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20046435</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/0"><b>anon</b></A> : There is really nothing to worry about... There is only a time frame of about 5 sec (5 sec, yeah, that's in the pdf, refer to the timing graphs of various models of computer tested) that 'they' might able to grab a 'partial' password that is 40 to 50% foul.<br><br>It really needs to be a 'JUMPER' that can warp in front of your laptop, opening up your laptop circuitry in less than 2 secs to spray the coolant...<br><br>Always power down your machine when not attended; 'Big Bang' on your front door, unplug your machine. That's it :)<br><br>Always Use 256-bit encryption, 50% foul is 128-bit secured :>]]></description>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20046435</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 22 Feb 2008 22:01:03 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20045226</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/156437"><b>dave</b></A> : <div class="bquote"><small>said by  amungus <A HREF="/useremail/u/1115065"><IMG SRC="http://i.dslr.net/bb/profile.gif" ALT="See Profile" BORDER=0 WIDTH=16 HEIGHT=11></A> :</small><br><br>Very valid points LanDroid2.<br>I like this idea:<br><blockquote>"Perhaps a script that automatically overwrites the encryption key in RAM every time you put it into sleep, hibernation, reboot, screen saver, or shutdown modes, forcing you to re-enter the key."</blockquote><br>---<br>that is actually a great idea...</div>OT: it's harder than you think. I once wrote some code that needed to do some stuff with a password. I figured I'd make sure I overwrote the password before returning the memory to the heap. It is close to impossible. As soon as you call any function you didn't write, you have no idea whether it made and destroyed another copy (that did not get overwritten). And given modern encapsulation techniques, you have no idea whether the password is even sitting at the same address from one moment to the next; an std::string can arbitrarily decide to reallocate itself.<br><br>Magnify that up to a real system and it mushrooms out of control.<br><br>Maybe the solution is to never put passwords in real memory. Keep 'em in the TPM chip ;-)]]></description>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20045226</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 22 Feb 2008 18:05:59 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20045218</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/586276"><b>premio</b></A> : <div class="bquote"><small>said by  dave <A HREF="/useremail/u/156437"><IMG SRC="http://i.dslr.net/bb/profile.gif" ALT="See Profile" BORDER=0 WIDTH=16 HEIGHT=11></A> :</small><br><br>Yeah, that's why I'm in favour of mandatory jail sentences for CIOs that are responsible for company procedures that puts <b>my</b> personal data on company laptops.<br><br>This is not a technical problem. This is a legal problem. The people who put you and I at risk are not held responsible for their actions.<br> </div>That is why California enacted SB1386 to allow for individuals to be liable as well as the company.]]></description>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20045218</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 22 Feb 2008 18:04:08 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20045199</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/156437"><b>dave</b></A> : Yeah, that's why I'm in favour of mandatory jail sentences for CIOs that are responsible for company procedures that puts <b>my</b> personal data on company laptops.<br><br>This is not a technical problem. This is a legal problem. The people who put you and I at risk are not held responsible for their actions.]]></description>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20045199</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 22 Feb 2008 17:59:44 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20045198</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/1115065"><b>amungus</b></A> : Very valid points LanDroid2.<br>I like this idea:<br><blockquote>"Perhaps a script that automatically overwrites the encryption key in RAM every time you put it into sleep, hibernation, reboot, screen saver, or shutdown modes, forcing you to re-enter the key."</blockquote><br>---<br>that is actually a great idea...<br><br>There is a foolproof method to protect against such a thing happening - turn the computer off.  Completely off.  Ram loses juice, end of problem.<br><br>Another solution, if using TrueCrypt (or similar software) - unmount your volume, close the program, and run a memory cleaner program.<br><br>This issue of being able to gather such info from RAM chips isn't very likely going to be used by a common thief - as others have pointed out. <br><br>The common thief, even if they are pretty nerdy, isn't likely to go through such lengths unless they have a good reason to.  <br><br>They're <b>FAR</b> more likely to be paranoid about a lojack or other method of tracking than whatever might be encrypted.<br><br>It's very likely that encrypted info on disk is still very safe from prying eyes... UNLESS the computer resumes from standby/hibernation/sleep WITH the encrypted information already opened up... THEN you might have cause for concern.<br><br>I still think the best practices should be shutting down the software AND the computer.  Not much chance of anything going bad.<br><br>Still, your idea of scripting a memory cleaner (after closing/unmounting etc... of course ;) ) is probably going to end up being a feature in future mem cleaners... if it isn't... it should be.<br>Bet someone is already working on it.]]></description>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20045198</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 22 Feb 2008 17:59:27 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20044990</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/1215698"><b>mikenolan7</b></A> : Data on laptops is a very significant issue.  Laptops with most of my personal information on them have been lost or stolen 3 times in the last 5 years.  