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| reply to amigo_boy
Re: Client information Giuffre pled guilty. Had he relied on Dowling he probably could have beaten the conspiracy to transport stolen property count but not the unauthorized computer access count.
It's amazing the lengths this tag-team will go through to justify the bank's and judge's actions and to label copyright infringement as somehow dealing with "stolen property". The plain language of Dowling says otherwise.
"(a) The language of 2314 does not "plainly and unmistakably" cover such conduct. The phonorecords in question were not "stolen, converted or taken by fraud" for purposes of 2314. The section's language clearly contemplates a physical identity between the items unlawfully obtained and those eventually transported, and hence some prior physical taking of the subject goods. Since the statutorily defined property rights of a copyright holder have a character distinct from the possessory interest of the owner of simple "goods, wares, [or] merchandise," interference with copyright does not easily equate with theft, conversion, or fraud. The infringer of a copyright does not assume physical control over the copyright nor wholly deprive its owner of its use. Infringement implicates a more complex set of property interests than does run-of-the-mill theft, conversion, or fraud. Pp. 214-218."
When you're just emailing bits, there is NEVER a physical identity between the items obtained (whether lawfully or otherwise) and those transported. NEVER. | |
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| said by russotto: Since the statutorily defined property rights of a copyright holder have a character distinct from the possessory interest of the owner of simple "goods, wares, [or] merchandise," interference with copyright does not easily equate with theft, conversion, or fraud. The infringer of a copyright does not assume physical control over the copyright nor wholly deprive its owner of its use. Infringement implicates a more complex set of property interests than does run-of-the-mill theft, conversion, or fraud. I don't disagree with that. Copyright is a social moderation of otherwise common law property rights. If someone elects to transfer property using copyright (instead of, say, licensing to restrict what is otherwise a total transfer of property rights) it does become more complex. Infringement of copyright isn't covered under common law property rights (against theft). It's covered under copyright.
What makes this inapplicable to the bank is that they *never* released their internal memos and customer records under copyright. These continue to be governed by common law property rights. Even though copyright law applies to everything regardless of whether the author (corporation) affixes a copyright notice or distributes does not eliminate the author's (corporation's) non-statutory property interest.
In other words, it's apples and oranges. If I distribute a song under copyright (instead of individual licensed use) I can't consider my property to be governed outside of copyright's provisions. If I don't distribute my song under copyright, but a janitorial crew steals it from my office, I can consider it to be protected beyond copyright.
Mark | |
| said by amigo_boy:What makes this inapplicable to the bank is that they *never* released their internal memos and customer records under copyright. These continue to be governed by common law property rights. Even though copyright law applies to everything regardless of whether the author (corporation) affixes a copyright notice or distributes does not eliminate the author's (corporation's) non-statutory property interest. The common law property right applies only to the memos and records themselves. Not to copies of the memos and records. That's what the court was getting at when it stated rather plainly "The section's language clearly contemplates a physical identity between the items unlawfully obtained and those eventually transported". No physical identity, no stolen property. | |
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