Wisconsin Realizes 'Franchise Reform' Was A Con > As usual Karl cherry picks the facts....

But critics say Hebl's wide-ranging bill would harm the cable industry and prove a setback to the video competition law just as it is starting to work.

"It's so mindboggling to me that just when we're starting to see some of the fruit blossom on this tree, there are some people who want to chop the thing down," said Sen. Jeff Plale, D-South Milwaukee, a co-author of the 2007 law.

Table 3 reports the results of this procedure. It is clear from these calculations that SVF does not necessarily
lead to increased competition, which in turn is expected to lead to lower prices. This is the conclusion that the
newly published FCC report reaches as well. California and Michigan both experienced nominal and real price
increases in video services even while statewide franchising was available. Real prices (corrected for core inflation)
grew by 69 percent and approximately 22 percent for California and Michigan, respectively, over a twoyear
period. Commodity bundling by telecommunications companies and expensive infrastructure build-outs
by telecommunications companies (particularly Verizon) can lead to higher prices even when there is increased
rivalry. In this environment, the incumbent (cable) providers do not have an incentive to lower their prices,
since their rivals are raising theirs. Escalating prices can be the result of this type of oligopolistic competition.
In the case of Texas, real prices fell by 7.4 percent over the three-year period that state-issued franchises had
been attainable. There are several cable companies vying for market share in Texas. The FCC report shows
that overbuild by cable companies was the main correlative factor in the reduction of video service prices. In
addition, it is possible that the longer time horizon for competition to take hold in Texas allows prices to eventually
fall as competition heats up. Nevertheless, there is no one outcome in the data; the presence of SVF is
not necessarily correlated with lower video service prices.

Real prices do not correct for all of the systemic changes in the market for video. It is possible that higher prices
reflect higher quality services. That is, video service customers might be paying higher prices and getting
access to more programming—more channels. The price data were, therefore, corrected for changes in the
number of channels provided. The second page of Table 3 shows nominal and real changes of video service
prices, based on a rate-per-channel calculation. Interestingly, all three states see prices increase, with Texas
now presenting the most dramatic increase in prices. That would be the case if there was little movement in
the number of channels offered, while prices escalated. It should be noted that if changes in prices and the
number of channels in Texas are calculated from 2006 instead of from 2005, then the dramatic increase in
quality adjusted prices vanishes.

This quality-adjusted price calculation tells an interesting story about the markets in only three states. Yet,
what happened in the other states that have SVF? How do price changes in Minnesota—which does not have
SVF—match up with those in other states that passed statewide franchising laws? Table 4 presents a cross
section of pricing calculations from December 2006 to January 2009, even for those states that initiated SVF
in 2005. For comparison’s sake, calculations for price changes are included with those for states that have SVF
and Minnesota. The states are rank ordered from largest to smallest change in real prices on a rate per chanel
basis.

Interestingly, Minnesota’s real price increases during the two-year time period rank near the top.22 Yet there
are two states—California and North Carolina—that have even higher increases in video service prices. This
begs the question: Would statewide video franchising lead to downward pressure on prices in Minnesota?
Based on the analysis in this report, the answer to this question depends on which companies would enter the
market, the nature of technology utilized by the companies and the type of products offered.

said by Alakar:

There are also 12 states listed that show prices drops after passing statewide franchise laws.

...
It looks to me from this report that there is no solid conclusion that SVF lead to lower or higher prices. In some states prices have gone up, in others they've gone down. In some cases the laws haven't been in place long enough to show what the final result will be.