Twice they were laptops that Human Resources reps from my former employer were carrying, and once was after donating blood.  So floating around out there are my (old) address, who I worked for, how long I worked for them, how much I made, my Social Security number, my education, my phone number, my nearest relatives, emergency contacts, and my blood type.  I don't even know how I can be sure I'm me any more!]]></description>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20044990</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 22 Feb 2008 17:22:42 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20044966</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/851790"><b>a_large_rock</b></A> : <div class="bquote"><small>said by  Anonymous_ <A HREF="/useremail/u/1027919"><IMG SRC="http://i.dslr.net/bb/profile.gif" ALT="See Profile" BORDER=0 WIDTH=16 HEIGHT=11></A> :</small><br><br><div class="bquote"><small>said by  jansson_mark <A HREF="/useremail/u/444625"><IMG SRC="http://i.dslr.net/bb/profile.gif" ALT="See Profile" BORDER=0 WIDTH=16 HEIGHT=11></A> :</small><br><br>Is there any way to easily overwrite old data in RAM?<br> </div>memtest86+  &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.memtest.org/" >www.memtest.org/</A><br><br>will over write it with usesless crap<br> </div>Memtest86 on powerdown would work. I remember reading about a company 20 or 30 years ago using a watchdog card to whipe system memory on a powerdown/power failure. I'm not sure how easy that would be on a PC today.]]></description>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20044966</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 22 Feb 2008 17:17:43 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20044652</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/156437"><b>dave</b></A> : <div class="bquote"><small>said by  LanDroid2 <A HREF="/useremail/u/1127543"><IMG SRC="http://i.dslr.net/bb/profile.gif" ALT="See Profile" BORDER=0 WIDTH=16 HEIGHT=11></A> :</small><br><br>Good for you, but the point is what if you are a hospital administrator with gobs of patient records on your laptop? </div>Then you or the CIO should be fired for gross negligence.  <br><br>Put the records on a secured server in a locked room. There is then little concern about someone stealing the server RAM before it has had time to get cold.]]></description>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20044652</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 22 Feb 2008 16:30:52 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20044583</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/1127543"><b>LanDroid2</b></A> : <blockquote>eljay001 said  On the list of things that I worry about, this sort of attack on my encrypted data is ranks at about 130498120947120958120958th on my list of concerns.</blockquote><br><br>Good for you, but the point is what if you are a hospital administrator with gobs of patient records on your laptop?  Or a political operative in a high stakes election campaign?  Or an informant for the FBI?  An attorney in an insanely expensive civil trial?  <br><br>For folks like these who could be direct targets, there should be foolproof methods to protect against these attacks.  Perhaps a script that automatically overwrites the encryption key in RAM every time you put it into sleep, hibernation, reboot, screen saver, or shutdown modes, forcing you to re-enter the key.  Princeton let this cat out of the bag, how about they get on the solution now, AY?  ]]></description>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20044583</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 22 Feb 2008 16:21:36 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20043891</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/972855"><b>ElJay</b></A> : On the list of things that I worry about, this sort of attack on my encrypted data is ranks at about 130498120947120958120958th on my list of concerns. :)]]></description>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20043891</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 22 Feb 2008 14:40:14 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20043849</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/444625"><b>jansson_mark</b></A> :  <blockquote><small>said by  darthboy <A HREF="/useremail/u/1515854"><IMG SRC="http://i.dslr.net/bb/profile.gif" ALT="See Profile" BORDER=0 WIDTH=16 HEIGHT=11></A> :</small><hr>With regards to the posts saying that a computer's POST will wipe out RAM contents:<br>that's presuming the malicious person plugs the RAM into another computer.<hr></blockquote><br>Actually, its presuming that user has time to restart computer and do the POST, BEFORE attacker can get physical access to the RAM chips in the computer.<br><br> <blockquote><small>quote:</small><hr>Surely there're standalone devices that are able to extract the RAM contents?<hr></blockquote><br>Yes, ofcourse.<br><br> <blockquote><small>quote:</small><hr>However, if a malicious person has physical access to your computer, it's no longer your computer anywayz.  :D<br> <hr></blockquote><br>That is poor quote. The point of encryption is to ensure that even if someone graps your computer, they cannot get the files. If you can have total physical security of your computer, there is no reason to use whole disk encryption or any other file encryption in the first place!]]></description>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20043849</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 22 Feb 2008 14:35:49 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20043815</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/1515854"><b>darthboy</b></A> : With regards to the posts saying that a computer's POST will wipe out RAM contents:<br><br>that's presuming the malicious person plugs the RAM into another computer. Surely there're standalone devices that are able to extract the RAM contents? Engineers, anyone? It probably depends on how much the data's worth before anyone would try this.<br><br>However, if a malicious person has physical access to your computer, it's no longer your computer anywayz.  :D]]></description>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20043815</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 22 Feb 2008 14:31:21 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20043706</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/586276"><b>premio</b></A> : WOW!  wonder if GuardianEdge is vulnerable.  I never realized these software products store their keys in memory that is so easily obtainable.]]></description>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20043706</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 22 Feb 2008 14:06:05 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20043360</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/1027919"><b>Anonymous_</b></A> : <div class="bquote"><small>said by  jansson_mark <A HREF="/useremail/u/444625"><IMG SRC="http://i.dslr.net/bb/profile.gif" ALT="See Profile" BORDER=0 WIDTH=16 HEIGHT=11></A> :</small><br><br>Is there any way to easily overwrite old data in RAM?<br> </div>memtest86+  &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.memtest.org/" >www.memtest.org/</A><br><br>will over write it with usesless crap]]></description>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20043360</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 22 Feb 2008 13:04:12 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20043310</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/156437"><b>dave</b></A> : If, however, like Markus you're worrying about Vay Eck attacks through the walls of your house, then I imagine you'll be taking this threat very seriously.]]></description>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20043310</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 22 Feb 2008 12:56:46 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20043251</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/1274901"><b>refused</b></A> :  <blockquote><small>quote:</small><hr>To reconstruct an AES key, we treat the decayed key schedule as an error correcting code and find<br>the most likely values for the original key. Applying this method to keys with 10% of bits decayed, we can<br>reconstruct nearly any 128-bit AES key within a few seconds. We have devised reconstruction techniques<br>for AES, DES, and RSA keys, and we expect that similar approaches will be possible for other cryptosys-<br>2<br>tems; we have correctly recovered keys from several popular disk encryption products.<hr></blockquote><br><br>wow<br><small>--<br>"Ubuntu" - an African word, meaning "Slackware is too hard for me".</small>]]></description>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20043251</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 22 Feb 2008 12:47:31 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20043241</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/530562"><b>ihaddsl</b></A> : <div class="bquote"><small>said by  jansson_mark <A HREF="/useremail/u/444625"><IMG SRC="http://i.dslr.net/bb/profile.gif" ALT="See Profile" BORDER=0 WIDTH=16 HEIGHT=11></A> :</small><br><br><div class="bquote"><small>said by  ihaddsl <A HREF="/useremail/u/530562"><IMG SRC="http://i.dslr.net/bb/profile.gif" ALT="See Profile" BORDER=0 WIDTH=16 HEIGHT=11></A>  :</small><br><br>sure, but how many people are going to <br>after each shutdown, reboot and let post run (*WITHOUT*) loading the disk encyption keys again when the OS boots up? </div>If they are smart they WILL do it. It they are stupid, no encryption is going to protect them anyway, so...<br> </div><strike>smart</strike>Savvy<br><br>The majority of users who are vulnerable to these types of attacks (mobile corporate workers) who have wde issued by corporate on their laptops are not going to have any idea that this is an issue unless corporate steps up and educates them on this (and even then getting people to put this into practice seems difficult at best)]]></description>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20043241</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 22 Feb 2008 12:45:58 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20043080</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/715380"><b>Maxo</b></A> : <div class="bquote"><small>said by  dave <A HREF="/useremail/u/156437"><IMG SRC="http://i.dslr.net/bb/profile.gif" ALT="See Profile" BORDER=0 WIDTH=16 HEIGHT=11></A> :</small><br><br>Yes, but leaving your PC powered off for 15 minutes before it gets stolen would seem to do the job just as well.<br><br>Which is to say, this is very interesting theoretically, but for most home users, I don't see any practical significance. We're talking about motivated attackers who have physical access to your computer and who arrive determined to capture your RAM content.  Maybe law enforcement will come equipped for RAM transplants in some cases.<br><br>Even for the laptop-in-car case, it requires motivation and planning. I don't believe that is a factor in most such thefts. Or to put it another way, if you've got data that's worth someone doing RAM scavenging, you should think twice about whether it's appropriate to leave it on a laptop in your car.<br><br>Just think "data security requires physical security" and you're protected. This new attack drives another nail (well, perhaps just a wire brad) in the coffin of the idea that someone can have your computer and not have your data.<br> </div>I think this is important for assessing your risk.  If you are Joe Shmoe like someone like me is, who has encrypted their data, which contains nothing more than some family pictures and school work, so if the laptop gets stolen they don't get that stuff, this isn't something you need to worry about.  If someone happens to swipe my laptop it's unlikely that the person is going to be a security expert who has in depth knowledge of cracking encryption.  It'll probably be some punk who saw a chance at a free laptop that they can sell for a couple hundred.  When they can't get it to boot, they'll probably just wipe it and start with a fresh, unencrypted, operating system.<br>However, if you are a spy carying state secrets, this is something you may want to be very aware of.  Of course, if you are such a person and you actually leave your laptop in a position to be stolen, you are a complete idiot.]]></description>
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<pubDate>Fri, 22 Feb 2008 12:11:47 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20043047</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/444625"><b>jansson_mark</b></A> : <div class="bquote"><small>said by  swhx7 <A HREF="/useremail/u/1376598"><IMG SRC="http://i.dslr.net/bb/profile.gif" ALT="See Profile" BORDER=0 WIDTH=16 HEIGHT=11></A> :</small><br><br>An encryption co-processor, with tamper-resistance like the TPM, would avert this problem.</div>Is it just me, but I from TPM I only get two particular words into my mind: Hardware backdoor.<br><br>I wouldnt trust any TPM to store my encryption keys. It just seems so perfect place to put all kinds of funky hardware backdoors and tempest-enhancing features in that TPM. No thanks.]]></description>
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<pubDate>Fri, 22 Feb 2008 12:05:16 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20043029</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/444625"><b>jansson_mark</b></A> : <div class="bquote"><small>said by  ihaddsl <A HREF="/useremail/u/530562"><IMG SRC="http://i.dslr.net/bb/profile.gif" ALT="See Profile" BORDER=0 WIDTH=16 HEIGHT=11></A> :</small><br><br>sure, but how many people are going to <br>after each shutdown, reboot and let post run (*WITHOUT*) loading the disk encyption keys again when the OS boots up? </div>If they are smart they WILL do it. It they are stupid, no encryption is going to protect them anyway, so...]]></description>
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<pubDate>Fri, 22 Feb 2008 12:02:42 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20043024</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/444625"><b>jansson_mark</b></A> : <div class="bquote"><small>said by  HA Nut <A HREF="/useremail/u/1006882"><IMG SRC="http://i.dslr.net/bb/profile.gif" ALT="See Profile" BORDER=0 WIDTH=16 HEIGHT=11></A> :</small><br><br>if a user cold boots, allows the PC to go through the normal BIOS POST test, and then does a shutdown without entering any passwords, would the RAM be flushed of any clues? I assume a re-boot would NOT be good enough, since the POST is not necessarily ran? </div>"Cold boot" doesnt have anything to do with POST.<br>You set the computers BIOS so that every time computer is started up POST is done, clearing the RAM from all traces.<br><br>Ofcourse if you just shut down the computer, the POST is not done until the computer is next time started up. Thats why you should not shut down directly, but rather reboot (to BIOS state, no reason to start Truecrypt etc. WDE), so that POST can be run BEFORE you actually shut down the computer.<br><br>Just do it.]]></description>
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<pubDate>Fri, 22 Feb 2008 12:01:22 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20042971</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/1376598"><b>swhx7</b></A> : An encryption co-processor, with tamper-resistance like the TPM, would avert this problem.<br><br><div class="bquote">Trusted Computing hardware, in the form of Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs) [22] is now deployed in some personal computers. Though useful against some attacks, todays Trusted Computing hardware does not appear to prevent the attacks we describe here. Deployed TCG TPMs do not implement bulk encryption. Instead, they monitor boot history in order to decide (or help other machines decide) whether it is safe to store a key in RAM. If a software module wants to use a key, it can arrange that the usable form of that key will not be stored in RAM unless the boot process has gone as expected [31]. However, once the key is stored in RAM, it is subject to our attacks. TPMs can prevent a key from being loaded into memory for use, but they cannot prevent it from being captured once it is in memory.</div><br>But imagine something like the TPM, but designed for bulk encryption and decryption instead of DRM. As with the TPM, the key could stay in the chip and only values derived by use of the key would come out. Even within the chip, an encrypted version of the key could be useless without a passphrase. But the hardware owner would have the ability to read/write the key by special procedures (thus avoiding the evils of Trusted Computing), and it would be designed to encrypt/decrypt unlimited data at high speed, offloading this work from the main processor. It could be designed such that the time to break into it without triggering a self-destruct mechanism would far exceed any volatile memory retention; and the non-volatile data would be useless without the passphrase.<br><br>I know that devices similar to this exist today - e.g. Intel puts an IPSec co-processor on some NICs. It could become a widespread security mechanism in future.]]></description>
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<pubDate>Fri, 22 Feb 2008 11:52:03 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20042862</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/530562"><b>ihaddsl</b></A> : <div class="bquote"><small>said by  jansson_mark <A HREF="/useremail/u/444625"><IMG SRC="http://i.dslr.net/bb/profile.gif" ALT="See Profile" BORDER=0 WIDTH=16 HEIGHT=11></A> :</small><br><br>Easiest way to clear and wipe RAM is to reboot and let BIOS do the "Power-On Self Test" (POST). It will read/write whole RAM three times. End of game.<br> </div>sure, but how many people are going to<br><br>after each shutdown, reboot and let post run (*WITHOUT*) loading the disk encyption keys again when the OS boots up?<br><br>It'll work for the truly paranoid, but not for the average laptop user, who is most vulnerable to these types of exploits]]></description>
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<pubDate>Fri, 22 Feb 2008 11:26:02 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20042705</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/1215698"><b>mikenolan7</b></A> : I don't remember where I got it, but I have a cheap little two piece laptop travel security item.  You put one piece in the bag with the laptop, and the other in your pocket.  If you get more than a few feet away, it starts beeping at you.  I would bet that more laptops get left somewhere, and "found", than get stolen.]]></description>
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<pubDate>Fri, 22 Feb 2008 10:57:21 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20042648</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/692752"><b>Shamayim</b></A> : Can't wait to read Bruce Schneier's evaluation of this attack.]]></description>
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<pubDate>Fri, 22 Feb 2008 10:49:36 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20042636</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/1215698"><b>mikenolan7</b></A> : Two important lessons here for most of us: <br>1. don't travel with your laptop in sleep or hibernate.  Shut it down.<br>2. don't ever leave your laptop running in a public place and step away (duh).]]></description>
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<pubDate>Fri, 22 Feb 2008 10:47:50 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20042623</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/243341"><b>nklb</b></A> : even better article on the subject with an actual demonstration: &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.news.com/2300-1029_3-6230933-1.html" >www.news.com/2300-1029_3-6230933-1.html</A><br><small>--<br><A HREF="http://www.linuxbasics.com/"> for all your Linux questions</a></small>]]></description>
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<pubDate>Fri, 22 Feb 2008 10:46:33 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20041850</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/156437"><b>dave</b></A> : <div class="bquote"><small>said by  HA Nut <A HREF="/useremail/u/1006882"><IMG SRC="http://i.dslr.net/bb/profile.gif" ALT="See Profile" BORDER=0 WIDTH=16 HEIGHT=11></A> :</small><br><br>To make sure a daft person like me understands... if a user cold boots, allows the PC to go through the normal BIOS POST test, and then does a shutdown without entering any passwords, would the RAM be flushed of any clues? I assume a re-boot would NOT be good enough, since the POST is not necessarily ran?</div>Yes, but leaving your PC powered off for 15 minutes before it gets stolen would seem to do the job just as well.<br><br>Which is to say, this is very interesting theoretically, but for most home users, I don't see any practical significance. We're talking about motivated attackers who have physical access to your computer and who arrive determined to capture your RAM content.  Maybe law enforcement will come equipped for RAM transplants in some cases.<br><br>Even for the laptop-in-car case, it requires motivation and planning. I don't believe that is a factor in most such thefts. Or to put it another way, if you've got data that's worth someone doing RAM scavenging, you should think twice about whether it's appropriate to leave it on a laptop in your car.<br><br>Just think "data security requires physical security" and you're protected. This new attack drives another nail (well, perhaps just a wire brad) in the coffin of the idea that someone can have your computer and not have your data.]]></description>
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<pubDate>Fri, 22 Feb 2008 08:28:35 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20041820</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/1006882"><b>HA Nut</b></A> : <div class="bquote"><small>said by  jansson_mark <A HREF="/useremail/u/444625"><IMG SRC="http://i.dslr.net/bb/profile.gif" ALT="See Profile" BORDER=0 WIDTH=16 HEIGHT=11></A> :</small><br><br>Easiest way to clear and wipe RAM is to reboot and let BIOS do the "Power-On Self Test" (POST). It will read/write whole RAM three times. End of game.<br> </div>To make sure a daft person like me understands... if a user cold boots, allows the PC to go through the normal BIOS POST test, and then does a shutdown without entering any passwords, would the RAM be flushed of any clues? I assume a re-boot would NOT be good enough, since the POST is not necessarily ran?]]></description>
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<pubDate>Fri, 22 Feb 2008 08:20:40 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20041756</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/156437"><b>dave</b></A> : This is <b>excellent</b> news. When I were a lad, you used to be able to power-off a computer, leave it for a day, power it up again, and continue running, since the core memory would have retained its content without power applied. Maybe those halcyon days will return!]]></description>
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<pubDate>Fri, 22 Feb 2008 08:02:39 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20041634</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/444625"><b>jansson_mark</b></A> : <div class="bquote"><small>said by Killer Max :</small><br><br>Executives of Microsoft said BitLocker has a range of protection options that they referred to as &#147;good, better and best.&#148; ....<br>...The Princeton researchers acknowledged that in these advanced modes, BitLocker encrypted data could not be accessed using the vulnerability they discovered.</blockquote> </div>You completely misquoted them, perhaps on purpose? The original sayes:<br><b>"That might include either a special U.S.B. hardware key, or a secure identification card that generates an additional key string. </b> The Princeton researchers acknowledged that in these advanced modes, BitLocker encrypted data could not be accessed using the vulnerability they discovered."<br><br>Without additional USB-plugged encryption devices and or smart cards, the Bitlocker IS vulnerable, as the example video clearly showed.<br><small>--<br>My computer security & privacy related homepage &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.markusjansson.net" >www.markusjansson.net</A> <br>Use HushTools or GnuPG/PGP to encrypt any email before sending it to me to protect our privacy.</small>]]></description>
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<pubDate>Fri, 22 Feb 2008 07:00:26 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20041502</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/279131"><b>jig</b></A> : ya know, they say that, but my guess is that they haven't tried yet.]]></description>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20041502</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 22 Feb 2008 05:13:04 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20041492</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/0"><b>anon</b></A> : <div class="bquote"><small>said by  amungus <A HREF="/useremail/u/1115065"><IMG SRC="http://i.dslr.net/bb/profile.gif" ALT="See Profile" BORDER=0 WIDTH=16 HEIGHT=11></A> :</small><br><br>I'm curious about one thing... why wouldn't Vista's "address space randomization" (whatever it's called...) do any good here?  Should that not make it more difficult to find the keys?  Could there be any way to sufficiently randomize it such that an analyst couldn't tell which pieces to put back together?  Granted, that'd probably take some serious work, but it seems like it might be one way of making things more difficult...<br> </div>Relax, it does.<br><br><blockquote>Executives of Microsoft said BitLocker has a range of protection options that they referred to as &#147;good, better and best.&#148; ....<br>...The Princeton researchers acknowledged that in these advanced modes, BitLocker encrypted data could not be accessed using the vulnerability they discovered.</blockquote><br><br>&raquo;<A HREF="http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/22/technology/22chip.html?ref=business" >www.nytimes.com/2008/02/22/techn&middot;&middot;&middot;business</A>]]></description>
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<pubDate>Fri, 22 Feb 2008 05:04:07 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20041328</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/279131"><b>jig</b></A> : almost everyone has post checks turned off, and further, almost no-one does more than sleep, not power off. <br><br>in addition, if you swipe the whole laptop and it's in sleep mode, all you need to do is bring it to another machine where you've turned off all post clearing and swap the memory (frozen, if you want).]]></description>
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<pubDate>Fri, 22 Feb 2008 02:23:48 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20041281</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/615773"><b>hpguru</b></A> : This has been a known issue for a long time. I first learned of it back in the '90s but I don't remember exactly. As I recall, most any good ram checker will mitigate the problem and some computer BIOS software can check ram during POST, over-writing it with zeros and ones.<br><small>--<br><b>15 Answers to Creationist Nonsense</b><br>www.sciam.com/article.cfm?articleID=000D4FEC-7D5B-1D07-8E49809EC588EEDF</small>]]></description>
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<pubDate>Fri, 22 Feb 2008 01:59:33 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20041206</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/1459613"><b>The Snowman</b></A> : <br><br>   Finally found time to read the pdf.....and to very quickly sum my thoughts up on this.......I definitely wont be lossing any sleep over this.....not so much as a wink.]]></description>
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<pubDate>Fri, 22 Feb 2008 01:22:15 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20041007</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/770196"><b>major marco</b></A> : Yeah, I saw this over at SANS.  Swa Frantzen did a write up on it. ]]></description>
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<pubDate>Fri, 22 Feb 2008 00:15:33 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20040851</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/634007"><b>SUMware</b></A> : Video presentation available <A HREF="http://citp.princeton.edu/memory/">here</a>.]]></description>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20040851</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 21 Feb 2008 23:30:11 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20040617</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/634007"><b>SUMware</b></A> : <div class="bquote"><small>said by  mikenolan7 <A HREF="/useremail/u/1215698"><IMG SRC="http://i.dslr.net/bb/profile.gif" ALT="See Profile" BORDER=0 WIDTH=16 HEIGHT=11></A> :</small><br><br>There is a software memory wiper called SMEM.  It was included in older versions of the System Rescue CD.  I haven't downloaded a copy of System Rescue lately, so I don't know if it is still one of their packages.</div>Yes, thanks. SMEM is one of numerous integrated Linux commands.<br><br>From <A HREF="http://www.sysresccd.org/Sysresccd-manual-en_Secure_Deletion_of_Data">Sysresccd-manual-en Secure Deletion of Data</a> <blockquote><small>quote:</small><hr>SMEM from the THC-Secure Deletion Tools ( see &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.thc.org/releases.php?q=delete" >www.thc.org/releases.php?q=delete</A> ) does a secure overwriting of unused memory (RAM)<hr></blockquote><br><br>For more information about SMEM, SRC, SHRED, etc. see:<br><A HREF="http://www.techthrob.com/tech/securedelete.php">Howto: Delete Files Permanently and Securely in Linux</a><br>smem - Secure memory wiper; used to wipe traces of data from your computer's memory (RAM)]]></description>
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<pubDate>Thu, 21 Feb 2008 22:45:38 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20040164</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/0"><b>anon</b></A> : After reading the coldboot pdf, the best combo to combat this side-channel attack is STILL 'a Laptop running WDE with Truecrypt 5.0a' :)<br><br>Imagine 'They' break in with WMD pointing to your head and You SHOULD HAVE unplugged your machine, what should 'they' do??? Rapidly remove your RAM from your machine and put it in a liquid Nitrogen container. Now that's the point why LAPTOP is better!!! Get a laptop that needs screws to replace RAM!!! Laptop motherboard is much hotter than your DESKTOP pc,  at least 50 C, data in RAM be GONE in 60 SECONDS!!!<br><br>Also, figure 5 in the pdf is an overstated example. a key is just 32byte long and the key schedule a little bit longer. While our cognitive skill let us visualize 'the lady', doesn't mean 'they' can construct a key with 45-50 bit loss, come on!!!<br><br>So Dump your copy of PGP; Use WDE with Truecrypt 5.0a!!! The Tide HAS CHANGED :)]]></description>
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<pubDate>Thu, 21 Feb 2008 21:14:49 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20039663</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/0"><b>anon</b></A> : What's worse IS some new machines HAVE so-called Turbo flash memory installed AND some new HDs HAVE flash memory bundled with their magnetic dishes... Those are the Dream machines for your adversary...PowerDown won't help... 'They' just read it OUT from the FLASH MEMORY!!!]]></description>
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<pubDate>Thu, 21 Feb 2008 19:55:20 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20039316</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/444625"><b>jansson_mark</b></A> : Easiest way to clear and wipe RAM is to reboot and let BIOS do the "Power-On Self Test" (POST). It will read/write whole RAM three times. End of game.]]></description>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20039316</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 21 Feb 2008 18:54:36 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20039292</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/1115065"><b>amungus</b></A> : Very interesting article SUMware.<br><br>This little part here almost made me laugh:<br>---<br>"Notably, using BitLocker with a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) sometimes makes it less<br>secure, allowing an attacker to gain access to the data even if the machine is stolen while it is completely<br>powered off."<br><br>page 13 - &raquo;<A HREF="http://citp.princeton.edu/pub/coldboot.pdf" >citp.princeton.edu/pub/coldboot.pdf</A><br>---<br><br>I'm curious about one thing... why wouldn't Vista's "address space randomization" (whatever it's called...) do any good here?  Should that not make it more difficult to find the keys?  Could there be any way to sufficiently randomize it such that an analyst couldn't tell which pieces to put back together?  Granted, that'd probably take some serious work, but it seems like it might be one way of making things more difficult...]]></description>
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<pubDate>Thu, 21 Feb 2008 18:50:53 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20038940</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/1215698"><b>mikenolan7</b></A> : Proves once again that physical access = owned.  <br><br>There is a software memory wiper called SMEM.  It was included in older versions of the System Rescue CD.  I haven't downloaded a copy of System Rescue lately, so I don't know if it is still one of their packages.  You would have to boot the System Rescue CD, then wipe your memory to go that route.  I have used it when completely wiping a machine.  In order for it to not stall and crash, I found that I had to set up a swap drive bigger than the amount of RAM in the machine (which System Rescue CD doesn't do on it's own).]]></description>
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<pubDate>Thu, 21 Feb 2008 17:50:05 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20038678</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/444625"><b>jansson_mark</b></A> : Is there any way to easily overwrite old data in RAM?<br>I mean, starting computer up doesnt clear the whole RAM or does it? Booting some lame Knoppix wont consume enought RAM to clear it from sensitive data either? What can you do - except wait and hope for best?<br><small>--<br>My computer security & privacy related homepage &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.markusjansson.net" >www.markusjansson.net</A> <br>Use HushTools or GnuPG/PGP to encrypt any email before sending it to me to protect our privacy.</small>]]></description>
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<pubDate>Thu, 21 Feb 2008 17:06:53 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20038634</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/530562"><b>ihaddsl</b></A> : <div class="bquote"><small>said by  The Snowman <A HREF="/useremail/u/1459613"><IMG SRC="http://i.dslr.net/bb/profile.gif" ALT="See Profile" BORDER=0 WIDTH=16 HEIGHT=11></A>  :</small><br><br>    Question:<br><br>    would encrpting the Paging File prior to shut-down/deletion be of any help to twart this ?<br><br>    <br> </div>no, that does nothing for the RAM which is the attack vector.  Similarly if you were to over write RAM on (graceful) shutdown, that doesn't help the case where the system is simply powered off forcibly. ]]></description>
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<pubDate>Thu, 21 Feb 2008 17:00:40 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20038622</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/1459613"><b>The Snowman</b></A> : <br><br>    Question:<br><br>    would encrpting the Paging File prior to shut-down/deletion be of any help to twart this ?<br><br>    ]]></description>
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<pubDate>Thu, 21 Feb 2008 16:58:16 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20037524</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/444625"><b>jansson_mark</b></A> : <strike>If they can get SYSTEM access to my computer when its running, well, ofcourse they can get the encryption keys currently in use. Nothing strange here. If SYSTEM could not get the keys, it could not decrypt anything I have in the system.<br><br>LESSON: Dont let anyone to get your box OWN3D while its running with crypto going on. And for havens sake, dont let anything write the encryption keys or passphrases on plaintext on hdd or other media!</strike><br><br>OK, I forgot this portion of the news:"describes is how to supercool the RAM chips with a can of compressed air held upside-down. Then the cooled memory can be physically extracted and inserted in another computer owned by the attacker."<br><br>THIS is a problem. Serious problem. We are used to believe that RAM is pretty safe, since when power is down, its content is gone. Well, it isnt. If someone can clearly find and point out what memory types are not vulnerable, PLEASE POST IT UP.<br><small>--<br>My computer security & privacy related homepage &raquo;<A HREF="http://www.markusjansson.net" >www.markusjansson.net</A> <br>Use HushTools or GnuPG/PGP to encrypt any email before sending it to me to protect our privacy.</small>]]></description>
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<pubDate>Thu, 21 Feb 2008 13:59:23 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Countermeasures?</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20037137</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/634007"><b>SUMware</b></A> :   <blockquote><small>said by C|Net :</small><hr>So what are the countermeasures? As I noted above, shutting down the system, zeroing memory on boot, and unmounting encrypted volumes are some options. The paper suggests others, including limiting booting from network or removable drives, better methods of putting a computer to sleep (perhaps involving encrypting the portions of memory with the keys to the file system), recomputing keys when they're needed to avoid keeping copies in memory, and hardware changes such as tamperproof or encrypting RAM.<br><br>There is one irony here. One Princeton Ph.D. student, <A HREF="http://www.cs.princeton.edu/~jcalandr/">Joseph Calandrino</a>, is listed as having "performed this research while under appointment to the Department of Homeland Security." Because this research lets them bypass filesystem encryption in some cases, police agencies are the most obvious and immediate beneficiaries of this research.<br><br>As early as 1984, the FBI Laboratory began <A HREF="http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/fsc/backissu/oct2000/computer.htm">developing</a> computer forensics hardware. And we know from the <A HREF="http://www.news.com/U.S.-keeps-PC-surveillance-under-wraps/2100-1023_3-272131.html">Scarfo</a>, <A HREF="http://www.news.com/8301-10784_3-9741357-7.html">Forrester-Alba</a>, and <A HREF="http://www.news.com/8301-13578_3-9834495-38.html">Boucher</a> cases how intent federal police agencies are in trying to find ways to circumvent the privacy that encryption provides. If the feds didn't know about these techniques already--remember, they were years <A HREF="http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/nsam-160/">ahead of everyone else</a> in inventing public key cryptography--today will be a very good day for Homeland Security.<hr></blockquote><br><small>[edit - added links]</small>]]></description>
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<pubDate>Thu, 21 Feb 2008 12:57:11 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20037118</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/1346679"><b>AB</b></A> : Concerns about this very thing when using WDE (whole disk encryption) in the latest version of TrueCrypt. No easy solution, apparently.<br><br>I just use straight volume encryption with TrueCrypt, and have it set to not cache passwords. I also have Windows set to clear the pagefile on shutdown. I lose no sleep.<br><br>I'm confident that if anyone can find a way to fix this issue in WDE, it's the fine and brilliant folks at TrueCrypt.]]></description>
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<pubDate>Thu, 21 Feb 2008 12:53:59 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20037117</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/634007"><b>SUMware</b></A> : <div class="bquote"><small>said by  OneHeart <A HREF="/useremail/u/588358"><IMG SRC="http://i.dslr.net/bb/profile.gif" ALT="See Profile" BORDER=0 WIDTH=16 HEIGHT=11></A> :</small><br><br>TrueCrypt is also on the list.</div>Yes. <blockquote><small>said by C|Net :</small><hr>The researchers say their technique works against Apple's FileVault, the BitLocker Drive Encryption feature included in the Enterprise and Ultimate versions of Windows Vista, the open-source product TrueCrypt, and the dm-crypt subsystem built into Linux kernels starting with 2.6.<hr></blockquote>]]></description>
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<pubDate>Thu, 21 Feb 2008 12:53:54 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Re: Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20037092</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/588358"><b>OneHeart</b></A> : TrueCrypt is also on the list.]]></description>
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<pubDate>Thu, 21 Feb 2008 12:49:18 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Disk encryption may not be secure enough</title>
<link>http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,20037057</link>
<description><![CDATA[<A HREF="/useremail/u/634007"><b>SUMware</b></A> : From <A HREF="http://www.news.com/8301-13578_3-9876060-38.html">C|Net News</a><br>February 21, 2008 - <blockquote><small>quote:</small><hr>Computer scientists have discovered a novel way to bypass the encryption used in programs like Microsoft's BitLocker and Apple's FileVault and view the contents of supposedly secure files.<br><br>In a <A HREF="http://citp.princeton.edu/pub/coldboot.pdf">paper</a> [pdf] published on Thursday that could prompt a rethinking of how to protect sensitive data, the researchers describe how they can extract the contents of a computer's memory and discover the secret encryption key used to scramble files.<br><br>"There seems to be no easy remedy for these vulnerabilities," the researchers say. "Simple software changes are likely to be ineffective; hardware changes are possible but will require time and expense; and today's Trusted Computing technologies appear to be of little help because they cannot protect keys that are already in memory. The risk seems highest for laptops, which are often taken out in public in states that are vulnerable to our attacks. These risks imply that disk encryption on laptops may do less good than widely believed."<hr></blockquote><br><br>It's complicated, so read the article and pdf.]]></description>
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<pubDate>Thu, 21 Feb 2008 12:44:55 EDT</pubDate>
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